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Abstract 
This working paper includes a collection of case notes written by the national judges who attended the 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers (ENTraNCE Judges 2016). 
The training programme was organised by RSCAS between September, 2015, and June, 2016, with 
the financial contribution of the DG Competition of the European Commission. The case notes 
included in the working paper summarise judgments from different EU Member States that relate to 
diverse aspects of competition law enforcement. The working paper thus aims to increase 
understanding of the challenges that are faced by the national judiciary in enforcing national and EU 
competition in the context of the decentralised regime of competition law enforcement that was 
introduced by Reg. 1/2003. 
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1. Introduction 
Giorgio Monti and Pier Luigi Parcu 
Introduction 
This collection of case notes is the result of the final workshop of ENTraNCE for Judges 2015, held at 
the European University Institute in June 2016. During the workshop, national judges presented and 
discussed a representative judgment from their jurisdiction. This is the sixth such workshop. We find 
this a fruitful way of allowing judges to exchange their views on a number of procedural and 
substantive issues, and we hope this informal judicial conversation can be the catalyst for further 
discussions among judges in other instances. 
The case summaries and notes are assembled on an annual basis so that they may serve as an open 
access repository in English language of how national courts are handling competition law disputes. 
They serve as a snapshot of the use of EU Law principles in the national courts, and how decentralized 
enforcement is faring among the courts.  
The purpose of this introduction is to summarise each case note briefly as a guide for the reader so 
as to provide a concise roadmap of the issues that are addressed in greater detail by each case note. 
1. Scope of application of competition law 
Judge Goncalves de Melo Marinho (section 2.1) presents us with a case of vital importance for the 
relationship between EU competition law and other rules of law. The dispute arose when the claimant 
(i.e. a shareholder in a company) took legal action against the defendant company and challenged the 
company’s accounts. The claimant wished to obtain certain information from the defendant, to verify 
the truthfulness of the claims made. In this dispute that involved national company law primarily, the 
defendant argued that he was unable to share certain information about prices and profit margins with 
the claimant because they were competitors; the sharing of information could be seen as an agreement 
restrictive of competition.  
Two issues arise: first as the national court rightly noted, if a practice restricts competition under 
EU Law, then the supremacy of EU Law means that the practice is unlawful even if authorized under 
national law. Second, the assessment of whether the exchange of information between two parties does 
indeed infringe Article 101 required more reflection and it seems the court was too quick to agree with 
the defendants that the provision of information could restrict competition. In fact the case required a 
balancing exercise between shareholders rights and competition law, when a minority shareholder is 
also a competitor.  
The case law provides that one should first explain why a certain exchange of information may be 
harmful (e.g. facilitating collusion) and then explain whether the nature of the information received 
suggests that the effect is plausible. On the facts, we are not told whether the claimant and defendant 
dominate the market or whether there are other market players. Moreover, the information is only 
provided by one party to another. Thus, it is not clear in which way the sending of this information 
would be anti-competitive. Furthermore, the value of information in time tends to decay rapidly. 
Nevertheless, special caution should to be given to price and internal transfer prices, information that 
are very delicate from a competitive point of view. Indeed, as Judge Goncalves de Melo Marinho 
opines in his case note, the judgment seems to make it difficult for a firm to be a shareholder of a 
competitor and this seems to be in tension with the general right to exercise a commercial activity.  
Judge Baran’s case note (section 2.2) shows how a more clear theory of harm can be denoted. In 
this case three banks withdrew their services from a foreign client (Ackenta) that was offering services 
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in competition with them. The Slovak Competition Authority was able to detect the anticompetitive 
effects of the concerted refusal to deal and to explain why this excluded a competitor, to the 
disadvantage of consumers. Apparently, the foreign competitor did not have a regular license to 
operate in the country, but the court argued that, if this was a problem, it is for a public authority not 
for private firms’ agreements to enforce the law.1 
2. Procedural aspects of competition law enforcement 
Judge Costa reports on the issue of limitation periods (section 3.1). The specific case appears to 
present a clear violation of competition law by a dominant firm that uses also restrictive agreements to 
stop competition in pumice sale both in Greece and Italy. The unusual aspect of the case is that the 
Hellenic Competition Commission decided to issue a decision ten years after the infringement had 
come to an end. It is not clear what the motivation was behind such belated action: the conduct in 
question related to loyalty rebates, so it does not appear to be a novel legal issue where the 
Commission might have felt the need to clarify the law for others. The difficult issue that the Greek 
administrative courts had to face was the absence of a limitation period in the national legislation 
applicable at the time. The ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court draws on the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights and on EU competition law to determine that a limitation period 
must exist, on the basis that parties require legal certainty and that there was no justification for an 
action to be launched a decade after the last alleged infringement. The judgment is largely of historical 
interest for the specific issue, but it is a relevant reminder that a number of procedural matters require 
resolution and that national judges have multiple sources of supra-national law to draw upon to help 
determine how to devise effective procedural protection. 
Judge Karlsson (section 3.2) reports on a judgment on the rights of a competition authority to 
review electronic files that it has seized, ASSA AB v. Swedish Competition Authority. On the facts, the 
Swedish NCA had seized all the documents on the hard drives of the undertakings under investigation 
and had moved this copy to their offices. These had been examined to check for a specific 
infringement. Subsequently the NCA wished to review the electronic files in its possession again, for a 
different infringement, and submitted an application to the Stockholm District Court, which was 
opposed by the undertaking. The District Court, replying on judgments from the EU courts agreed that 
a second look at the files was justified, but this was overturned on appeal by the Market Court which 
took the view that as a matter of constitutional law the undertakings had a right to object, because they 
had originally only consented to hand over the data on the basis of another allegation. New legislation 
in Sweden clarifies the right of the NCA to review information that is stored digitally in the premises 
of the NCA, but Judge Karlsson takes the view that this does not alter the validity of this judgment, by 
which the NCA may not examine the documents again, on different grounds, absent the undertakings’ 
consent. 
Judge Mattheou (section 3.3) reports on Cyprus Telecommunication Authority v. Commission for 
the Protection of Competition. The procedural issue at play was whether the appellant should provide 
the complainant (a firm known as Primitel, who had made the complaint that led to the competition 
authority’s decision under appeal) a file that included confidential information. It appears that Primitel 
was taking an active role in the litigation. The administrative court of Cyprus held that on balance the 
complainant was entitled to a version of the submission that included confidential information, by 
balancing respect of confidentiality with the need for transparency in legal procedures. The Court 
relied on British precedents to illuminate the role of transparency and also sought support from the 
judgments of the CJEU. As Judge Mattheou rightly notes this approach is interesting but a tad 
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abstract: it might have been also helpful for the court to have explored whether the facts at hand were 
really needed by Primitel. 
Judge Kukovec (section 3.4) reports on a judgment of the Supreme Court of Slovenia that overturns 
a finding of infringement of the national competition authority with respect to a finding of bid-rigging. 
The appellant in this case failed on procedural claims, but succeeded on two substantive issues. First, 
the appellant showed that it did not have the economic pre-requisites to bid for the tenders that had 
been issued. Accordingly the appellant argued, and the court agreed, this company was unable to 
participate in an agreement or concerted practice to rig these bids. While hypothetically the appellant 
could have made a bid jointly with another market player, this was held by the court to be too 
speculative. Second, the court held that the national competition authority (NCA) had not explained 
why Article 101 should apply because it had not shown the way in which trade between Member 
States was affected. The NCA did not explain its claim as to why the cartel would deter bids from 
undertakings based in other Member States. However, this last element may appear somewhat at 
contrast with the low level test often applied even by the European Commission to assess the 
applicability of Article 101.  
Judge Stam (section 3.5) reports on Eleven flour manufacturers from the Netherlands, France, 
Belgium and Germany v. The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM). In this case 
the dispute concerned a request by the appellants to obtain the leniency file from the NCA. The NCA 
was reluctant to hand it over for the same reasons that were noted by the CJEU in Pfleiderer.
2
 In other 
words, that making the leniency statement easily public would undermine the NCA’s leniency policy. 
The Dutch court however ruled otherwise and held that the rights of the appellants to plead their case 
properly took precedence over the leniency policy of the NCA. This is an important ruling, which will 
be of assistance in many jurisdictions where balancing between competing interests in these cases will 
remain vital. 
Judge Baker (section 3.6) brings us a hub and spoke cartel where collusion among dealers was 
coordinated by a trade association. Her annotation is particularly valuable because in Ireland such 
infringements bring criminal penalties. This judgment (DPP v. Duffy and Duffy Motors (Newbridge) 
Ltd) is important because of the detailed discussion of the policy arguments for criminalization that the 
judge explores in details. While in this instance the sentence was suspended, the judgment signaled 
willingness by the judiciary to follow up with custodial sentences in future cases. 
3. Horizontal Agreements 
Judge Maravelaki (section 4.1) discusses an appeal against a cartel decision, which was unsuccessful, 
largely because the appellants queried a number of fairly clear provisions of antitrust law as applies to 
cartel conduct. Five Greeks milk companies meet to share geographical market and control prices, the 
meeting was clearly anti-competitive. It is consolidated jurisprudence that even a single meeting is 
sufficient and there is no question to gauge effects in case of such a hard-core violation. The obvious 
lesson here is that parties should avoid appealing unless they have some proper grounds where they 
feel the probability of success is high – in cases where the collusion is so self-evidently 
anticompetitive, the better grounds of appeal are normally procedural, as the substantive law on hard-
core cartels is now well settled, as demonstrated by the copious reference to CJEU judgments by the 
court. An interesting element to remark in this case is the fact that in an agreement by object the 
duration of the cartel has by definition no bearing on the measure of the fine.  
Judge Anttila (section 4.2) discusses a bid-rigging case in tenders for public property, where the 
main difficulty for the NCA and the court was in apportioning responsibilities among a group of 
companies, and whether the parent firms were liable for an infringement of the subsidiaries. The 
                                                     
2
 C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt (2011) ECLI:EU:C:2011:389. 
Pier Luigi Parcu and Giorgio Monti 
4 
court’s ruling that the parents were not responsible sounds a little surprising given that these were 
small undertakings and only few people were involved in the actions of the companies. However, it 
seems that the main issue was lack of evidence for the court to judge the appropriate relationship 
between the firms that directly orchestrated the bid rigging and those who owned these firms. 
Judge Tamási (section 4.3) reports on one of the biggest cartel cases in Hungary in recent years. 
Five tenders for university systems were altered by an agreement involving IBM, SAP and another 
local company. These companies together were even able to affect the tenders' contents. Fines were 
applied because these were severe and well documented violations. As in other cases of bid rigging it 
was not necessary to define the relevant market when the agreement concentrates on a specific tender. 
The learned judge notes how bid rigging cases are treated as very severe infringements of competition 
law and that the application of national competition law follows closely the principles set out by the 
CJEU in interpreting the prohibition in Article 101 TFEU. 
Judge Schlotter (section 4.4) identifies an issue that has plagued the German antitrust system. 
Simplifying matters somewhat, in the German legal system it is relatively easy for parties to avoid 
paying an antitrust fine by reconstituting the company that was found liable for an infringement in a 
new company. A 55 million € fines, like in this case, may well cause a restructuring of a company to 
escape previous responsibility. In the judgment under review, the Federal Constitutional Court tried to 
put a stop to this practice when the applicant in the case (Melitta Europe) was the legal successor of 
Melitta Kaffee: on the facts, the new entity continued the same business as the successor so it could 
not escape the fine imposed. However, it appears that some corporate restructuring techniques can still 
allow undertakings to avoid paying a fine and the legislator is considering ways of closing this 
loophole: in July 2016 the Bundeskartellamt set out a proposed amendment to the competition act to 
address this issue. 
4. Vertical restraints 
Judge Čuveliac (section 5.1) reports on a resale price maintenance case taken by the Croatian 
competition authority. There are two striking aspects of this case. First, that the competition authority 
imposed a fine on both the manufacturer and the distributor of the goods. This is unlike most cases 
taken by the European Commission where the fine is normally imposed only on the party that set the 
restrictive clause, and not on the party who accepts it. Moreover, fairly heavy fines were imposed 
notwithstanding the fact that the agreement had not been implemented! The reason given by the NCA 
and accepted by the court was that the fine was to serve as a general deterrent mechanism. With 
respect, this approach seems a little extreme taking into consideration that the adverse welfare effects 
of resale price maintenance are ambiguous.
3
  
Judge Stoilova (section 5.3) also reports on a resale price maintenance case. Again here, given the 
ambiguous welfare effects of these kinds of clauses one wonders why the Bulgarian competition 
authority is prioritizing this kind of case and whether it has a deterrence strategy in mind when 
selecting these cases. 
Judge Witters discusses the termination of an agreement between a motorbike manufacturer 
(Ducati) and a dealer/repairer, DD Bikes (section 5.2). The DD Bikes had been selling and repairing 
Ducati motorcycles for many years. Once the dealership was terminated, DD Bikes requested that 
Ducati supply it with parts and allow it to carry on as a repairer, but Ducati refused. The dealer took 
the issue to court. It transpired that Ducati would only allow persons to act as repairers if they also 
sold the bikes. At first instance, the court took the view that there was both an agreement restrictive of 
competition (Ducati was tying the sale of bikes to repair services) and an abuse of dominance (Ducati 
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dominant in the aftermarket for its spare parts). On appeal, only the abuse of dominance portion was 
upheld because the court took the view that there was no agreement between Ducati and DD Bikes.  
There are two concerns with this case. First, on the question of an agreement, it is possible to say 
that the effect of the Ducati sales policy with respect to the other dealers/repairers in Belgium is to 
foreclose market access to the repair market, therefore, a dealer/repair company can seek a remedy 
even if it is not party to a pre-existing agreement with Ducati. Second, on the abuse of dominance, it 
should be recalled that the Court in Volvo v Veng, on similar facts was much more cautious and 
required some detailed reflection before ordering the owner of spare parts to supply them to a dealer.
4
 
The secondary market power issue, in fact, appears economically much more nuanced than it shows in 
this clear-cut decision.  
5. Facilitation of collusion 
Judge Spera (section 6.1) discusses a case that follows from the liberalization of the legal profession 
where the Italian competition authority found that the Italian Bar Association had attempted to 
circumvent such market opening by restricting competition in two ways: by controlling the fees 
lawyers charged and by limiting the capacity of lawyers to advertise. It allegedly did so by issuing two 
circulars on its website to guide its members. Lawyers realize an economic activity and, therefore, are 
undertakings under competition law, their association is an association of undertakings, and its 
circulars may be restrictive agreements. On a close review of the facts the Administrative court 
discovered that the circulars that the bar association had made available regarding the fees on its 
website were put up in error and that it was probably clear to all viewers of the website that this was 
an error. Moreover, the court found that there had been no enforcement of this circular. Nonetheless, 
the circulars limiting advertising could reasonably be taken to be describing the association’s policy 
and they were found to restrict competition. As Judge Spera rightly remarks, the reaction of the bar 
association is a typical reaction of those whose protected market is opened to competition, and it is 
wise for competition authorities to enforce competition law actively in the years immediately 
following liberalization. 
Judge Wikberg (section 6.2) discusses a case about the Finnish Bakery Federation and its price 
recommendations, which appeared to be attempts to facilitate collusion in the retail price of bread. The 
Federation recommend all bakeries to raise their prices in the face of costs increases. However, a 
contemporaneous VAT diminution made difficult to actually raise the prices, but obviously even a 
concert not to diminish prices may be a serious infringement. The market court agreed that the practice 
constituted a decision of an association of undertakings. There are two interesting aspects of this 
judgment: the first relates to the question whether each annual price recommendation was a separate 
infringement (which on the facts would have meant that some of the claims against the Federation 
would be time barred) and here the national court makes ample reference to the principles established 
by the CJEU. A second issue which may be discussed more on the appeal which is pending at this time 
is how far the competition rules apply to labor markets and if this exclusionary rule is applicable on 
the case at hand. As judge Wikberg notes, this is not the first time an association of self-employed 
workers has been challenged, and it remains to be seen if this issue is addressed on appeal. 
Judge Visinskiene (section 6.3) shows us that occasionally a new, small and energetic competition 
authority, like the one in Lithuania can be the pioneer in certain economic sectors. The Eturas 
judgment is the first time a competition authority and the CJEU addressed collusion facilitated by on-
line platforms. The issue at stake is an email sent by a website administrator to all tour operators on 
the platform suggesting a restriction to maximum 3% of the discount which all tour operators, whose 
trips could be booked through the website, could apply. The national competition authority thus had 
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evidence that Eturas appeared to have started a discussion which would facilitate collusion and 
evidence of collusive conduct in the pricing on the website. It concluded that there were sufficient 
elements to condemn.  
On appeal, the court made a reference to the Court of Justice, whose approach was to suggest that 
the matter required cautious handling.
5
 First, the Court held that the presumption of innocence was a 
principle to be taken into consideration when assessing whether the travel agents could be deemed to 
have applied or even read the email communication. One can presume that members of a cartel hear 
information from others when they sit in the same meeting, but it is harder to make such a 
presumption with the method of communication used here. For instance, a rebuttal based on electronic 
behaviours would be acceptable, like not opening of the message. Second, the Court took the view that 
even if a party could be deemed to know of Eturas’ plans, it could still publicly distance itself from 
this collusive attempt and that to do so one must not communicate the wish not to follow the suggested 
prices to everyone. It sufficed either to communicate this to Eturas, or indeed by systematically 
departing from the terms of the agreement. The matter is now back with the national court whose 
judges will have to look closely about how to apply national procedures to cartel standards. This case 
is an important reminder that while the substantive law has been broadly harmonized, procedural rules 
have not been harmonized and it may be that these affect the outcome of cases across the EU. 
Judge Škrk (section 6.4) considers a bid-rigging case among pharmaceutical firms in some markets 
for prescription drugs in Slovenia. Four wholesalers used to offer the same price on prescription and 
non prescription items, they were condemned by the NCA for bid rotation and the first court 
confirmed, the Supreme Court confirmed that this was a violation by object and that the existing 
public regulation did not allowed or covered the agreement. 
This judgment is interesting because of the unusual regulatory background whereby the maximum 
price for the goods is fixed by a state agency and so prices are negotiated under the umbrella of that 
maximum price. It is also important to note how the court here, similar to other national cases, requires 
more evidence of an effect on trade between Member States before allowing the NCA to apply Article 
101 TFEU. 
6. Abuse of Dominance 
Judge Ramsjö (section 7.1) brings up a privately litigated case which has some similarities to the 
Google saga: Pizza24 Nordic AB v. OnlinePizza Norden AB. Both companies offered a service 
whereby consumers could order a pizza on their platform from any of the pizzerias that subscribed to 
the platform. Pizza24 alleged that OnlinePizza was the dominant platform and that it threatened the 
pizzerias that used it that it would cease to deal with them if they also utilized another platform. The 
main issue at trial was whether the market had been defined correctly. The Market Court was not 
satisfied that the claimant had brought enough evidence to exclude the possibility of a wider market 
(e.g. on-line sale of all kinds of prepared food) or indeed whether on-line sales were a distinct market. 
The case illustrates clearly the importance, but also the costs, of private litigation and probably also 
witness the fact that it is not best suited for settling novel issues. 
Judge Raycheva-Shekerdzhieva (section 7.2) discusses a set of agreements between the dominant 
natural gas supplier and its customers. What is interesting in this annotation is the different 
construction placed on the contract terms by the national competition authority and the Supreme 
Administrative Court at first instance on the one hand, and the Supreme Administrative Court of 
second instance on the other. While the former took the view that the agreements were abusive in 
requiring information from the customers, and in authorizing unilateral termination by the dominant 
firm in certain circumstances, the highest court noted that this kind of conduct was a normal way of 
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doing business having regard to the market context. The highest court placed much emphasis on the 
likely effects of the agreements and did not find the risk of harm to the downstream firms. 
Judge Henriksen (section 7.3) presented a case that addresses monopoly pricing. Here the Estonian 
court had an occasion to clarify that the scope of national competition law includes not only 
exclusionary practices, but also prices that harm consumers directly. It is the kind of case that the 
European Commission does not take often but it is to be expected that national competition authorities 
would be more keen observers of excessive pricing as these are more likely to be affecting solely local 
markets. 
Judge Correria (section 7.4) discusses a monopoly holding exclusive broadcasting rights for 
Portuguese Football League. The complaint was that it discriminated between the downstream 
broadcasters. Much of the litigation here focused on whether the discrimination was justified by the 
differences between the broadcasters, or whether it had no economic justification. 
7. Private Enforcement 
Judge Van Heel (section 8.1) discusses the duties of national courts in a follow on damages claim, 
related to an air cargo cartel on fuel surcharges and commissions discounts, where the Commission 
decision has been appealed to the General Court. The damage claim was opened in the Netherlands 
and other countries while the commission Decision was under appeal by KLM and others. This 
annotation is important because the Amsterdam court of appeal specifies that in this scenario the judge 
has a discretion whether to stay proceedings. Moreover the court took this opportunity to explain the 
kind of information that it needed from the defendant to be persuaded that the action should be stayed, 
which includes details of the points of appeal and the defenses it wishes to plead. On the facts, the 
litigation continued because the defendants did not contest the matter further, but the appeal to the 
General Court was successful.
6
 However the Commission’s decision was annulled on a technical 
matter, so the next difficult question for the national court is whether to continue the trial on certain 
points (e.g. applicable law) or stay proceedings pending a fresh decision. This illustrates the pitfalls of 
a litigation system where the claimants are likely to be out of pocket for a considerable time. A 
possible consolation is that interest payments may make the final award quite lucrative. 
Judge Farcas Supranu (section 8.2) discusses a follow on action in the Romanian courts where the 
claimant relied on a decision of the national competition authority. In the market for advertising mail, 
the Romania post, allegedly in a dominant position, gave rebate schemes only to one company. The 
discrimination begins to tip the market, and other companies asked for damages after the competition 
authority condemned the discriminatory rebate as abusive. The report indicates that much of the 
debate in this case rested on the standard of proof and on how the claimant may show a causal link 
between the unlawful discrimination by the dominant firm and the losses sustained by the claimant. 
Judge Swalens (section 8.3) reports that similar difficulties affected the Commission in its lawsuit 
against Otis in the follow-on damages claims arising from the cartel that the Commission had 
penalized.
7
 At first instance the Commission’s action was dismissed for lack of evidence of a causal 
link between the wrong and the loss. On appeal, the court explored issues of discovery, discussing 
what documents may be secured by the parties to afford the plaintiff the possibility of proving the loss 
it suffered. It remains to be seen how the court will rule. 
Judge Visokaviciene (section 8.4) discusses a case of unfair competition, where the defendant is 
alleged to have lured some of the plaintiff’s employees to work with it and has obtained business 
secrets and contracts. The plaintiff sought damages for the loss of business this caused. The report 
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notes how the matter was handled under Lithuanian civil law and the methods for assessing damages 
in these kinds of case. It is interesting to remark the difference between compensation rules in 
competition and in trade secrets or so, as in the second case the profit of one is the loss of the other, 
while in competition the picture normally is much more complex and nuanced. 
Judge Nõmm (section 8.5) discusses a case where a lawsuit about the excessive prices charged by 
the holder of an essential facility in the telecommunications market was settled successfully. The 
Estonian court established the key elements for a damages claim and explored the various legal 
options available to the plaintiff. The court established that leasing a cable conduit is different from 
leasing a line or other electronic communication services, but that, in any case, a wrong or poorly 
regulated price can be abusive (based on Deutsche Telecom CJEU precedent)
8
. In the end, the parties 
transact and the plaintiff that was asking the restitution of the rise in price apparently got a significant 
part of it. It is perhaps surprising that the matter was settled, given that normally it is very difficult for 
plaintiffs to prevail in excessive pricing cases, as some of the other case notes in this working paper 
suggest. 
Judge Ozimek (section 8.6) notes another damages claim, this time against the incumbent telecoms 
operator for exclusionary tactics taken against a new entrant. Being a complex stand alone case, as 
with many such cases, the court was reliant on economic experts for a number of technical matters, 
such as defining the relevant markets, calculating costs for the purposes of determining whether there 
was a margin squeeze and assessing the losses incurred by the plaintiff. One aspect the learned judge 
notes here is the scarcity of economic experts in a small State like Slovenia, making it sometimes hard 
to obtain independent advice. One wonders how far this is an issue that the European Union could 
address, by facilitating the identification of independent experts across the Union. 
Judge Milnarić (section 8.7) takes us to a different market, and again to the difficulties of litigating 
a stand-alone case. The plaintiff operated a pharmacy and she alleged that she was forced to shut it 
down as a result of abusive conduct by an upstream supplier. She had tried to rely on a decision of the 
Croatian competition authority but the abuse that had been established by the NCA predated the 
plaintiff’s loss. The plaintiff litigated without legal assistance and did not manage to establish the 
elements necessary to sustain a claim. Also this example confirms the high difficulty of litigating 
stand-alone cases. 
8. The Interaction of Competition Law and Regulation in the Telecoms Industry 
Judge Stefanska (section 9.1) comments on a somewhat unusual case, where an internet service 
provider objected to a customer’s terms for installing internet services. The customer was a housing 
association and the view was taken that this customer held a dominant position in their buildings. This 
is, to put it mildly, a somewhat eccentric market definition. As the judge notes, this is probably an 
issue that might be best resolved by sector-specific regulation which likely also explains why it is that 
the home owner has to assist the internet service provider. 
Judge Boerwinkel (section 9.2) reports on an important Dutch case (UPC v. T-Mobile and KPN) 
where The Hague Court of Appeal had occasion to explore in detail the question of excessive pricing. 
The judgment is important for considering the relationship between ex-ante price regulation and price 
abuse under antitrust law. As the judge makes clear in her discussion, what prices may be deemed 
adequate by the regulator is not the same matter as what prices are unfairly high as a matter of 
competition law. Regulation and competition act in different moments and with different hindsight.  
Judge Kranjec (section 9.3) discusses a case of discriminatory termination rates where the 
defendant charged a higher rate for international calls than domestic ones. The claim failed and what 
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this case shows, in common with those above, is the steep burden that the plaintiff faces in 
demonstrating that prices are unfairly high – in this case an economic expert was called to explain the 
working of the market and this appears to have been vital in explaining why the conduct in question 
was not restrictive of competition. 
9. Unfair Competition and State Aid Law 
Judge Cerón Ripoll (section 10.1) comments on a tax exemption that Spain wished to grant to a state 
owned enterprise that was active in the market for shipbuilding. The question referred by the domestic 
court to the CJEU was whether this tax exemption constituted state aid.
9
 The CJEU replied by setting 
out the conditions for assessing tax relief under Article 107(1) TFEU, and the Spanish court then 
found that the tax break was indeed state aid on the facts. It must be recalled that most tax exemptions 
constitute State aid, since any selective tax break can only be treated as valid if there is an objective 
reason for preferential tax treatment. 
Enrique Gabaldón (section 10.2) discusses a case that tests the borderline between EU law and 
national law. The dispute arose when Spanish TV operators objected to a law requiring them to invest 
a certain amount of their profits into producing European films and a percentage of that into producing 
Spanish language films. The aim was the preservation of national culture, but the parties did not agree 
to this constraint. The challenge to this rule under State aid law failed because the resources did not 
come from the State (following the well-established rule in Preussen Elektra).
10
 The parties also 
considered that the national law was contrary to other provisions of European Union Law as well as 
contrary to Spanish Constitutional Law. As the case note makes clear, the case is pending, and it not 
impossible that the measure, while authorized under EU Law, is finally found to infringe national law, 
in particular Article 38 of the Spanish Constitution which guarantees freedom of enterprise.
 11
 
Judge Rosalinova (section 10.3) discusses misleading advertising. The tricky aspect of these cases 
is that the defendants try and take advantage of consumers by advertising in such a way that the 
consumer’s expectations are greater than what the defendant offers in reality. Here the advertising 
campaign suggested that all goods on sale were discounted by a significant amount; hidden discreetly 
in the advertisement was a qualification that the discounts were only applicable to selected goods. 
However, the consumer did not have a reasonable chance to become aware of this, consequently the 
NCA imposed a fine on the advertiser. 
Judge Berezovskij (section 10.4) discusses another case of unfair competition – here the issue is 
unlawful poaching of employees and trade secrets. This is a matter that is often dealt with exclusively 
under national law, and the case at hand afforded the national court an opportunity to clarify the rules 
applicable. One issue that might arise in subsequent litigation is how far these unfair competition rules 
may effectively be found to run counter to EU Law.  
10. Conclusion 
A number of general themes emerge from these case notes. The most important one in our view is that 
national courts are contributing to the development of EU competition law in a significant manner. 
This is because a number of issues are likely to come up at national level before they are tested by the 
EU Commission, interesting instance in the cases we summarized are discussions on the seizure of 
economic data or the facilitation of collusion by platforms. In these settings national courts can 
                                                     
9
 Case C-522/13, Ministerio de Defensa and Navantia SA v Concello de Ferrol (2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2262. 
10
 Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG (2001) ECLI:EU:C:2001:160. 
11
 Case C-222/07, Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) v Administración General del Estado (2009) 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:124. 
Pier Luigi Parcu and Giorgio Monti 
10 
provide useful answers for all jurisdictions. This is so in particular because the national courts will 
strive to secure a balance between effective enforcement and fundamental rights, especially in issues 
of procedure. Other national courts should consider these judgments persuasive. In other instances 
national courts can help in developing the case law of the CJEU on particular kinds of abusive 
conduct, like refusals to deal in the Dutch case noted above (section 5.2) or cases of excessive pricing 
that have a marked local dimension but can find a wider interpretation and definition.  
National courts have also revealed that a searching inquiry will be made of whether an effect on 
trade exists before concluding that EU Law will apply in parallel with national law. The level of the 
test may appear to be more accurate or restrictive than what is traditionally done by the European 
instances. National courts will also be vital in shaping private enforcement, and the judgments under 
review reveal that a number of procedural matters will require clarification even after the 
implementation of the Damages Directive.
12
 
It is encouraging to see that NCAs often prioritize the right kinds of cases (e.g. bid rigging or 
exclusionary practices by former monopolies), but this is balanced by the fact that some agencies still 
seem to take too aggressive a stance against vertical restraints on which economic reasoning about the 
welfare consequences is more divided. 
Finally, the cases have brought up a further issue for the EU Commission to consider: in small 
jurisdictions the number of experts that are able to testify is limited (see section 8.6 where this issue 
came up clearly). It may thus be hard to find an expert for both sides, or to be certain of impartiality. 
Might an EU-wide grouping of experts be generated so that these may move freely across courts? This 
might also facilitate further convergence in economic reasoning and ultimately in legal standards. 
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2. Scope of application of competition law 
2.1. Carlos Manuel Gonçalves de Melo Marinho (The Lisbon Court of Appeal) 
Court: Court of Appeal of Guimarães (PORTUGAL) 
Court Case: case n. 1/08.0TBVNC.G1 
Date: 20-11-2012 
Keywords: Annulment of a shareholders' decision; competition; rights to information; EU Law. 
1. “T.., AG”, a company with headquarters in Germany, came to a Portuguese First Instance Court 
asking, against two other companies, “D.., S.A.”, (DMP), with headquarters in Portugal, and “D.. 
ESPAÑA, S.A.” (DME), with headquarters in Spain:  
a. for the annulment of the shareholders' decision that approved the First Defendant’s Annual 
Report and Accounts for 2006;  
b. for an order imposing on the same Defendant the provision, without limitations, of the 
information requested by the Claimant in the general assembly of 27.11.2007;  
c. the awarding of an indemnification to be paid by the second Defendant, corresponding to the 
difference between the amount that the Claimant received as profit sharing and the sum that 
they would have received if the accounting had not been changed. 
2. To support its request, it said that:  
a. the Claimant is a minority shareholder, so cannot control or participate in the management of 
the first Defendant; 
b. even if being positive, the profits of that Defendant didn't seem to correspond to the real 
volume of its businesses;  
c. such a situation created the need for an analysis by a specialised company, which showed 
that it was accounted as in prior years there would be a correction of €102,919.00 related to 
adjustments under the pricing policy; and the Defendant was asked fort a justification and 
details of these adjustments. The information was refused on the grounds that the Claimant 
company was in direct competition with the Defendant for the same products and in the same 
market (the parties compete in the same market niche – the manufacture of steering wheels and 
airbags – and comprehend two of the three largest suppliers of this type of car parts); the first 
Defendant asks for prices that are different from the market prices in commercial relations with 
the second Defendant, which grants special advantages to this Defendant and causes damage to 
the Claimant. 
3. In its opposition, the Defendants said that they had given to the Claimant all of the the information 
requested, except that related to pricing, because this is a matter that cannot be revealed, especially to 
a competing undertaking like the Claimant. In possession of the information requested about the 
process of price formation, the Claimant could easily supersede the prices of the Defendants, thus 
taking for themselves the awards under tendering procedures. Moreover, the provision of that 
information violates the principles and rules of competition law. 
4. A judgment was given which dismissed the action as unproven, acquitting the Defendants from 
the requests formulated by the Plaintiff. 
5. Disagreeing, the Claimant entered an appeal asking to see the judgment repealed, submitting that 
the present case was not intended to prevent behaviours of any kind, but rather to judge the violation 
of the rights to information of the shareholders, pursuant to the Portuguese Commercial Code, where 
the provision of information requested by the shareholder can only be legitimately withheld if its 
supply may cause serious harm to the company or to another associated company, or lead to a breach 
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of the secrecy that is imposed by law. Nevertheless, even if this case were to deal with questions of 
competition law, the Court did not carry out a detailed technical analysis that might support the 
conclusion that the actual act of providing the information that was requested by the Applicant might 
imply a restrictive measure of competition; the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty (now Article 
101 of the TFEU) cannot, in any way, be defined in an abstract and automatic way, requiring instead a 
detailed analysis of both the subject of the agreement and of its capacity to restrict competition. It is up 
to the Curt to verify, taking into account the above indicated criteria, whether an exchange of 
information about the past, considering the peculiarities of the case, may have an important impact on 
the future performance of the company. It would not be possible to draw any conclusions on the cost 
structures of the Defendant from the information requested, taking into account the constant changes 
in the market and the technological developments. Final prices depend on many variables and factors 
that are specific to each company, to which must beadded additional costs that remain unknown. 
Purely historical information (that is, information covering more than one year) lacks strategic utility 
for businesses and does not fall within the scope of Article 81 paragraph 1 of the EC Treaty. 
6. The Defendants responded to the appeal, sustaining their previous positions and opposing 
arguments put forward by the appellant, especially noting that in a market with the characteristics of 
the one in which the Applicant and the Defendants operate, revealing detailed information about 
transfer pricing is an anticompetitive practice, since it would reduce the risk to the Applicant in the 
tender for supplies, to the detriment of the normal operation of the market and effective competition. 
The degree of historicity of information depends on the market and its characteristics; what matters is 
that the exchange of information can have an effect on existing or future competition conditions. 
The recent or historical nature of the information should be assessed with some flexibility, taking 
into account the extent to which data becomes obsolete in the relevant market. 
7. The pleas in law and the legal grounds for the decision, referred to AArticles 21(c), 288, 290(2) 
and 291(6) of the Portuguese Commercial Company Code, Article 4(1), 5, 6 and 7 of the Law no. 
18/2003, AArticle 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU), AArticles 
3(1) and 15(1) of the Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the opinion of the European Commission of 05.08.2010 
and the Communications of the European Commission from 27/04/2004 and 14/01/2011. 
8. The case-law evoked in the decision under analysis was: the CJEU judgments on cases no. 6/64, 
Costa vs. ENEL, 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma, 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd ., C-7/95, John 
Deere Limited, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber), cases nos. T-
202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 of 12 July 2001, Tate & Lyle plc. 
9. The Court of Appeal decided that:  
a. the corollary of the principle of loyalty that emerges from the commitment of Member States 
to the European Community, the principle of the primacy of EU law over national law, 
precluded an application of national law that is incompatible with the law of the European 
Union;  
b. the Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU are intended to protect competition in the market, 
preventing companies from restricting competition between themselves, or in relation to third 
parties, by coordinating amongst themselves;  
c. thus, an exchange of information that can be considered as a concerted practice that is 
capable of affecting trade between Member States, which is prohibited by Article 101 of the 
TFEU; and given the primacy of European Union law, this prohibition prevails over domestic 
law and makes inoperative the right to information claimed by the shareholder, a company that, 
in the market, is a competitor of that trading company;  
d. the file on transfer pricing contains accurate information on production costs, so whoever has 
access to it also gets access to information on the margin that is practised by that company; 
thus, given the confidentiality of this information and its essential importance to the company's 
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activity, it is legitimate to prevent a shareholder who is also a competitor from having access to 
such information. 
10. This decision justifies the following comment: this judgment is relevant since it makes an adequate 
affirmation of the primacy of EU Law, it shows and protects the superior degree of the interests that 
lie behind the EU competition rules and states that the shareholder's rights to information are not 
absolute, which occurs regardless of its motivation. With the same adequacy, it draws a flexible notion 
of the historical character of the information, declaring that the historicity depends on the 
characteristics of the market. In interpretative terms and for the effects of the application of Article 
101 of the TFEU, it shows that major difficulty can emerge at the level of the subsumption of the 
access to corporate information in the context of the mere exercise of a right to the legal notion of 
agreement “between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices” 
because, here, the share of information is not wilful and consensual, but it is obligatory by law. On the 
other side, it raises questions: these result from this judgment that a company acting in the same 
market cannot ever be a full rights shareholder? Is this against the right of the free exercising of a 
commercial activity? 
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2.2. Martin Baran (The Prešov District Court) 
Defendant: The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic 
Court of the First Instance: The Regional Court Bratislava 
Court of the Second Instance: The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic 
Court of First Instance: September 28th, 2010. 
Date of the judgment of the Court of Second Instance: May 22nd, 2013. 
Type of proceedings: review of the decision of the National Competition Authority  
Brief summary of facts of the dispute 
The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic initiated administrative proceedings in the matter of 
agreements restricting competition in the area of a common market in providing bank services in the 
territory of the Slovak Republic on the ground of a complaint lodged by a private company. By its 
decision, imposed on three big banks in Slovakia they were each fined €3,197,912 on the grounds of 
documents and other proofs that were gathered by the Office, which established the infringement of 
Article 101 Par.1 TFEU/ ex. Article 81 TEC/. 
Every bank provides, with the licence of the Slovak National Bank, cashless purchasing and sales 
of foreign currencies to their clients, who need to have a current account in the bank, due to the 
cashless character of the transaction. The currency conversion is included in the service at the 
exchange rate announced by the bank. Of course, there is a possibility for some clients to make an 
agreement with their bank about an individual exchange rate, if the condition of having a higher 
amount of money is fulfilled. The so-called “dealing” division of the bank is responsible for the 
operation. Non- banking subjects with the licence of the Slovak National bank for cashless purchasing 
and sale of foreign currencies can provide the same operations, but they need to have bank accounts in 
the same bank as their client, due to the enhancing of their business and in order to make it easier. 
The Czech based company AKCENTA CZ, as a non- banking company, provided services for 
clients on the cashless foreign exchange market. Their services were normally used by companies such 
as travel agencies, trading companies, and others who did their cashless financial transaction in more 
countries and in more currencies, with a better rate of exchange than that offered by a bank. The big 
advantage for this business was in having current accounts in the same bank as the client and 
company, due to the fast transfer of money and no further fees. 
In comparison to bank services, the services of the company AKCENTA CZ were provided to all 
clients, regardless of the amount of their turnover or due to other restrictions --for example, the 
minimum money transaction in a bank was Sk500,000 – €16,500, and the services were much cheaper, 
which was very important for their target group – small and medium enterprises. The Czech National 
Bank granted a licence for AKCENTA CZ to provide cashless transactions, and the company opened 
current accounts in more banks in Slovakia with the aim of providing its services in Slovakia too. 
In September and October, 2007, the three banks terminated their agreements in relation to current 
accounts with AKCENTA CZ by notice, and the bank current accounts of the company were 
cancelled. The company filed a petition to the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic, which 
launched the investigation of the case. All three banks were asked about the issue, but their answers 
were too vague and they refused to accept an agreement on the termination of accounts. They alleged 
unjustified business by the complainant, because they had a licence only from the Czech National 
Bank. More information was not published as this is a bank secret. The Antimonopoly Office realised 
inspections at the banks’ premises of all three banks and the findings, especially e-mail 
communications between bank clerks, clearly showed that during the period prior to the cancellation 
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of the accounts of the complainant a personal meeting was held with the aim of restraining the 
complainant as a direct competitor. Two other banks were investigated for similar conduct also, but 
the findings were insufficient to establish the restriction of competition and no measures were taken 
against them 
Summary of the administrative and judicial proceedings. 
Administrative proceedings 
The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic issued a decision imposing a fine in the total amount 
€9,593,736 in the banking sector for restraining competition. This was imposed on the grounds that the 
three banks made a collective agreement about the cancellation of the current accounts of a competitor 
with the aim of excluding him from competition. The decision was upheld by the Council of the 
Office, which decided on appeals and review decisions in administrative proceedings on November 
19, 2009. 
Judicial proceedings 
The first judicial organ involved in the proceedings was The Regional Court, Bratislava. The Regional 
Court revoked the decision of the Council of the Office on the ground that the facts of the case weren´t 
established satisfactorily. The Court stressed that the company, AKCENTA CZ, runs a business on the 
territory of the Slovak Republic without the licence of the Slovak National Bank and its organisational 
element in Slovakia was cancelled, so they run a business without permission, thus he couldn´t be a 
competitor in the relevant market for bank institutions. A competitor, pursuant to the relevant law, 
must be an entity which runs a business lawfully in the relevant market. The activities of AKCENTA 
CZ were illegal, so the banks were entitled to adopt measures leading to the elimination of these 
activities. As for the alleged internal meeting of the banks’ representatives, this meeting wasn´t held 
with the aim of making an anticompetitive agreement, but to protect their clients from financial harm 
caused by non-banking subjects, as had happened previously. The scope of the relevant market wasn´t 
proven, so the share of the complainant in that market couldn´t be defined satisfactorily. The 
Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (henceforth the defendant) appealed the judgment to the 
Supreme Court.  
Ruling of the Court 
The Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, as the appellate court, held in favour of the defendant and 
quashed the judgment and dismissed the suit. The reasoning behind the decision stated that it was 
proven beyond reasonable doubt that a co-ordinated procedure existed among the three banks to 
terminate the current accounts of AKCENTA CZ, and they had an agreement promising not to open 
new accounts for this company. The aim of the procedure was to gain clients from AKCENTA CZ. 
The Court pointed out that if the company took part in a meeting of an anticompetitive character with 
others companies, then it has the burden of proof to prove that his participation had no anticompetitive 
character and other participants were informed about its different reasons for participating at the 
meeting so openly, so that his participation couldn´t be understood as implied consent with the 
initiative. The company must openly and clearly disagree with the initiative, and the companies that 
participated must show, in an obvious way, their termination of the initiative. The bank didn´t meet the 
burden of proof in this case. The allegations of the banks, that the aim of their behaviour was to 
protect their clients from the unauthorised business of AKCENTA CZ, were not proven in the file. The 
unauthorised business of a company is entitled to be controlled and punished only by the competent 
organ of public control, not by a private company. The Court stressed that the imposed fine amounted 
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to 0.55 % of the turnover of the bank, and it was imposed at the level of the minimum scale allowed 
by the law. 
Personal comment 
This case, from my point of view, is relevant because the Court followed the ruling of the ECJ in the 
preliminary request. The question referred for the preliminary ruling was raised by The Supreme Court 
of the Slovak Republic in another case, but the matter of the case was the same as in the pending case, 
because it was the case of another participant in the same anticompetitive agreement. Both cases were 
pending at the same time. The Court stayed the proceedings until the ruling of the ECJ. By its 
questions, the referring Court was asking whether Article 101 TFEU should be applied to companies 
that had agreed on a restriction of competition against a company, which allegedly did business in the 
relevant market without a valid licence, when the licence is obligatorily stipulated by national law. 
The ECJ held that this fact has no impact on the evaluation of the behaviour of participants in a cartel 
agreement. In the light of the ruling of the EJC, the Supreme Court stated that the banks’ defence in 
relation to the illegal business of AKCENTA CZ is not relevant for the valuing of their conduct. It was 
obvious from the judgment, that the national judges had very strictly followed the ECJ ruling, which is 
very important in order to unify decisions in this area of law across Europe. The ruling of the ECJ was 
decisive to a different interpretation of the matter if compared with the ruling of the Court of the First 
Instance. 
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3. Procedural aspects of competition law enforcement 
3.1 Olympia Kosta (Court of Athens) 
Council of State ΣΤΕ 1976/2015 (Supreme Administrative Court of Greece): 
Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens 3793/2012  
Name of the parties: “ELSIMET S.A” “LAVA S.A” AND “The HELLENIC COMPETITON 
COMMISSION of Greece – (HCC)” 
Facts  
The case came about when Elsimet S.A –the complainant – who was denounced in the year 1995 to 
the National Competition Authority of Greece (Hellenic Competition Commission- HCC) that “Lava 
SA” continuously violated Articles 85 and 86 of the European Community Treaty, and that the 
national law no. 703/1977 (the competition law that was in force then, with provisions equivalent to 
101, 102 TFEU). The investigation of the case began ten years later, and the recommendation for this 
case took place in 2010 and the decision in 2011.  
Decisions of the HCC and ruling of the courts 
The Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) enacted decision 517/VI/2011 and found that Lava SA 
had infringed Articles 1 and 2 of Law no. 703/1977 and Articles 85 and 86 EC, which were in force at 
the time, by abusing its dominant position in the market for sales of pumice stone and by giving 
discounts to its clients in order to force them to buy almost all of its products. Most of the 
infringements took place in the years 1994 and 1995. HCC took the view that “Lava S.A” prevented, 
directly or by giving discounts, all of the Greek Competitors to its mother company “Hercules S.A”, 
from exporting pumices to Italy, and that through its contracts it forced all other Greek distributors to 
export all the quantities it gave them only to Hungary and to Sweden. This behaviour led to the 
withdrawal from the Italian Market of all Greek competitors to “Hercules S.A”. HCC also found that 
LAVA SA had also committed an infringement of Article 85 EC by providing its customers with 
discounts in order to force them to buy both large quantities and almost all of its products, and to 
prevent them from buying from other competitors from abroad.  
LAVA SA argued during the procedures that HCC had no authority to impose any fines or to 
conclude on the infringements and submitted a limitation objection under Article 25 of Regulation 
1/2003 and under Greek law. It claimed that, according to the Greek case law, a reasonable time for 
action against companies could be no more than five years from the infringement, and that HCC 
violated (in this case) the principle of legitimate public confidence. This was due to the long period of 
time that had passed. HCC overruled those objections and found that no limitation period was, then, 
settled by Greek Law, and that the limitation periods provisions of Regulation 2988/1974, were about 
only European competition law provisions. After finding the above mentioned infringements proven, 
HCC forced Lava S.A to cease them and also issued a recommendation to the accused company to 
omit such conduct, threatening to impose fines in the case of the continuation of those infringements. 
HCC took into account that a long period from the commission of the offences had passed, and that 
this product (pumice and wash stones) was no longer produced in Greece, and therefore found it 
appropriate not to impose any fines and just to make recommendations.  
Against that decision, Lava SA lodged an appeal to the Administrative Court, claiming among 
other things, that the right of the Competition Commission to impose fines and to declare the 
Community offences had been undertaken in the five-year limitation period that is found in Article 25 
of Regulation 1/2003. The National Competition Authority should also have acted within a reasonable 
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time, which could never pass the five years from the commission of the offences, as required by the 
safety-run, the protected trust and the principles of timely and direct management. They also stated 
that the timing of a 5 year limitation is provided by the new Greek Competition Law 3959/2011, with 
equivalent provisions to Article 25 of Regulation 1/2003. 
The Administrative Court of Appeal (number of decision 3793/2012) held that the question of the 
limitation of the powers of national authorities, when they were called upon to apply them in an 
anticompetitive practices case that goes beyond the national and also the Community’s competition 
rules, are left to the responsibility of Member States, in accordance with the general principle of 
institutional and procedural autonomy, which governs the actions of the competent administrative 
authorities when imposing penalties for infringements of the Community’s general provisions. In no. 
703/1977, which was in force at the relevant time, no limitation provision was included, while the 
five-year limitation period that is laid down in Article 42 of l. 3959/2011 (GG 93 t. A), is occupied 
only with the infringements committed before the entry of this law into force, ones which were not 
pending before the Competition Committee (Article 50 Section 6) and that this distinction is 
constitutionally legitimate and is not contrary to the principle of equality, as the appellant claimed. 
The Competition Commission, should therefore, in compliance with the principle of equivalence, 
observe the principle of a reasonable period, which (reasonable period) is estimated according to the 
circumstances of each case. Where there is a failure, however, this principle is relevant to the validity 
of the administrative procedure and to the decision, but only where it is established that the undue 
delay has had an impact on the ability of companies to defend themselves effectively, otherwise it 
simply implies a reduction in the amount of fines (T. 305 / 94 6. 122, C-238/99 6. 173, T-213/00 6. 
321, C-113 / O4 6. 47-48, C-185/95 6. 48-49, 141-142). In this case, as above, given its complexity, its 
importance, and the behaviour shown by the parties, the Court found that the proceedings before the 
Commission lasted beyond a reasonable period. However, it found that it has not been proven that this 
delay had affected the rights to a defence of the appellant, and also that the appellant merely claims 
vaguely that, for the above reason, it was impossible to find all those documents which confirmed their 
allegations and which proved that they did not commit the infringements. HCC also based its decision 
on data produced by the appellant (Minutes of meetings between representatives of the undertakings). 
In view of all of these, the Court concluded that the Competition Commission in the contested 
decision found the offences to be legally proven and limited itself - without imposing fines - a) to 
address to the applicant recommendation for omission of such behaviour in the future and b) to 
threaten to fine in case of repeating that behaviour. 
-Then Lava SA lodged a request before the Supreme Administrative Court (Council of State) to set 
aside decision No. 3792/2012 of the Administrative Court, claiming that, according to Article 25 
Regulation 1/2003 and Regulation 2988/1974, and according to the principles of legal certainty, of the 
stability of legal situations, according to legitimate expectations, of lawfulness and good 
administration, the infringements were time- barred and therefore the decision of the HCC was illegal.  
The Council of State, with decision no. 1976/2015, underlines that the principle of legal certainty, 
which is enshrined both in the Greek Constitution and in primary Community law as a general 
principle, requires, in particular, the clear and predictable application of competition law and that all 
provisions must be observed all the more strictly in the case of rules that are liable to entail financial 
consequences, (see CoS 144/2015, CoS 2034/2011, DEP 4/2013, DEC 8.12.2007, C-409/04, Teleos, 
45-48, DEC 16-9-2008, C-288/2007, Isle of Wight Council 47). As the Court underlined, the principle 
of legal certainty requires, in particular, that the position of the operator, having regard to his rights 
and obligations vis-à-vis the national authority, must not be open to challenge indefinitely and that, 
consequently, a limitation period must be applicable to proceedings, for the attribution of 
infringements and for the imposition of any of the discriminatory measures identified as applying to 
the operator. In order to fulfill its function of ensuring legal certainty, that period must be fixed in 
advanced (see C 201/2010, C 202/2010 Ze Fu Fleischhandel and Vion Trading, Para. 32), and be 
sufficiently predictable by the person concerned (ECR 9.1.2013, 21722/2011 Volkov v. Ukraine, Para. 
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136-140 ECR 3.3.2015, 12655/09, Dimitrovi v. Bulgaria. Paragraph 45-46, 56). Such a limitation 
should be reasonable and should permit effective control of compliance with the rules, without, 
however, encouraging any inaction by the Competition Commission, but it also should not leave the 
operators a long period of legal uncertainty and the risk of not being able to defend themselves 
properly against all categories after a long time period. It is therefore, as the Court underlined, not 
consistent with the principle of legal certainty that Law no. 703/1977 failed to predict a limitation 
period in relation to violations of Articles 1 and 2 of this law or of Articles of 81 and 82 of European 
Community Treaty. Further, in a case such as this, infringements of Articles 1 and 2 of Law 703/1977 
and Articles 85 and 86 of the European Community Treaty are attributed to the Appellant, the 
limitation rules set out in Regulation 2988/1974 should “by analogy” be applied. Such an application 
could have been sufficiently provided for by a prudent and diligent operator (see C 201/2010, C 
202/2010 Ze Zu Fleschhandel and Vion Trading, paragraph 35). and after all of those, the Council of 
State held that between the time of cessation of the temporally last infringement (31-12-1995) and the 
period of the beginning of the investigation of this case by the Competition Commission, which could 
interrupt the limitation period, a decade elapsed, a much longer time than the five years under the Art 
of Regulation 2988/74, which was in force then, and since the contested decision of HCC took place in 
2011, well beyond a decade (after the last offence) the contested decision is illegal and must be 
annulled. On those grounds, the Council of State annulled the decision of the Court of Appeal and also 
the decision of the HCC.  
Comment 
- We can see the diverging interpretations of the limitation provisions on competition law by HCC and 
the Greek courts and the implementation of the limitation provisions in Competition Law by the 
Council of State, as above mentioned, and we should notice that the Council of State implemented 
European Competition Law procedural provisions “by analogy” to a Greek case without asking for a 
preliminary ruling from the ECJ.  
-We should also notice that, in this case, it was not investigated by the courts (probably because 
there was no such an argument from the parties) if the HCC had a legitimate interest in adopting the 
contested decision (see Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003) despite the long period that had passed, for 
example the interest of discouraging other companies to adopt the same anticompetitive behaviour, the 
interest in clarifying the legal situation, the interest to enable the injured parties to bring matters before 
a civil court. It is true that HCC, in the contested decision, did not demonstrate a legitimate interest in 
finding that Lava SA had anticompetitive behaviour, but this was not investigated by the Court.  
Finally we must point out that there is no doubt that the limitation period was introduced in 
Competition Law provisions to insure legal certainty (see second recital in the preamble or R 
2988/1974 and Paragraph 31or the preamble of R 1/2003) and that legal certainty was not always the 
case in many Member States.  
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3.2. HELENE KARLSSON (SWEDISH MARKET COURT) 
ASSA AB v. Swedish Competition Authority 
Relevant national legislation 
Chapter 5, § 3 Swedish Competition Act 
The Stockholm District Court may, on application by the Swedish Competition Authority, decide that 
the Agency may conduct an investigation of a company to determine whether it has infringed 
prohibitions that are included in Chapter 2. 1 § or 7 § or in Article 101 or 102 TFEU, if: 
there is reason to believe that a violation has occurred, 
The company does not comply with an obligation imposed pursuant to § 1, Paragraph 1, or there is 
otherwise a risk of evidence being withheld or tampered with, and 
The importance of the action taken is sufficient to outweigh the interference or other inconvenience 
caused to those affected by the measure. Act (2010: 642). 
Chapter 5, 6 § Swedish Competition Act 
When the Competition Authority conducts an investigation it has the right to:  
a) examine the books and other business records; 
b) take copies of or extracts from the books and business records; 
c) ask for oral explanations on the spot, and 
d) have access to premises, land, means of transport and other areas. 
Facts of the dispute 
In a decision of 15
th
 November, 2012, the Stockholm District Court upheld in the Swedish 
Competition Authority's application for permission to conduct a survey of ASSA AB and AB Copiax 
to investigate whether these companies had breached the rules of Chapter 2 § 7 of the Competition Act 
and Article 102 TFEU. The suspected infringement related to a margin squeeze on sales of the ASSA 
ABLOY security products and volume commitments and conditional discounts in the customer 
agreement with Swedish locksmiths. 
With the support of the decision the Swedish Competition Authority conducted a site survey of 
ASSA and Copiax, where digital materials were mirrored (which means that the hard drive is picked 
out of the user's PC and "mirrored", and thus a so-called image file is created. This image file is an 
exact copy of the original hard drive and contains the so-called metadata, i.e., information about when 
a document was created, by whom, etc.). 
The Swedish Competition Authority had subsequently submitted a new application to the 
Stockholm District Court with a request to conduct a new investigation of the digitally stored material 
which the Competition Authority had obtained in the site investigations of ASSA and which they, with 
the company's consent, had moved to their premises. ASSA AB opposed the Competition Authority's 
request, arguing, inter alia, that it was contrary to the prohibition of so-called "Fishing expeditions" 
and the right to defence. 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2016 
21 
Ruling of the national courts 
The Stockholm District Court (Case A 842-14) 
The Stockholm District Court first found that the national courts are obliged to ensure the 
effectiveness of EU law and that this obligation extends to the rights of defence (Canal Plus 2948/08 
and T289/11 Deutsche Bahn and Others v Commission). The question that the Stockholm District 
Court had to decide on was whether the Competition Authority had the right to use the information 
collected during a site survey for a particular admitted infringement, in order to justify an application 
for investigation of the digitally stored material from the site investigation in order to examine 
assumptions about another infringement of competition law. The District Court referred to the issue 
that had arisen in Case T-289/11, where the Commission, in the context of a site survey, found 
documents suggesting a different competitive conduct than that which was the subject matter of the 
investigations. The Commission then launched a further investigation, which led to a second and a 
third inspection decision. The companies argued, inter alia, that the Commission had infringed their 
rights of defence in that the second and third inspections were based on information that had been 
unlawfully obtained during the first inspection. The General Court stated that “it cannot be concluded 
that the Commission is barred from initiating an inquiry in order to verify or supplement information 
which it happened to obtain during a previous investigation if that information indicates the existence 
of conduct contrary to the competition rules in the Treaty” (Paragraph 125). According to the General 
Court “The fact that the Commission once obtains documents in a given matter does not confer such 
absolute protection that those documents cannot be requested under statutory powers in another 
matter and used as evidence. Were it otherwise, undertakings would have an incentive, when a first 
matter is investigated, to give all the documents providing evidence of another infringement, thereby 
forearming themselves against any prosecution in that respect. Such a solution would go beyond what 
is required to safeguard professional secrecy and the rights of the defence and would thus constitute 
an unjustified hindrance to the Commission in the accomplishment of its task of ensuring compliance 
with the competition rules in the common market” (Paragraph 127). The General Court dismissed the 
applications from the companies entirely. 
The Stockholm District Court noted that the case had been appealed to the European Court of 
Justice and concluded that the Swedish Competition Authority was not precluded from relying on 
information of which they coincidentally became aware during the site survey of ASSA AB, where 
data indicated behaviour contrary to the competition rules. The Competition Authority could, with the 
support of such data, according to the District Court, request to be allowed to conduct an investigation 
under Chapter 5 of the Swedish Competition Act. 
Then came the District Court to examine whether the conditions for an investigation decision 
otherwise existed, and they concluded that there was reason to believe that a violation had occurred, 
there was a risk that evidence would be withheld or distorted, and that the investigation met the 
requirements of proportionality. The District Court therefore decided that the Swedish Competition 
Authority had the right to conduct an inquiry into digitally stored material gathered during site 
investigation, to investigate whether the company had breached competition rules in certain respects. 
The Swedish Market Court (Case A 3/14) 
ASSA AB appealed against the Stockholm District Court decision to the Swedish Market Court and 
asked the Swedish Market Court to reject the Swedish Competition Authority's claim for an extended 
investigation. 
The Swedish Market Court began by noting that the Competition Authority, provided that the 
conditions in Chapter 5. § 3 were met, had the right to conduct a site survey and examine the books 
and other business records and take copies of them, or extracts thereof. The court went on and noted 
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that the framework for the site-investigation is determined by the object and purpose of the Court's 
decision on the investigation. 
The Market Court noted that the Swedish legislator had stated that the issue of the legal regulation 
of, inter alia, review of electronically stored information in the Competition Authority´s premises 
should be further investigated. The Market Court found that an investigation is such an intervention 
against a company that the requirements of the principle of legality must be met. The principle implies 
a strict interpretation of burdensome regulations and a broad interpretation cannot be justified with 
reference to, for example, the purpose of an investigation. The Market Court then made a comparison 
with the national rules for house search, which requires the explicit support of the law, and considered 
that an investigation by the Swedish Competition Authority, which, in fact, constituted a violation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, required qualified constitutional support. The Court went on and 
stated that the provision in Chapter 5 § 3 of the Swedish Competition Act refers in its wording to the 
investigation of a company, on the company premises. The Swedish Market Court did not consider 
that this meant that the Competition Authority was allowed to take a copy of, or a mirrored, hard drive 
for inspection of their premises. However, this had occurred in several cases where the company 
concerned had agreed to it. That a company gives its consent to the data being moved to the 
Competition Authority's premises for the given survey does not, in the Court's view, mean that the 
consent also includes a survey relating to other infringements. Such an order would mean that the 
company could not foresee the consequences of giving consent and would thus be in breach of a 
fundamental requirement for legal certainty. In conclusion, the Swedish Market Court found that there 
was no legal basis for the Competition Authority's request to investigate the electronically stored 
information of which they had previously taken care, and that ASSA had not agreed to such an 
inquiry. In addition, the Court noted that there was no risk that ASSA would withhold or distort the 
evidence, since the company had no control over the material that was held by the Swedish 
Competition Authority. The Swedish Market Court therefore set aside the Stockholm District Court’s 
decision and dismissed the Competition Authority's application. 
My personal comment 
I think this case is relevant because it is an appeal judgment where the Swedish Market Court annuls 
the decision of the Stockholm District Court. The case concerns the question about what possibilities a 
National Competition Authority have to make investigations from material obtained in the past in 
order to find evidence of new violations. The issue has been raised before the General Court and the 
European Court of Justice in the case C-583/13 P Deutsche Bahn and others v European Commission. 
The Stockholm District Court has, in its assessment, relied on the General Court's judgment and held 
that the Competition Authority had the right to rely on data that the Authority by chance learned of 
during the site survey of ASSA AB, when the information indicating behaviours that were contrary to 
the competition rules.  
In the appeal case C-583/13 the European Court of Justice, in their judgment, which was notified 
after the judgment of the Stockholm District Court but before the judgment of the Swedish Market 
Court, held that the judgment by the General Court and the second and third inspection decisions by 
the Commission should be set aside on the grounds of infringement of the rights of the defence. 
However, this decision was based on the conduct of the Commission when it informed its officials of 
the existence of a new complaint before the first inspection. The judgment does not therefore give 
complete guidance on the question with which the national courts had to deal. 
The Swedish Market Court did not refer to the judgment in C-583/13 P at all, but settled the issue 
with the support of Swedish competition law and with regard to the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms, and came to a different conclusion than the Stockholm District Court.  
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2016 
23 
In my view, the decision by the Stockholm District Court seems to be more in coherence with the 
case-law of the European Court of Justice concerning the powers of the Commission. However, the 
Swedish Market Court has focused on the fact that that Swedish legislation did not support the actions 
taken by the Swedish Competition Authority and this is something to which the Stockholm District 
Court didn´t give any special consideration in its decision. 
It might be noted that the Swedish legislation has been amended, with effect from 1st January, 2016, 
so that it now specifically provides that the National Competition Authority may review electronically 
stored information at their premises, if the company under investigation agrees that the information is 
transferred to the Competition Authority. However, this clarification would not, in my view, change 
the impact of the Swedish Market Court's decision in such a way that the Competition Authority may 
examine materials relating to an infringement other than that specified in the earlier decision, at least 
not when the company opposes such an investigation.  
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3.3. MANTHOS MATTHEOU (District Court of Paphos) 
Cyprus Telecommunication Authority 
v. 
1. Commission for the Protection of Competition 
2. The Republic of Cyprus, through the Commission for the Protection of Competition 
 
Case No. 741/2013 of the 30
th
 November, 2015 
Summary of the Facts of the Dispute 
In this case, the Commission for the Protection of Competition, which is the National Competition 
Authority of Cyprus (hereinafter the “Commission”) imposed a fine on the Cyprus 
Telecommunication Authority (hereinafter “Cyta”) because it was found that Cyta had infringed 
Section 6 (1) (a) and (c) of Law No. 13(I)/2008 for the Protection of Competition (hereinafter the 
“relevant legislation”). 
As provided by the above-mentioned Section, any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the internal market, or in a substantial part of it in respect of a product, shall 
be prohibited, especially if it affects or may affect, first, the direct or indirect fixing of unfair purchase 
or selling prices or any other unfair trading conditions and, second, applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions, thereby placing certain undertakings at a competitive disadvantage. 
The case concerned a complaint that was filed to the Commission by Primetel Ltd (hereinafter 
“Primetel”) against Cyta, for the alleged infringement of Section 6 (1) (c) of the relevant legislation as 
a result of the discriminatory pricing applied to the detriment of Primetel, and for the alleged 
infringement of Section 6 (1) (a) as a result of the imposition of unfair prices. The basis of the 
complaint was the contract signed between Cyta and Primetel for the acquisition of rights of use in 
capacity in an undersea cable system for a period of 12 years. 
The Commission evaluated all the evidence before it and unanimously decided that Cyta had 
infringed Section 6 (1) (a) of the relevant legislation by concluding that Cyta held a dominant position 
in the relevant market for the available capacity that could potentially be sold to a telecommunications 
operator in Cyprus. The Commission reached this conclusion by taking into account the general 
financial position of Cyta as a telecommunications organisation, the fact that since its establishment 
Cyta has been operating in a monopolistic protected environment, the existence of the high legal and 
economic barriers to dumping submarine cable systems, the available capacity that could be purchased 
by an operator in Cyprus, and the absence of an alternative route and of an alternative submarine-
capable systems controlled by other telecommunication operators. 
The Commission held, in its decision that, the time at which Primetel had required the above 
mentioned international capacity from Cyta was crucial and was highly important to Primetel. Primetel 
at that point had just entered the retail market for broadband services, having Cyta as its main 
competitor, while, at the same time, Cyta was Primetel’s supplier for inter-connection services, 
unbundled access to the local loop and international capacity through the submarine cable systems. In 
relation to the above-mentioned facts, the Commission concluded that Cyta, by taking advantage of its 
dominant position in the supply of international capacity when compared to other competitors within 
the market, imposed significantly high prices on Primetel for the supply of international capacity, thus 
hindering Primetel’s possibility of charging lower prices for the services for which Cyta was charging 
its own customers. 
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Considering all the above, the Commission, with regard to the nature, duration and gravity of the 
infringement unanimously decided to impose on Cyta a fine of €295.277.00. 
Summary of the Judicial Proceedings 
Cyta filed a recourse to the Administrative Court of Cyprus (hereinafter the “Court”) against the 
decision of the Commission. This case note is not made in relation to the examination of the substance 
of the recourse against the decision of the Commission. Instead, the case note refers to a rather 
interesting procedural point that arose during the hearing of the case. The actual hearing of the 
recourse involved the filing of, and service on other parties of the written submissions to the Court. 
Cyta had served on Primetel its written submission to the Court, from which it had hidden or deleted, 
or not included, certain matters and facts which Cyta claimed constituted confidential information. 
Primetel had filed an application with which it petitioned the Court to issue an order through which 
Cyta would reveal to Primetel all of the facts that Cyta claimed constituted confidential information. 
Both Cyta and the Commission filed an objection to the application that was made by Primetel. 
The Procedure before the Court 
The Court referred to the arguments presented by the lawyers representing both parties to the recourse 
(i.e., Cyta and the Commission) as well as the interested party (i.e., Primetel). 
It is rather interesting to briefly state these arguments. 
The basic position put forward by Primetel was that Cyta arbitrarily, and without having previously 
obtained the permission of the Court, decided to file and serve on Primetel a written submission from 
which it had deleted or not revealed, or not included, allegations or facts which it claimed consisted of 
confidential information, whereas these allegations and facts were given to the Commission. Primetel 
was thus not in a position to adequately promote its arguments or to put forward its defence in relation 
to allegations of which it was not aware, and, as a result, a state of inequality was created amongst the 
litigants, while the invocation by Cyta of business or professional secrecy cannot outweigh Primetel’s 
right to defence or its right to a fair trial. Furthermore, it was put forward as an argument, that in 
accordance with the case law of the General Court of the European Union, the Commission cannot 
decide on its own which documents may be deleted or not discovered, nor decide which part of the 
administrative file for the case may or may not be useful for the defence of an interested party. 
The position of Cyta was that the application was premature, because nothing had been set before 
the Court which had not also been given to both Primetel and the Republic of Cyprus. It was argued 
that there is certain information which is not accessible, and this includes business secrets and internal 
deliberations of the Commission. Primetel had no status in the substance of the investigation of the 
Commission because this was carried out in relation to Cyta, while Primetel, even though it had filed a 
complaint, was not placed in the position of a prosecutor, but was merely in the position of an 
interested party. If the interested party were to be allowed to have access to professional secrets this 
would lead to an abolition of secrecy and confidentiality. Even though Primetel, as the interested party 
in the recourse, also has a right to be heard, the correctness of the decision of the Commission would 
be promoted by the Republic, which had access to the relevant information both through the file of the 
Commission and from the decision file. Furthermore, the Commission had already decided that the 
information which was requested was confidential, without this decision having been challenged in the 
proper manner as an independent executory administrative act within the time limit set by the 
Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”). 
The position of the Commission was that even though there was no legislative framework in 
relation to the matter in issue nonetheless the Court had inherent power within the context of the court 
procedure to accordingly decide, by issuing the necessary directions for the correct administration of 
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justice. The Commission called upon the Court to balance, on the one hand, the principle of the 
confidentiality of information, which includes professional secrets and which is protected by the 
Courts of the European Union and, on the other, the right to a hearing (i.e., audi alteram partem). It 
reminded the Court that Primetel had been present throughout the administrative procedure and was 
aware that the confidential information had not been given to it and yet they raised no objection, even 
though it accepted that this did not stop the interested party submitting its application to be provided 
with the information. Even though the Commission accepted that all the information would have to be 
revealed to the Court, it called upon the Court to place emphasis on the protection in relation to the 
confidentiality of business secrets, and drew the attention of the Court to the possibility that if such 
confidential matters were revealed during the procedure before the Court, this might affect the 
effective implementation of the rules of Competition Law causing businesses to become reluctant to 
provide information to the Commission. 
The Ruling of the Court 
The Court concluded that there was insufficient reason not to approve the application made by 
Primetel, and further stated the following. The Court had the right to have before it all the matters, 
information and facts which had led to the taking of a decision. This right springs from the simple fact 
that, constitutionally, the Court is the only institutional organ that has the right to issue a judgment to 
solve the dispute placed before it. Access to the Court is safeguarded by the Constitution and its 
judgments have to be reasoned. The right to such access causes and imposes corresponding obligations 
on litigants. It is not possible to conceal facts and information which are necessary for the 
determination of the dispute before the Court. The Court cannot perform its task in a vacuum of 
information or on the basis of inadequate information. 
The Commission had acted on its own by asking Cyta whether it wanted, in the publication of its 
decision, to delete or leave out any information. However, Cyta could not assume that on its own 
initiative it did not have to reveal the information that it deemed to be confidential, particularly 
without obtaining beforehand the leave of the Court. The Commission, by asking Cyta which 
information it did not want to be revealed, had acted on the basis of its statutory obligation under 
Section 33 of the relevant legislation (i.e., the duty of secrecy for the protection of business secrets and 
confidential information). However, the relevant legislation does not refer to court procedure and it 
cannot have any consequence on the transparency of judicial procedure and, in particular, in relation to 
the maintenance of the equality of arms between the litigants. The Court pointed out that Primetel, by 
placing emphasis on its role as a litigant, had correctly pointed out that it was unacceptable for certain 
facts to be made known to the rest of the litigants but not to the interested party. In relation to the 
protection given by the law of the European Union in relation to cases examined by a National 
Competition Authority, the Court stated that this does not necessarily affect the procedure before the 
Court. The Court referred to the fact that the Republic had not made any special provisions in relation 
to the procedure before the Court in respect of matters of confidential information within the context 
of competition law. It considered that such a provision was necessary so as to balance the two 
principles which, prima facie, seem to be contradictory: firstly, the protection of industrial and other 
confidential information and the principle of transparency, which ought to govern the procedure before 
the Court. It concluded that since no such provision had been made for a recourse against a decision of 
the Commission, then the same procedure would be applied as in any other recourse to the Appeal 
Court, in accordance with Article 146 of the Constitution. The argument, put forward by Cyta, that the 
application was premature, was rejected, while emphasis was placed on the principle of the equality of 
arms between the litigants. The argument that Primetel was aware of the concealment by the 
Commission of confidential information was also rejected, and since this had not been challenged, 
Primetel was estopped from doing so before the Court, by a reminder that the concealment of 
information was done within the context of the judicial procedure. Reference was made by the Court 
to the case Akzo Chemie BV, C-53/85, stating that it does not solve the matter of what is to be 
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considered as the proper procedure before the Court. The Court referred to the principle that 
documents which contain commercial secrets cannot be revealed to the complainant, examined in the 
Akzo case, as well as to other authorities such as Pfleiderer A. G. v. Bunderskartellamt, C-360/09, and 
Varec SA v. Etat Belge, C-450/06, and placed emphasis on the fact that the Varec case involved 
procedure before a Court and that it recognised that the principle of audi alteram partem, which 
involves, as a general rule, the right of access to facts and observations submitted to the Court and then 
to express an opinion accordingly. The Court observed that this was in agreement with the time-
honoured common law position whereby the principles of the transparency of the judicial process and 
the right to freedom of expression and taking a stance are undoubtedly recognized, and it referred also 
to the cases of A v British Broadcasting Corporation [2014] 2 All ER 1037 and British Broadcasting 
Corporation v Roden (2015) W. L. 2190724. The Court acknowledged, by reference to the Varec case, 
that the adversarial principle does not mean that the parties are entitled to unlimited and absolute 
access to all of the information relating to the award procedure concerned, which has been filed with 
the body responsible for the review. It also quoted Paragraph 52 of the same case, where it is stated 
that the principle of the protection of confidential information and of business secrets must be 
observed in such a way as to reconcile it with the requirements of effective legal protection and the 
parties’ rights to defence in the dispute in the case of judicial review, or of a review by another body 
which is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 EC, in such a way as to ensure that the 
proceedings as a whole accord with the right to a fair trial. The Court stated that in balancing the 
various criteria and factors involved, the overwhelming principle is that of securing a fair trial, and it 
accordingly ordered the filing of a new written submission by Cyta in which there would be included 
the facts and information omitted from the written submission already filed. 
Personal Comment as to the Relevance of the Case 
To begin with, I must confess that the judgment was very interesting in relation to the confidential 
information involved and the balance that had to be attained between maintaining the secrecy of such 
information and the right to a fair hearing for Primetel. However, in my opinion, the interpretation 
given by the National Court in relation to European Union Law in the field of competition law 
overlooks the emphasis that is placed on maintaining professional secrecy and, in fact, the approval of 
the application was granted without in any way examining whether or not the information to be 
revealed, or part of it, ought to be revealed for the purposes of attaining a fair trial. In other words, 
even though reference is made to various principles in relation to confidential information, these do 
not seem to be applied to the facts of the case, of which one can only assume the Court was aware. I 
am also concerned as to whether the analysis outlined in the Varec case was correctly applied to the 
issue before the Court, not so much as a matter of principle as such, but strictly in relation to the 
apparent necessity of an inquiry into the facts that Cyta was called upon to reveal, and whether the 
revelation of all or part of them was necessary so as to actually carry out the exercise of the balance of 
the various factors involved so as to attain the overriding aim of maintaining the right to a fair trial. 
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3.4. POLONA KUKOVEC (SLOVENIA SUPREME COURT) 
Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia: G 22/2012 from the 11. 2. 2014 
The National Competition Authority (NCA) decided that sixteen undertakings had breached Article 6 
of Slovene competition law (ZPOmK-1) and from 1
st
 May, 2004, onwards, also Article 81, now 
Article 101 TFEU, by agreeing to (or by establishing consorted practice in regard to) attribute projects 
of construction and repair to highways, connecting roads and other objects of the national plan for 
constructing highways in the Republic of Slovenia, of handing in manipulated offers to the public 
procurement procedure in regard of the ordering party, the Undertaking for Highways in the Republic 
of Slovenia (DARS) and before handing in offers they exchanged information in regard to the prices 
they offered, which represents a competition restricting practice /concered practice between 
undertakings involved with conditions for acting in the market, the aim or goal of which is the 
distortion or restriction of competition in the Republic of Slovenia. All concerned undertakings were 
prohibited from any further agreement or concerted action and it was ordered that they publish the 
decision of NCA on their web pages. 
Undertaking X challenged the decision of the NCA in front of the Supreme Court claiming that 
there had been a breach of procedure and that the material law has not been applied correctly. It 
suggested that the Court repeal the decision of the NCA or annul it and brought the case before the 
NCA for retrial. 
The Supreme Court partly annulled the decision of the NCA, in that part that refers to the claimant, 
for the violation of Article 6 of ZPOmK-1 for the period from 17. 10. 2005 - 10.3.2010, and in part 
also where the claimant was found to be in violation of 101 TFEU, and they reversed the case before 
the NCA for retrial. 
Reasons: 
1. Procedural aspect 
The claimant disputed the way the NCA conducted the investigation of the claimant's premises. 
Namely, during its investigation of the premises the NCA allegedly breached the informational 
privacy of the claimant's employees as is stated in Article 37 and Article 38 of the Slovene 
Constitution. The investigation itself allegedly breached Article 36 of the Slovene Constitution. 
Furthermore, the procedural rights of the claimant were allegedly breached, because the NCA did not 
enable a hearing of the claimant.  
The Court held that the claimant did not specify concretely enough the private correspondence of 
employees, for which it held that it should not be investigated by the NCA, but it was, and on this 
basis the incriminating data had been gathered against the claimant. In the Court's view, the claimant 
did not manage to prove this. For no specified document, electronic correspondence or note of his 
employees did the claimant allege that it has been gathered by the NCA in contravention of the 
claimant's constitutional rights. The Court added that the status of private correspondence is not 
already obtained by the fact that it has been created by the employee. From this circle, business 
corespondence is exempted, as it belongs to the claimant and not to the employees of the claimant. 
Furthermore, the Court explained that although the Slovene Constitutional Court held, in its 
decision U-I-40/12-31 from the 11. 4. 2013, that the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 28. 
of ZPOmK-1, in so far as it allows the NCA to conduct an investigation without a court order.in 
contravention of the Constitution, the Act nonetheless still empowers the NCA to conduct 
investigations, but the Court has to weigh whether the NCA breached the Constitution while enacting 
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the law. This means that in the light of the Constitutional Court's decision, the investigation that was 
itself conducted by the NCA is not automatically unconstitutional or unlawful. 
In regard to the alleged breach of contadictory procedure, because the claimant was not heard by 
the NCA the Court explained that this right was fullfilled by the NCA because it enabled the claimant 
to file a written defence against the allegations. 
2. In regard to the restrictive practice 
The first paragraph of Article 6 of ZPOmK-1 refers to the agreements between undertakings, whose 
aim or effect is to restrict, prevent or distort competition in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. 
The Article implies that the notion of an undertaking encompasses an undertaking which acts on the 
market, and it is thus in its power to restrict, prevent or distort competition. An agreement between 
undertakings that do not participate in the market can, on the contrary, have no effect on competition 
in the market. The claimant stated that due to the lack of references it did not fulfill all of the 
necessary conditions so as to be able to independently participate in the compeetitions issued by 
DARS. The Court held that whether the claimant fulfilled the conditions of DARS was relevant, 
because the conditions laid down the parameters of those undertakings that could take part in the 
public competition and compete in terms of price and quality of service. An undertaking that did not 
fulfill the requirements of DARS, could not act in the specific market that the NCA did not define in 
its decision. Articles of the Slovene Public Procurment Act enable agreements between offerers. An 
undertaking, taking part in a public procurement competition can refer to the capacities of other 
undertakings, no matter what buisness relationship they have towards such an undertaking, when this 
is appropriate. In such a case an undertaking must prove that it will, because of co-operation with 
another undertaking, have the means that are necessary for carrying out the public project. As a proof, 
a written agreement among such undertakings can be presented. At a single, specific competition more 
undertakings can agree among themselves to participate in the competition jointly. The Court held that 
this must also apply even more in regard to an undertaking that is incapable of taking a place in the 
competition independently. Within the frame of such an agreement among undertakings there are 
undoubtedly elements of the joint offer, such as the offered price, as well as the participation of 
undertakings in the joint offer. 
The NCA claimed that joint offers can present a breach of competition at single public procurement 
competitions if the same pattern of behaviour can be established over a longer period of time. The 
Court held that such a view cannot hold in this concrete case. Although the Court left open the 
possibility of a breach of competition rules in regard to the agreement among undertakings, of which 
one is not capable of independently taking part in the competition, just the abstract possibility of such 
a breach does not suffice. What is needed is normative concretisation which is based on facts. The 
NCA did not make such a concretisation that would »incriminate« the claimant. As the NCA did not 
establish whether the claimant fulfilled the requirements of DARS, or at what point in time it was 
incapable of taking part independently in the competition, and this information would shed a light on 
the position of the claimant in the alleged cartel agreement, the decision of the NCA had to be 
annulled and sent back for retrial. 
3. Application of Article 101 of TFEU 
In regard to 101 TFEU, the claimant said that the findings of the NCA did not give a sufficent basis 
for drawing conclusions on cross border influences on the competition. The NCA stated that forign 
companies were restricted in the competition (through offering their services) as they would have to 
compete against a whole group of Slovene companies. What did competing against the group of 
Slovene companies imply? The NCA did not answer this.. If it were the aim of the cartel agreement to 
raise the price on the public competition, then, the court held, would foreign companies find it easier 
to compete, as they would be able to offer a very competitive (and realistic) lower price. The Court 
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found in favour of the claimant, since the NCA;s decision did not offer a satisfactory explanation to 
uphold that there had been a breach of Article 101 TFEU. 
Conclusion 
I regard the case relevant as it deals with a judgment by a Supreme court which annulled the previous 
NCA decision. It also represents a judgment which considered an alleged breach of European law.  
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3.5. RON STAM (DUTCH ADMINISTRATIVE HIGH COURT FOR TRADE AND 
INDUSTRY) 
Case numbers: 14/581, 14/583, 14/585, 14/587, 14/589, 14/590, 14/591, 14/592, 14/593, 14/594, 
14/595, 15/206, 15/207, 15/208, 15/209, 15/210 
Decision pursuant to Article 8:29(3) of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act in the cases 
of: 
Eleven flour manufacturers from the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Germany v. The 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) 
Course of the proceedings  
ACM has submitted the confidential version of several case documents and, with reference to Article 
8:29 of the General Administrative Law Act (‘the Act’), has stated that only the Court may examine 
these documents.  
This decision pertains to the transcriptions of the oral statements provided by the leniency 
applicants which have been recorded under numbers 31, 33, 35, 80, 102, 111, 129 and 138.  
Findings  
1. Under Article 8:29(3) of the Act, the Court decides whether the refusal to allow examination, or a 
limitation on allowing examination, of documents is justified. 
2. In rendering this decision, the Court must balance the interests. On the one hand, it is important 
that the parties have equal access to information that is relevant to the appeal and that the Court has all 
the information necessary to dispose of the case in a proper and careful manner. On the other hand, the 
publication of certain data may disproportionately harm the interests of one or more parties, while the 
ACM also has an interest in ensuring that, in the future, it receives the information, including 
competition-sensitive data, which it needs to carry out its responsibilities properly.  
3. Moreover, because this case relates to a punitive sanction, the guarantees in Article 6 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) apply 
in any event. As the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) makes clear, the 
defence is entitled in principle, under Article 6.1 of the ECHR, to examine all of the relevant 
evidentiary material. Still, this right is not absolute. Other interests may be in opposition to it, such as 
national security, protection of others' fundamental rights and the confidentiality of investigation 
methods. In appropriate cases, these interests must be weighed against the defence’s interests (ECtHR, 
26
th
 March,1996, Doorson v Netherlands, No.54/1994/501/583, NJ 1996, 741, Paragraphs 69-70; 
ECtHR, 1st February, 2000, Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom, No. 28901/95, BNB 2000, 259, 
Paragraphs 60-62).  
4. The ACM argues that limiting the examination of the transcriptions of the oral leniency 
statements is necessary in order to ensure the success of its leniency programme. If the companies 
concerned were to have a copy of the transcriptions, it would, the ACM contends, be relatively easy 
for third parties to request these documents from them and to rely on these in respect of the leniency 
applicants (in, for example, civil actions for damages). The leniency applicants have specifically 
requested leniency on the condition that copies of the transcriptions will not be furnished. The ACM is 
afraid that if the companies concerned were to obtain a copy of the transcriptions then this would keep 
potential leniency applicants from making a leniency request. In addition, the parties who were not 
requesting leniency were able to take note of the content of the statements. Although they were not 
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allowed to make copies of the transcriptions, they were permitted to reproduce the content, by, say, 
transcribing the transcriptions. 
5. The Court notes that the oral leniency statements play a major role in the evidence for the 
violations that are asserted by the ACM in relation to Article 6 of the Dutch Competitive Trading Act 
and Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Given this major role, the 
interest in being able to put forward a proper defence must be given great weight in the balancing of 
interests in the case to be conducted here.  
6. In the Court’s opinion, the success of ACM’s leniency programme deserves less weight in this 
case than the interest in being able to put forward a proper defence. The parties not requesting leniency 
are aware of the content of the leniency statements and the involvement of the leniency applicants in 
the violations asserted by ACM can also be inferred from other, non-confidential documents, so that, 
in the Court's view, the interest in limiting examination of the transcriptions is relatively minor here. 
While the Court is cognizant of the measures which ACM has taken to compensate for the interest 
which the fined companies have in conducting a proper defence, the Court believes that the interest 
asserted by ACM is not sufficiently compelling to justify limiting the examination of the documents in 
this case. The request will therefore be denied. 
7. The Court will send the transcriptions recorded under the numbers 31, 33, 35, 80, 102, 111, 129 
and 138 back to ACM. ACM must submit these documents and must, within two weeks after this 
decision is sent, send a new version of these documents to the Court and the other parties. Should 
ACM not submit one or more documents, the Court may draw the conclusions which it deems 
appropriate. The Court further points out that the oral leniency statements recorded under numbers 31 
and 33 which were furnished to the Court were not entirely complete, as several passages or pages 
were missing from them.  
Decision 
The Court hereby:  
- decides that the limitation on allowing examination of the transcriptions of the oral 
statements provided by the leniency applicants recorded under numbers 31, 33, 35, 
80, 102, 111, 129 and 138 is not justified; 
- orders that the documents referred to under the previous dash be sent back to ACM; 
- asks ACM to send a new version of the documents concerned to the Court and the 
other parties within two weeks of today’s date. 
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3.6. Marie Baker (Irish High Court) 
DPP v. Duffy and Duffy Motors (Newbridge) Ltd  
[2009] IESC 208 
[2009] 3 I.R. 613 
Introduction 
I have chosen this case for a number of reasons. The first is its importance in the context of the 
enforcement of competition law in Ireland. It was the first case involving a criminal conviction for a 
breach of Irish competition law where the judgment was reported. An earlier decision by the same 
judge, in DPP v. Manning, had not been published. 
Secondly, it gives a clear indication of the seriousness with which the Irish Courts take the breach 
of competition law, and anticompetitive practices in general.  
Finally, McKechnie J. set down a clear marker that the next person before the Court would face a 
custodial sentence. 
I should, in addition like to set the case in context, in terms of its place in the chronology of events. 
The Act which established the process was the Competition Act 1991, which has now been superseded 
by the Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014, which, among other things, provided for the 
merging of the old Competition Authority and the National Consumer Agency.  
The first sentences were not handed down under the 1991 Act until 2008, beginning a period of 
activity on that front. In 2008, James Durrigan was sentenced to three months imprisonment 
(suspended) and his company, James Durrigan & Sons Ltd., was fined a total of €20,000. Later that 
same year, another motor dealer, Ravensdale Trading Ltd., trading as Jack Doran Motors was fined 
€20,000 and one of the directors in the company, Jack Doran, was given a three month sentence which 
was again suspended. 
In March, 2009, we see the instant case (more anon) and then, in April, 2009, another member of 
the Citroën Dealers Association, Jim Bursey, was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment 
(suspended) with a fine of €80,000, and his company, Bursey Peppard Motors Ltd was also fined 
€80,000. Over 2009, various other members of the CDA cartel were before the courts and the 
companies received fines and the individuals involved, suspended prison sentences. The matter came 
to a head, however, in November, 2009, Mr. Bursey came before McKechnie J. due to his failure to 
pay the fines imposed earlier. He was sentenced to twenty eight days imprisonment for contempt of 
court. Mr. Bursey thus earned the unwelcome notoriety of being the first person to serve a prison 
sentence arising out of a breach of Irish competition law. 
Moving to 2011, we see KcKechnie J., now in the Supreme Court, delivering a judgment with 
which Murray C.J. and O'Donnell J concurred in a case held in Galway Circuit Criminal Court, 
wherein he can be said to have shown the support of the Irish judiciary for the effective enforcement 
of competition law. The severity of the sentence imposed by Judge Groarke following the decision of 
the Supreme Court once again showed that, even in the Lower Courts, they take the matter of breaches 
of competition law very seriously. It is in this context and this light that we should view McKechnie's 
decision in DPP v. Duffy and Duffy Motors. 
The facts 
In this case, the DPP brought charges against six Citroën dealerships and seven individuals who were 
either officers or directors of those dealerships. It was alleged that they had agreed to fix prices in 
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relation to the sale of Citroën cars and to do so in breach of competition law. The DPP also charged 
the Secretary of the Citroën dealers Association ("CDA") and it was alleged that he had aided and 
abetted the price-fixing by the dealerships. 
The CDA was made up of members who were authorised Citroën dealers throughout Ireland. 
Among its other functions was the setting up of a scheme designed to achieve set prices by influencing 
a number of factors: 
 Setting the maximum permissible discounts to be offered by Citroën dealers. 
 Establishing a recommended price list for new vehicles. 
 Setting delivery charges and accessory prices. 
 Setting the prices to be offered for cars traded in and the sale of secondhand stock and, 
 Setting prices for cars to be exported. 
The CDA, having met and agreed these 'factors', the said factors would then be circulated to all of the 
dealers within the organisation, by the Secretary. Furthermore, to monitor compliance with these 
pricing agreements, the CDA used the services of 'mystery shoppers' to check the actual prices being 
negotiated with customers by the individual dealers. If the 'mystery shopper' found a dealer acting 
outside of the agreement, it was reported to the CDA and the dealer would then be fined €1,270 (the 
equivalent of £1,000). 
The scheme came to the attention of the Competition Authority when a dealer/member of the CDA 
was fined for non-compliance and came forward as a 'whistle-blower'. The Authority questioned Mr. 
Duffy, who had played a significant role in the CDA, as its Treasurer. In this capacity, he attended 
most meetings and authorised payments from the CDA, ironically including the payments made to the 
'mystery shoppers'. 
Proceedings 
The DPP commenced proceedings against Mr. Duffy and his company, of which he was a director. 
The alleged breach was behaviour contrary to s.4(1) of the 1991 Act and s.2 of the 1996 amending 
Act, namely "entering into an agreement which had as its object the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition" He was also charged on the basis of being a director of a company which 
had entered into such an anticompetitive agreement. He pleaded guilty on both counts. 
The part of the judgment given by McKechnie J. which is of the most interest to us is his treatment 
of cartels and his approach to custodial sentences for breaches of competition law. He devoted seven 
paragraphs of his judgment (Paras. 22 to 27) to setting out the nature of cartels. He noted that they can 
be either formal or informal, with most providing for some form of penalty mechanism for non-
compliance. He especially noted the absence of a clear definition of a cartel at Para. 22: 
"Cartels involve a group of competitors who for self gain agree to restrict their individual business 
freedom and follow a common course of conduct on the market. They can be used for all forms of 
anticompetitive behaviour but are particularly attracted to price fixing, restricting output/limiting 
production, bid rigging and market allocation". 
He went on to describe cartels as "hard core" breaches of competition law, and as "involving odious 
practices" which, because of their anticompetitive nature, destroy the incentives to compete, put 
customers off buying or shopping around, and put prospective competitors off from entering the 
market. This therefore, has a negative impact on the economy of a country. He continued to echo his 
stern criticism of cartels by describing them as "offensive and abhorrent", not only because they are 
prohibited, but because they are inherently wrong. 
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Sentencing 
He began his discussion of sentencing by separating Ireland and the UK from the EU regime, where a 
custodial sentence was impossible, even for the most serious breach of competition law. He listed 
some of the arguments from Faull & Nikpay, in which the Commission had rejected mitigating factors 
against the imposition of penalties for breaches of EU competition law: 
   the fact that no benefit arose from the cartel, nor any economic disadvantage suffered due to 
participation in a cartel; 
 the fact that the cartel made a positive contribution to the economy; and  
the fact that the cartel was designed as a defensive measure against “distortions of 
competition” caused by others was no ground to allow “the main players of a given market 
segment to take concerted private actions regarding the prices they charge to their customers 
in order to compensate… for [other's] ‘dumping strategies”; 
   the fact that customers may accept a practice which is contrary to competition rules does not make 
such a practice lawful; 
 the fact that the offence is a first offence does not amount to a mitigating factor; 
   the fact that a company terminates such illegal behaviour before any intervention by the 
Commission does not merit any particular award; and 
  arguments that the cartel evolved from initial discussions of lawful matter and gradually 
drifted into unlawful activities, have been rejected. 
Instead, McKechnie J. chose to follow the line adopted by the English Courts in R v. Whittle, Alison 
and Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim 2560, where Hallett L.J set out a list of non-exhaustive 
considerations in relevant cases: 
 the gravity and nature of the offence;  
 the duration of the offence; 
   the degree of culpability of the defendant in implementing the cartel agreement; 
 the degree of culpability of the defendant in enforcing the cartel agreement; 
   whether the defendant's conduct was contrary to guidelines laid down in a company 
compliance manual; and 
   mitigating factors, for example, any co-operation the defendant may have provided in respect 
of the inquiry or whether or not the defendant was compelled to participate in the cartel under 
duress. 
In turning to Ireland, McKechnie J. agrued strongly for custodial sentences, principally to serve as a 
deterrent, and certainly not out of any vindictiveness. He noted that fines play a significant role in the 
criminal law, but that unless they were severe and had a severe impact, they were not sufficient as a 
deterrent. He explained at Para 37: 
"In these respects I would agree. Competition crimes are particularly pernicious. Coupled with 
that, and the low likelihood of recidivism amongst perpetrators, this means that in order to be 
effective sanctions must be designed and utilised for, and have the purpose of, deterring offenders 
from committing crimes in the first place." 
He then went on to consider whether it would be appropriate to punish both the firm and the 
individual, two separate legal entities, yet both guilty of the offences. He relied on the judgment of 
Hardiman J. in DPP v. Roseberry Construction Ltd [2003 4 I.R. 338], wherein he stated that as the 
legislation provided for penalties in the form of fines and/or custodial sentences, it was clear that 
competition offences could be committed by both persons, natural and corporate. He argued that such 
an approach made perfect sense, as otherwise manoeuvring could set the entire sanctions provisions at 
naught. 
Put simply, there were two options available, fines and imprisonment. He indicated that a Court 
would normally address the fine first and consider a custodial sentence only where the fine was likely 
to be unpaid, or where the fine would have little deterrent. His own preference was for a mixed type of 
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sentence and he reiterated his comments in Manning, where he gave his reasons for favouring 
custodial sentences in cases involving cartels: 
“[A] sentence can operate as an effective deterrent in particular where if fines were to have the 
same effect they would have to be pitched at an impossibly high figure. Secondly, fines on 
companies might not always guarantee an adequate incentive for individuals within those firms to 
act responsibly… Thirdly, knowledge within undertakings that courts will regularly make use of a 
custodial sentence may act as an incentive to people to offer greater cooperation in cartel 
investigations against, and quite frequently against their employers. Fourthly, prison, in particular 
for those with unblemished pasts, for those who are respected within the community, and for those 
who are unlikely to re-offend can be a very powerful deterrent and finally, the imposition of the 
sentence for the type or category of persons above described can carry a uniquely strong moral 
message.” 
In applying those principles to the circumstances in this case, he had to have regard for the earlier 
sentencing in others of the CDA cartel cases, and in view of this he imposed sentences which were 
consistent with the earlier cases. He sentenced Mr. Mr. Duffy to six and nine month in prison 
respectively, with a fine of €50,000 and he fined Duffy Motors €50,000. 
Concluding comments 
The significance of Duffy is that McKechnie J. set out some very important guidance for future 
prosecutions in cartel cases. Some commentators were disappointed and were critical at the time 
because of the extent of the punishment, a mere fine and a suspended sentence. It did however, as I 
mentioned earlier, set down a clear and unambiguous marker that future similar breaches were likely 
to result in imprisonment, actual imprisonment, rather than a suspended sentence. It was clear 
therefore, that competition law offences would not be punished lightly. Indeed subsequent legislation 
removed the option for the application of the Probation Act in relation to competition cases.  
I will conclude with a short quotation from David McFadden (The Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in Ireland, Hart Publishing, 2013): 
"To the businessman, 'prison is the inferno'. This is a powerful endorsement of the criminal 
sanction as a deterrent to individuals. This view also has support today in Ireland. In the recent 
cartel case of DPP v. Duffy, McKechnie J. gave a detailed judgment on sentencing in hard-core 
price-fixing cases.... Regarding the role of deterrence in the criminal justice system McKechnie J. 
commented that 'while there is no place in the criminal justice system for either vengefulness or 
vindictiveness, there is for deterrent'." 
It sums up admirably the significance of the decision in this case. 
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4. Horizontal agreements and bid rigging cartels 
4.1. SOFIA MARAVELAKI (ATHENS ADMINISTRATIVE COURT) 
Fine from the Greek Competition Authority for infringement of Article 1 Para. 1 of law 
N.703/1977 and Article 81 Para. 1 of the EC Treaty {Article 101 (1) TFEU}. 
The infringement consisted of participation in an agreement for price-fixing and the distribution of 
sources of supply in the market for cows’ milk. It was based on the law’s provision that any agreement 
or concerted practice between undertakings which have as their object the restriction, prevention or 
distortion of competition, irrespective of its results, is forbidden.  
The undertaking has lodged an appeal before the Administrative Court of Appeal in Athens. The 
Court of Appeal decided that there was an infringement of the competition law provisions and that the 
undertaking was lawfully fined. The market data, cited by the infringer, did not exclude it from 
temporary partnership with its rivals, in order to achieve (anticompetitive) common goals and 
objectives. The fine was reduced by the Court of Appeal.  
The infringer applied for the cassation of the Appeal Court Decision before the Conseil d’Etat. The 
application was rejected. As far as the criteria for the determination of the fine were concerned, the 
Conseil d’Etat decided that there was no issue with a further reduction of the fine, based on the 
criterion of the duration of the infringement, since the infringer was attributed only with participation 
in an anticompetitive agreement and not with the implementation of this agreement in practice. 
Facts 
On May 31st, 2004,, the five milk zone managers of the five largest industries in dairy products 
operating in the Greek territory, members of the Federation of Greek Industries for Dairy Products, 
met in a hotel in Larissa (a big city in central Greece). They agreed that the main axes of their 
companies’ strategy in the next period, included, inter alia  
a) preventing the movement of milk producers between the industries for dairy products and making 
an effort to hold dairy prices in Greece and to reverse the upward trends,  
b) deciding to establish a regular group, formed by the milk collectors from these five companies, 
which would meet regularly in order to monitor the developments and to plan joint actions that are 
aimed at ensuring the quality and competitiveness of Greek milk, and  
c) assigning the realisation of the next meeting for the end of July, 2004. All of the representatives of 
these companies participated in the decisions taken, without any prejudice. This behaviour was 
considered by the Greek Competition Authority to be participation in an agreement for price-
fixing and the distribution of sources of supply in the market for cows’ milk, in breach of Article 
81 Para. 1 of N .703/1977, as well as the corresponding provisions of Article 81 Para. 1 of the EC 
Treaty {Article 101 (1) TFEU}. The fine was €3,168,806,01  
The undertaking tried to annul the Decision of the National Competition Authority or, at least, to 
reduce the imposed fine, by lodging an appeal before the Administrative Court of Appeal in Athens. 
The Administrative Court of Appeal decided that at the “Larissa meeting” there had indeed been an 
agreement among competing companies which involved the price-fixing of the market price for milk 
and the prevention of the movement of milk producers. This agreement, since it was aimed at 
determining market prices and the distribution of supply sources, had as its effect the restriction and 
distortion of competition, i.e., the creation of conditions of competition which did not correspond to 
the normal conditions of the market in question, in breach of the above mentioned law provisions, 
given that the agreement in question might indirectly affect intra-Community trade. 
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There was an application for cassation before the Greek Conseil d’Etat (Supreme Administrative 
Court of Greece-Court of Cassation), which was rejected. In particular, the Supreme Administrative 
Court referred to its own case law, as well as the case law of the Courts of the European Union, in its 
ruling, and accepted that any agreement or concerted practice between undertakings which have as 
their object the restriction, prevention or distortion of competition (with the additional condition that 
the agreement may substantially affect trade between Member States), is forbidden, regardless of the 
results (Conseil d’Etat 2365, 2007/2013, 2780/2012, ECJ decisions of 08-07-1999, C-49/92 P 
Commission v Anic Partecipazioni, CRS. 99 and 122-124, of 20-11-2008, C-209/07, Beef Industry 
Development Society Ltd etc., CRS. 15-16, of 07-02-2013, C-68/12, Sporitela Slovenska, CRS. 17), or 
non-application of the agreement (Conseil d’Etat 2365, 2007/2013, 2780/2012, ECJ decision of 11-07-
1989, C-246/86 Belasco and others v Commission, CRS. 15) or if the agreement has a legitimate 
purpose (Conseil d’Etat 2365, 2007/2013, ECJ of 20-11-1 2008, C-209/07 Beef Industry Development 
Society Ltd ., CRS. 21of 04-06- 2006, C-551/03 P, General Motors BV v Commission, CRS 64, T-
49/02, Brasserie Nationale, etc., v Commission, CRS 85.) Furthermore, in order to have an 
"agreement", within the meaning of the same provisions, the Supreme Court accepted that the 
undertakings concerned must have expressed their joint intention to behave on the market in a certain 
way (Conseil d’Etat 2365, 2007/2013, 2780/2012 ECJ decisions of 15-07-1970, 41/69 ACF 
Chemiefarma v Commission, CRS. 112, and of 29 October 1980, 209/78, etc., Van Landewyck and 
others v Commission, CRS 86, judgment of 26-10-2000, T-41/96 Bayer v Commission, CRS. 67), 
with no care as to the form of expression at that joint intention (Conseil d’Etat 2365, 2007/2013, 
2780/2012, ECJ decisions in ACF Chemiefarma case, CRS. 112, and Van Landewyck, CRS. 86) and 
without being necessarily an agreement that constitutes an obligatory and valid contract, in accordance 
with the national law (Conseil d’Etat 2365, 2007/2013, 2780/2012, ECJ decision of 11-01-1990, 
277/87 Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici v. Commission, CRS13 ). 
Determination of fine  
According to Article 9 N.703/1977 (as amended with Article 4 N.2296/1995 and Article16 
N.3373/2005), if the Competition Authority finds a breach of Para. 1 of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty, it may a) ... b) ... c) ... d) ... e) ... f) impose fines on undertakings, or associations of 
undertakings, which participated in the infringement. 2. The imposed or threatened fine, according to 
the previous paragraph, can reach fifteen percent (15%) of the gross revenue of the business, of the 
current or the previous usage of the infringement. In determining the amount of the fine, the gravity 
and duration of the infringement must be taken into account. ”Within the meaning of that provision, 
the Supreme Court decided that the duration of the infringement constitutes a statutory criterion for the 
determination of the fine, but in a case like this, where the infringement consists in participation in an 
agreement with an anticompetitive context, the criterion of the duration of the infringement cannot be 
implied, since what was critical was the existence of the agreement, regardless of its duration. So, 
there was no further reduction of the fine. 
Notes 
By object/effect approach in the light of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
The mentioned restrictive agreement had a harmful effect on consumer welfare. There is a 
likelihood, a probability, of a harmful effect. This means, there is an assessment of the effect of 
restriction in the light of economic conditions and a counterfactual analysis. 
The duration of the infringement is not taken into account as a criterion, in order to reduce the fine, 
since the infringement consists in the participation in an agreement with an anticompetitive context 
and not in its implementation. 
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The national Supreme Administrative Court refers to previous ECJ case law and to its own case 
law, in its ruling. 
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4.2. SANNA ANTTILA (TURKU COURT OF APPEAL) 
Market Court, Finland 28.2.2013 no 69/2013  
The Supreme Administrative Court 23.8.2013 no 2629  
The Finnish Competition Authority (The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority) vs. 
Asunto-Väylä Ltd. , CSC Consulting Service Centre Ltd., , Hansatalot Ltd., , Kiinteistö Ltd., 
Rovakartano and Sata-Väylä Ltd.  
Introduction  
This case is about judgments by the Finnish Market Court and The Supreme Administrative Court on 
infringements of national competition law. The bid rigging cartel took place in Rovaniemi in 2006 and 
2009. In 2009, the City of Rovaniemi asked the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) to investigate 
the actions of several undertakings that had been taking a part in tenders. In 2011, the FCA took its 
claims to the Market Court.
13
 The Market Court made its ruling in 2013. The penalty payments were 
imposed on two of the five undertakings. The judgment was also about the liability of the other three 
undertakings. The City of Rovaniemi appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, but, according to 
the ruling, it did not have a right of appeal. 
The FCA´s claims and grounds  
The FCA claimed that the Market Court imposes a penalty payment on undertakings that infringed the 
national Competition Act
14
 as follows:  
1) Asunto-Väylä Ltd., Kiinteistö Ltd., Rovakartano and Sata-Väylä Ltd., jointly and severally an 
amount of €50.000,  
2) CSC Consulting Service Centre Ltd., an amount of €15.000, and  
3) Hansatalot Ltd. and Kiinteistö Ltd. and Rovakartano, jointly and severally an amount of 
€30.000. 
At the time the Asunto-Väylä Ltd. was owned by Sata-Väylä Ltd. and the Kiinteistö Ltd. Rovakartano. 
Hansatalot Ltd., was a subsidiary of Kiinteistö Ltd., Rovakartano. According to the FCA, Sata-Väylä 
Ltd. and Kiinteistö Ltd., Rovakartano, had liability for the actions of Asunto-Väylä Ltd., and 
Rovakartano for the actions of Hansatalot.  
According to the FCA, the undertakings had infringed the Competition Act by restraining 
competition through prohibited means. The undertakings had made an agreement to fix the purchase 
prices on two different tenders: the Tenders of the Health care District of Lapland in 2006, and the 
City of Rovaniemi in 2009, both tenders for property. The Deputies of the undertakings Asunto-Väylä, 
CSC and Hansatalot had co-operated in both cases. The tenders had been made partly by the same 
persons and they all had information about the other undertakings’ tenders. The undertakings that had 
made the highest tenders, had withdrawn these tenders to make other undertakings tender become the 
                                                     
13
 At the time, the applicable law was the former Competition Act, which was based on Articles 81 and 82  
14
 The Competition Act, Chapter 2, Section 5, based on Article 101 (formerly 81): Prohibited restraints on competition 
between undertakings (1) All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings,and concerted 
practices by undertakings which have as their object the significant prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, or 
which result in a significant prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, shall be prohibited. (2) In particular, 
agreements, decisions, or practices which: 1) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions;- -„  
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highest tender. Due to the procedure, the price of the property was €150.000 lower in 2009, and 
€51.000 lower in 2006.  
Prohibited co-operation in the 2006 case, according to the FCA: meant that the tenders of the 
Asunto-Väylä and the CSC had been made by same person; the tenders had the same appearance; the 
tender from Hansatalot was precisely €100.000 higher than the tender from Asunto-Väylä, and the 
tender of the CSC was precisely €50.000 higher than the tender by Hansatalot.  
Prohibited co-operation in the 2009 case, according to the FCA  
The tenders from Asunto-Väylä and the CSC had been made by same person; conversations and an 
email between those persons who participated in the tender; the tender by Hansatalot had been 
€51.001 higher than the tender by Asunto-Väylä and the tender from CSC was precisely €51.000 
higher than the tender by Hansatalot; the Procedural in 2009 was in line with the tender in 2006. 
The FCA claimed that a penalty payment should be imposed on the undertakings, because the bid 
rigging cartel had infringed the Competition Act. According to the FCA, the bid rigging cartel is one 
of the severest means with which to restrain competition. The cartel had targeted publicly funded 
operations, like healthcare. This took place in only one city in Finland, so it was geographically 
concise and also the value of the properties was almost €5 million.  
All the Undertakings contested the claims presented.  
The Market Court Proceedings and the Judgment of the Market Court  
The Market Court offered its judgment in 2013. According to the Market Court, Asunto-Väylä Ltd. 
and CSC Consulting Service Center Ltd. had infringed the Competition Act by bid-ridding, and it 
therefore imposed a penalty payment on both undertakings: Asunto-Väylä Ltd. € 40.000 (€20.000 and 
€20.000s) and the CSC €3.000 (€1.500 and €1.500). The other claims were dismissed.  
According to the Market Court, in 2006 and 2009 Asunto-Väylä and CSC had discussed the tender 
prices, or at least the facts affecting the prices, and they prepared the tenders together. There was no 
evidence against Hansatalot. The actions of Asunto-Väylä and CSC were seen to be a contract 
between the undertakings or were, at the least, a uniform procedure, and with this behaviour the 
undertakings had removed the competition between them. The Market Court deemed these actions to 
be prohibited restraints on competition between undertakings.  
The Market Court stated that there were two separate infringements, one in 2006 and the other in 
2009. The infringements were not deemed to be minor,
15
 because the geographical conciseness, and 
even though the infringements occurred within a relatively short time period. The amount of the 
penalty payment for Asunto-Väylä was calculated by their turnover for the year 2008, not the year 
2009, because the undertaking did not have any turnover in 2009.
16
  
The other issue in the judgment was that the owners of Asunto-Väylä, Sata-Väylä and Rovakartano 
were responsible for the actions of Asunto-Väylä.
17
 Legal praxis
18
 has stated that EU competition law 
                                                     
15
 The Competition Act Chapter 3, Section 12: A penalty payment shall be imposed on an undertaking or association of 
undertakings that infringe the provisions of Articles 5 or 7, or Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, unless the conduct shall be deemed to be minor or the imposition of the penalty payment otherwise 
unjustified in respect of thesafeguarding of competition.  
16
 The Court referred to joined cases T-456/05 and T-457/05 and the case T-410/09  
17
 The claims against Hansatalot were dismissed, so there the court didn’t make a statement on the liability of the parent 
company. 
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and legal praxis must be taken into account when considering a penalty payment to an undertaking by 
actions of another undertaking.  
The Market Court referred to joined cases C-628/10 P and C-14/11 P7
19
 and T-314/018
20
 and stated 
that even though the same people had mastery in the undertakings there were no co-operated actions 
de facto and Sata-Väylä and Rovakartano did not have a joint and several penalty imposed upon them 
due to Asunto-Väylä’s action.  
The Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court  
The City of Rovaniemi appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. In the appeal, it claimed that 
Hansatalot Ltd. should also have a penalty payment imposed upon it for its actions. The Supreme 
Administrative Court deemed that the City of Rovaniemi was not a party to the case and it did not 
have a right of appeal.
21
 The Court ruled the appeal inadmissible, without considering its merits, on the 
grounds that it was in default of procedural requirements. 
Comment  
The relevance of this case lies in the liability of the other undertakings. The undertakings had the same 
people in charge of them, but still the Market Court ruled that the owners of Asunto-Väylä were not 
responsible for the actions of Asunto-Väylä. The ownerships and relations are not explained 
completely above, but there were only a few people involved in the case. The main thing that lead to 
the appeal being dismissed was the lack of evidence. In such cases it is probably hard to find solid 
evidence. It does not automatically mean that the undertakings co-operated de facto, even though the 
same people pulled the strings.  
The ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court is also relevant. The City of Rovaniemi started the 
case, but in the end it was not a party to the trial.  
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
18
  The Supreme Administrative Court 2009:83. 
19
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 19th July, 2012 — Alliance One International Inc., Standard Commercial 
Tobacco Co. Inc v Trans-Continental Tobacco Leaf Corp. Ltd , European Commission and European Commission v 
Alliance One International Inc., Standard Commercial Tobacco Co. Inc., Trans-Continental Leaf Tobacco Corp. Ltd. . 
20
 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 27 September 2006. Coöperatieve Verkoop- en 
Productievereniging van Aardappelmeel en Derivaten Avebe BA v Commission of the European Communities. 
Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Sodium gluconate -Article 81 EC - Fine - Liability of the 
parent company for the unlawful conduct of an association without its own legal personality - Article 15(2) of Regulation 
No 17 - Rights of the defence - Exculpatory documents - Principle of proportionality - Obligation for state reasons.. 
21
 Administrative Judicial Procedure Act Chapter 2, Section 6: Any person to whom a decision is addressed or whose right, 
obligation or interest is directly affected by a decision may appeal against the decision.. 
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4.3. ESZTER TAMÁSI (HUNGARIAN OFFICE FOR THE JUDICIARY) 
The Curia of Hungary 
Case No. Kfv.III.37.072/2013/15. 
Plaintiffs: 
No.1 International System House Kft. 
No.2 SAP Hungary Kft. 
No.3 International Business Machines Corporation Magyarország Kft. 
Defendant: 
Hungarian Competition Office (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, GVH) – the state authority for competition 
in Hungary 
1. Summary of the facts 
Five public procurement procedures were published by five of the Hungarian univerities between 24th 
February – 3rd May, 2004, separately. The subject of the public procurement procedure was the 
preparation of integrated economic systems and in some cases – parallel with or in itself – the 
preparation of clinical informatics sytems. 
The defendant (the Hungarian Competition Office) found in its decision that the plaintiffs, together 
with the five universities, prepared an arrangement that was able to restrict competition through a 
concerted practice, in order to increase their chance of winning with parallel entries and - in the case 
of two of the universities - they even infuenced the preparation of the texts of the tenders. 
As a result of the infringement, the defendant imposed the following competition fines on the 
plaintifss: HUF 130.000.000 on Plaintiff No.1., HUF 690.000.000 on each of Plaintiffs No.2 and No.3. 
The plaintiffs performed their contest separately forthis decision. 
2. Judgment of the Metropolitan Court of Budapest 
The Metropolitan Court altered the decision of the Hungarion Compettion Office and reduced the fines 
imposed as follows: HUF 117.000.000, in the case of Plaintiff No.1, and HUF 620.000.000 for each of 
the Plaintiffs No.2 and No.3. 
In its judgment, the Metropolitan Court highlighted that the affected market was the five economics 
and control systems, and the medical informatics system for the procurement was published by the 
five universities. 
The Court also articulated that the agreement between the plaintiffs was clearly made in relation to 
public procurement procedures and contained parts that directly targeted the sharing of the market 
among themselves.  
It was declared also that in order to state the sharing of market it is not necessary that all the 
competitors take part or that the sharing is successful, but an agreement targeting these results is 
sufficient. 
Each of the plaintiffs, and also the defendant, appealed against this judgment. 
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3. Judgment of the Metropolitan Court Of Appeal 
The Metropolitan Court of Appeal approved the judgmentof the First Instance. 
It was declared by the Court of Second Instance that, in this case, five separate markets were 
affected, i. e., the whole of the public procurement represented different markets. 
The Court of Second-Instance highlighted that the behaviour of the plaintiffs targeted the cartel so 
as to share the market and in this regard it was not necessary to investigate the affected market and the 
share of the plaintiffs in this. 
The participants cannot be acquitted from the prohibition of forming a cartel, even if their 
participation in the market is low, since the sharing of the market is seriously restricted and distorts the 
competition, as declared by Hungarian law. 
It was emphasised by the Court of Second-Instance that the prohibition of the limitation of 
competition was harmed by the cooperation of the plaintiffs in targeting the mutual winning of the 
tenders by the universities. The plaintiffs coordinated their behaviour in order to exclude other 
competitiors, and they made their steps into the market based on this cooperation.  
All the plaintiffs asked for a revision of this decision. 
4. Judgment of the Curia of Hungary 
The Curia stated that the applications for revision are insufficiently substantiated. 
According to the standpoint of the Curia, all the courts dealing with the case investigated and stated 
the facts in the necessary depth and, in the opinion of the Court, the statement of facts was clear and a 
correct legal conclusion was reached. 
In its sentence the Curia made it clear that among the plaintiffs an agreement targeting the sharing 
of the market was found, and this cooperation resulted in the minimising of the competition. It is thus 
a serious restriction of competition. 
Based on the above mentioned facts, it is clear that a common accord that certainly resricted the 
competition was developed. 
In order to point out the violation of the prohibition of resriction of competition it was sufficient to 
prove that behaviour distorting and restricting competion was found. 
5. Personal comments 
This case was one of the biggest cartel cases in recent years. 
It raises sensitive issues regarding state financed public procurement projects.  
For me, it is important that the process of the whole procedure behaviour that distorts and restricts 
competition is sufficient to point out the violation of the erelevant rules. It is also important that, in 
this sense, the Hungarian national law is in strict harmony with European law (Article 101 (1) TFEU). 
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4.4. STEFAN SCHLOTTER (GERMAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE) 
Court: Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) 1. Senat 2. Kammer  
Date: August 20th, 2015.  
File number: 1 BvR 980/15  
Type of decision: Order of rejection 
1
st
. Instance: OLG (Regional Court of Appeal) Düsseldorf, Febr. 10
th
, 2014, Az: V-4 Kart 5/11 
OWi 
2
nd
. Instance: BGH (Federal Court of Justice) January 2
nd
; 2015, Az: KRB 39/14 
The German Federal Constitutional Court refused to hear the complaint that was brought by Melitta 
Europa GmbH & Co. KG (“Melitta Europe”) as the legal successor of its former affiliate, Melitta 
Kaffee GmbH (“Melitta Kaffee”), against several court decisions confirming fines imposed on Melitta 
Europe, despite its restructuring. 
The FCC thus confirmed the Federal Court of Justice’s (FCJ) position, according to which a new 
entity is “identical” to a cartel infringer – and is consequently liable for cartel infringements that are 
perpetrated by their predecessor – not only once such an entity continues (virtually) unchanged with 
its predecessor’s business, but also if its assets include, in an undiminished form, the assets of the 
cartel infringer. 
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, this approach does not infringe constitutional 
principles (“nulla poena sine lege”). The imposition of fines on successor companies can thus be 
based on Section 30(1) of the German Act on Misdemeanors without infringing constitutional 
boundaries. 
The Court confirms, that Section 30 (1) of the German Act on Misdemeanors can be applied, and 
this is where a lay person should view the new company and the old as being the same undertaking. 
Fining the new entity is congruent not only with the literal meaning of this Section, but also with its 
statutory purpose.  
This decision is important as it gives leeway to the legislator to bring the German system in line 
with the EU system as to the liability of restructured enterprises. 
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5. Vertical restraints 
5.1. JELENA ČUVELIAK (ZAGREB COMMERCIAL COURT) 
Case No.: the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia, Ref. No UsII-4/15 of July 
16th, 2015.  
Case: Narodni trgovački lanac d.o.o. and Kraš d.d. vs. CCA of December 3rd, 2014 . 
Class: UP/I 034-03/2013-01/016  
Case: CCA v Kraš d.d., Zagreb and Narodni trgovački lanac d.o.o., Sesvete  
The Croatian Competition Agency established, in the course of the proceedings, that the agreement 
between the undertakings Kraš and Narodni trgovački lanac (NTL), that was in force for almost four 
years, from October, 2010, to July, 2014, contained restrictive provisions involving resale price 
maintenance. The sanctions imposed by the CCA amount to more than 2, 5 million Kuna. Namely, 
under the sales agreement, Kraš and NTL agreed upon minimum resale price maintenance in 
accordance with which the distribution chain NTL was not allowed to sell Kraš’ products below the 
agreed price. Otherwise, Kraš was entitled to refuse to supply and NTL might have lost its extra 
bonuses.  
Facts of the case  
In the case Class: 031-02/11-01/012, the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) conducted market 
research into food, beverages and sanitary products’ distribution in the Republic of Croatia for 2010 in 
which it asked the undertakings that were active in this market to communicate to the CCA particular 
documents. Among other undertakings, the undertaking, Kraš d.d., with its seat in Zagreb, Ravnice 48 
(Kraš), was also requested to communicate with the CCA and give it copies of its commercial 
agreements with its major trade partners.  
It was established in the analysis of the documentation received that it contained strong indices that 
certain provisions of the sales agreement between Kraš and the undertaking Narodni trgovački lanas 
d.o.o., with its seat in Sesvete, Soblinec, Soblinečka 55 (NTL), contravene the Regulation on Block 
Exemption that was granted to undertakings that were active at different levels in the production or 
distribution chain (OG 51/04), and the Regulation on Block Exemption is granted to certain categories 
of vertical agreements (OG 37/11) and so thereby constitutes a prohibited agreement within the 
meaning of Article 8 of the Competition Act (OG 79/09 and 80/13).  
On the basis of the above indices the CCA issued a procedural order, UP/I 034-03/13-01/016, 
opening the proceeding against Kraš and NTL on 23rd May, 2013, to assess whether the provisions 
that were being challenged were contained in the said sales agreements and constitute a prohibited 
agreement within the meaning of Article 8 of the Competition Act.  
Following the proceeding, the Competition Council, in its 23/2014 session, held on 3rd July, 2014, 
within its powers under Article 30 of the Competition Act, found that the undertakings Kraš and NTL 
had concluded a prohibited agreement that had as it object or effect the prevention, restriction and 
distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 8 Paragraph 1 Item 1 of the Competition Act. 
The duration of the infringement was defined to cover the period from 1st October, 2010, to 3rd July, 
2014.  
Namely, the Competition Council established that Article 6 Paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of the sales 
agreement for 2010 which was concluded between Kraš and NTL on 12th July, 2010, and Article 6 
Paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of the sales agreement for 2012, concluded between the same undertakings on 
2nd July, 2012, contained provisions that committed NTL not to sell the products supplied by Kraš 
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beneath the price that was set out in the Kraš’ price list that was in force, and provided for retaliation 
in the case that NTL did not comply with the agreed minimum resale price maintenance. These 
restrictive provisions constitute a hardcore restriction of competition, which is prohibited under Article 
9 Paragraph 1 Item a) of the above mentioned 2004 Regulation on vertical agreements, which was in 
force until 7th April, 2011, and Article 9 Paragraph 1 Item a) of the 2011 Regulation on vertical 
agreements. I other words, it constitutes a prohibited agreement under Article 8 Paragraph 1 Item 1 of 
the Competition Act.  
With respect to the sales agreement for 2009, which was concluded on 18th May, 2009, which 
contained identical competition concerns, the Competition Council found it was applied in its entirety 
before 1st October, 2010, that is to say, before the 2010 Competition Act entered into force, bringing 
new powers to the CCA. It was thus the view of the Competition Council that the provisions of the 
2010 Competition Act which is now in force could not be applied to the sales agreement for 2009, nor 
could any sanctions be imposed for the infringements committed in the period when the 2003 
Competition Act was in effect.  
Following a separate proceeding involving a definition of the level of fines, the Competition 
Council, in its 48/2014 session held on 3rd December, 2014, established the conditions for the 
imposition of fines and other relevant circumstances for setting their level. When setting the level of 
fines the Competition Council took particularly into account the fact that, in this concrete case, the 
prohibited agreement produces, or may produce, effects in the territory of the Republic of Croatia 
between undertakings that do not operate at the same level of the production or distribution chain, 
whereas the challenged provisions have been introduced in the said agreements at the Kraš’ initiative. 
The Competition Council took into account also the fact that, in practice, the infringement had actually 
not been committed.  
Acknowledging all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances with respect to both parties to 
the agreement, the Council found that the mitigating factor was that the provisions concerned had not 
been applied in practice and despite the presence of the prohibited agreement, the parties to the 
agreement otherwise observed the competition rules. No aggravating factors were established, either 
for Kraš, or for NTL.  
Taking what has been said above into account, including all the circumstances of this case, 
pursuant to the set criteria, the CCA imposed a fine on Kraš in the amount of 1.560,600 Kuna and on 
NTL in an amount of 1.022,000 Kuna. It is the opinion of the CCA that the fines imposed are adequate 
for the said infringements, at the same time they produce a preventative effect on the participating 
undertakings, but also act to produce a deterrent effect, which should keep other undertakings from 
any further infringements of competition law in the form of restrictive agreements.  
Ruling of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia  
Against the decision of the Croatian Competition Agency undertakings, NTL and Kraš filed a claim 
and the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia (Ref. No UsII-4/15 of July 16th, 2015.) 
dismissed the claim made by the undertakings NTL and Kraš.  
The Court finds that in the proceeding concerned the facts of the case were correctly and 
completely established, that the substantive law was correctly applied, and that no breach of 
procedural rules was committed. In the assessment of the Court the defendant had taken all of the 
relevant facts and circumstances of the case into account when imposing the fine that is defined in the 
fine setting procedure, including the long duration of the infringement, and provided a detailed 
explanation of its decision, which this Court accepts.  
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Comment 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this entire case on a prohibited agreement is prevention. 
Agreeing on a minimum resale price (resale price maintenance) constitutes a hardcore restriction of 
competition that is prohibited under competition rules, with no exception, even where such a 
restrictive provision is not applied in practice. Concretely, the supplier imposes a restriction on the 
seller to freely set the prices, which directly affects the interests of the final consumer.  
In this particular case, the CCA did not find evidence that the prohibited provisions had been 
applied in practice. However, given that they had been repeatedly incorporated into three subsequent 
contracts and that they had been in force for almost four years, Kraš was in the position to impose 
them at any time and to stop the supply to NTL and deprive them of their extra bonuses. 
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5.2. ANNE MARIE WITTERS (BRUSSELS COMMERCIAL COURT) 
Ducati North Europe BV v/ DD Bikes BVBA case number 2010/AR/3351 Decision of the Ghent 
Court of Appeal of 1st October, 2014.  
Brief summary of the relevant facts and of the procedural background of the dispute 
Ducati is responsible for the production and the sales of Ducati motorcycles and accessories in 
Northern Europe. DD Bikes was an authorised dealer and repairer of Ducati motorcycles for 22 years. 
The agreement between Ducati and DD Bikes was not laid down in writing. According to DD Bikes, 
95% of its activities were related to the sales or repairs of Ducati products. 
On 26th October, 2007, Ducati terminated the contract granting DD Bikes a notice period which 
(after discussion) was extended until 31t December, 2008. DD Bikes formally requested to be granted, 
after the expiry of the notice, the status of an authorised repairer of Ducati motorcycles, so as to keep 
the right to use the official Ducati logo, to order components and spare parts under the same conditions 
as other authorised repairers and to carry out repairs covered by the two-year warranty that is 
applicable to Ducati motorcycles. However, Ducati refused to grant such status, arguing that only 
authorised Ducati dealers would be admitted as authorised repairers. As a result, DD Bikes filed a 
complaint for unfair commercial practices before the Commercial Court of Dendermonde (in fact, 
before the President of the Commercial Court, seeking in essence a cease and desist order). 
In its November 3rd, 2010, judgment, the Commercial Court in Dendermonde (ruling in the First 
Instance on the merits) noted that the repair of Ducati motorcycles was not part of the same market as 
the sale of Ducati motorcycles and that, unlike the market for the sale of motorcycles, the repair 
market was brand-specific. The Commercial Court also found the brand-specific market for after-sales 
services to be national in scope. The Commercial Court then ruled that Ducati's distribution system 
could not benefit from the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption (as Ducati's market share in the 
after-sales market exceeded 30%), or from an individual exemption under Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter referred to as “TFEU”). According to the 
Commercial Court, Ducati unnecessarily forced repairers to also be dealers, in order to be considered 
as authorised Ducati repairers. Ducati also foreclosed competition from repairers who were not 
authorised dealers, notably by refusing to apply the two-year warranty on motorcycles repaired by 
repairers who were not Ducati dealers, and by limiting access to technical information, specialised 
tools, parts and accessories to authorised dealers (independent repairers could only purchase parts and 
accessories from competing authorised dealers/repairers at a significantly higher price). As a result, 
the Commercial Court found this system to constitute an anticompetitive agreement prohibited by 
Article 101 TFEU and Article IV.1 of the Belgian Economic Law Code (“Wetboek Economisch 
Recht” hereafter referred to as “WER”). 
In addition, the Commercial Court of Dendermonde noted that Ducati was dominant in the market 
for after-sales services for Ducati motorcycles in Belgium. It stated that the owners of Ducati 
motorcycles are likely to use the services of authorised Ducati repairers and original Ducati spare parts 
for various reasons, including the fact that the quantitative number of independent repairers is limited. 
After finding Ducati to be dominant in the market, the Commercial Court found that Ducati's decision 
to only allow its authorised dealers to become authorised repairers constituted an abuse of its dominant 
position, since it prevented independent repairers from competing effectively with official Ducati 
repairers. 
The Commercial Court (in the First Instance) ordered Ducati to cease / end its refusal to grant DD 
Bikes the status of an authorised repairer of Ducati motorcycles.  
Ducati appealed this judgment before the Court of Appeal of Ghent, which partially upheld the 
judgment of the Commercial Court. 
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Summary of the judicial proceedings before the Court of Appeal of Ghent 
In its judgment of 1st October, 2014, the Court of Appeal followed the Commercial Court's reasoning 
on the definition of the relevant market. However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Commercial 
Court as regards the infringement of Articles IV.1 of the WER and 101 TFEU. According to the Court 
of Appeal, DD Bikes had not established that Ducati's refusal to grant DD Bikes the status of an 
authorised repairer was based on an agreement between Ducati and its authorised dealers or repairers. 
Ducati's refusal to admit DD Bikes to its authorised repairers' network therefore constituted unilateral 
behaviour, which falls outside of the scope of Articles 101 TFEU and IV.1 of the WER. 
However, the Court of Appeal confirmed the existence of an abuse of Ducati's dominant position in 
the Belgian market for after-sales services for Ducati motorcycles. Firstly, the Court found Ducati to 
be dominant in this market, and noted that independent repairers could not exert any countervailing 
market power owing to the limitations applied to the manufacturer's warranty and the restricted access 
to parts, specific tools and technical information. Then the Court stated that although companies are in 
principle free to choose their business partners and how to dispose of their own property, dominant 
companies, such as Ducati, cannot refuse to sell a product - or sell it under unreasonable conditions - 
in a way that restricts competition. According to the Court, Ducati had abused its dominant position by 
preventing DD Bikes from directly obtaining, from Ducati, and under the same conditions as Ducati 
dealers, the motorcycle parts, equipment, technical information and tools that are necessary to repair 
Ducati motorcycles. As a result, DD Bikes could not effectively compete in the market for the 
maintenance and repair of Ducati motorcycles. 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal found that Ducati's conduct did not have an effect on trade 
between Member States since DD Bikes was only active in the Dendermonde region of Belgium and, 
as a result, it ruled that only the Belgian competition rules, and not Article 102 TFEU, should be 
applied to the present case. 
Ruling of the Court 
The Court of Appeal, in essence, ordered Ducati to enable DD Bikes to repair and maintain Ducati 
motorcycles under competitive conditions by supplying it with technical information, specialised 
tools, software and parts, on the same terms as authorised dealers, and imposed a periodic penalty 
payment of €1,000 per day (with a maximum of €200,000) in the case that Ducati failed to do so. 
 
Personal comment 
The case is very interesting for several reasons, and certainly because the Commercial Court of 
Dendermonde requested assistance from the European Commission on the interpretation of 
competition law rules. In an interim decision of 28th January, 2009, the Commercial Court of 
Dendermonde raised a number of questions to the European Commission, to which the European 
Commission replied by a letter of 17th November, 2009, as follows (this is an unofficial summary in 
English of the main replies by the European Commission to the questions which were formulated in 
Dutch) : 
- Whether the Commission has a procedure pending in relation to the behaviour with which the 
case in hand is concerned, to which the answer was that this is not the case. 
- Whether the setting up of a selective distribution network by Ducati has such a nature as to 
have an appreciable effect on trade between the Member States. The Commission reiterated 
the conditions for an appreciable effect on trade between the Member States from the relevant 
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2016 
51 
Commission Guidelines and stated that it is for the national court to determine whether these 
conditions have been fulfilled in the concrete case at hand. 
- How the relevant product market should be defined, and what the impact on the application of 
the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2790/1999 would be. The Commission stated that it 
had not yet taken a position on the definition of the relevant market at issue in its own 
decisions and that it is for the national court to come to such a definition in the context of the 
specific case at hand. It furthermore explained the application of the market share threshold 
from the BER. 
- Whether the selective distribution network of Ducati qualifies for an individual exemption. 
The Commission gave general guidance on factors that could be taken into account, leaving 
the specific assessment of the case to the national court. 
- Questions on the qualification of certain conditions of the selective distribution network as 
qualitative or quantitative conditions. The Commission gave general guidance on the 
distinction, leaving the specific assessment of the case to the national court. 
- Whether or not Ducati has a dominant position in the relevant market, and whether or not it 
has abused such a dominant position. The Commission gave general guidance on factors that 
could be taken into account, leaving the specific assessment of the case to the national court. 
Moreover, this is an excellent illustration of (a particular form of) private enforcement, whereby a 
former dealer gains the right to be supplied with information, tools and parts, in the same way and 
according to the same conditions as authorised dealers, on the basis of the competition law rules. 
There are some authors who question the definition of the relevant market and the calculation of 
the market share by the Court of Appeal and who request a more thorough economic analysis in 
relation to the potential abuse of Ducati's dominant position in the Belgian market for after-sales 
services for Ducati motorcycles. 
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5.3. PETYA STOILOVA (SOFIA ADMINISTRATIVE COURT) 
Star JSC – producer of sunflower oil and the distributer “Trade and Tourism” JSC v. Commission 
for Protection of competition 
Decision No. 844 from 11.07.2013 of the Commission for Protection of Competition, Case 
N633/2012 
Decision No. 5873 from 29.04.2014 of the Supreme Administrative Court – First Instance (three 
member panel), Case No. 11185/2013 
Decision No. 11427 from 30.09.2014 of the Supreme Administrative Court – Second Instance 
(five member panel), Case N8662/2014 
I. Summary of the facts 
In September, 2004, a contract was signed between two Bulgarian companies: the producer “Star“ JSC 
and the distributor, “Trade and Tourism” JSC. 
It was signed under the General terms and conditions for sale of "Star" JSC, with which the 
distributor was familiar and which they accepted, certified by the signatures of both parties. Under the 
contract, "Star" was obliged to sell to the distributor, “Trade and Tourism", bottled sunflower oil, by 
giving the latter the exclusive right to distribute the full range of types of bottled oil produced by 
“Star” in the territory of Bulgaria. The distributor would sell goods purchased from "Star" to third 
parties, on its behalf and at its expense, not engaging the seller legally. The distributor had no 
representative rights with regard to the seller. “Trade and Tourism" were obliged to comply with the 
pricing policy and the recommended selling prices that was set by the seller's price list. The seller, 
"Star", had the right to change prices and, in the case of a change, he should notify the distributor in 
writing with 7 days’ notice. This notice should be sent by fax. The ownership of the goods received by 
the distributor was transferred to him on payment of the full cost, including related interest and 
penalties if there were any. Under The General Terms and the conditions for sale of "Star", the 
distributor might not sell to a third-party products below the officially announced price that was the 
seller’s policy, this obligation applied to all of retail outlets of the distributor. 
In January, 2009, a new distribution agreement with altered clauses in Section IV "Rights and 
obligations of the distributor”, was signed between “Star” and “Trade and Tourism”. The obligation of 
the distributor, when selling bottled oil to third parties, to implement the "recommended selling prices 
set by the seller's price list" was repealed, but, in Point 14, the new contract provided that when selling 
the products to a third party, the distributor "is obliged to adhere to the pricing set by the seller." The 
seller was entitled to change the prices. In the case of change, it was obliged to inform the distributor 
in writing with 7 days’ notice. This notice should be sent by fax or e-mail. 
The Bulgarian Commission for the protection of competition initiated proceedings ex officio, after 
an analysis was made of the competitive environment in both of the interrelated markets for the 
production and tradeof sunflower oil in the domestic market.  
The Commission for the Protection of Competition, in its Decision № 844 of 07.11.2013, case № 
CPC-633/2012, decided that "Star" and "Trade and Tourism" had committed an infringement under 
Article 15, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law on the Protection of Competition, which was expressed in a 
prohibited vertical agreement which, by its ordering, prevents, restricts or distorts competition in the 
market for bottled sunflower oil for final consumption in the national territory, by establishing fixed 
and minimum resale prices. The Commission imposed on "Star" JSC and "Trade and Tourism" JSC 
fines, respectively, for "Star," this amounted to 85 673 Levs, and "Trade and Tourism’s" fine 
amounted to 76 154 Levs. 
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II. Judicial proceedings 
The two sanctioned companies appealed the Decision of the CPC before the Supreme Administrative 
Court of the Republic of Bulgaria - three member panel as a First Instance.  
In its appeal, "Star" pointed out that the contractual relationship between the two companies lacks 
an anticompetitive purpose, and / or effect, on the market of bottled sunflower oil for final 
consumption in the national territory, and their behaviour was wrongly classified in the hypothesis of 
Article 15 Para. 1 p. 1 of the LPC. It is claimed that the prices agreed are recommendatory and not 
binding under the agreement. The CPC, according to the claim, did not take into account all of the 
extenuating circumstances, and thereby wrongly determined the amount of the penalty. "Star" pleaded 
for the CPC decision to be cancelled, or alternatively it asked that the fine be reduced, bearing in mind 
all the extenuating circumstances. 
In "Trade and Tourism’s" appeal arguments are developed in such a direction that the contractual 
relations between the two companies did not affect or influence the other participants in the product 
market for bottled sunflower oil, since there is no agreed and fixed resale prices. It is argued that the 
amount of the fine is excessive and does not correspond in proportion to the infringement. It was also 
alleged that the CPC failed to consider all of the mitigating circumstances. This applicant also pleads 
against the CPC’s decision, which found that "Star" and "Trade and Tourism" had committed an 
infringement under Article 15, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law on the Protection of Competition, 
resulting in a prohibited vertical agreement being entirely repealed. Alternatively, a reduction of the 
sanction imposed by the CPC was requested. 
The Supreme Administrative Court – First Instance found that the complaints were procedurally 
admissible but were essentially unfounded. 
The Supreme Administrative Court - Second Instance found the decision of the First Instance Court 
to be correct and upheld it. 
III. Ruling of the Court 
According to the Court, the CPC carried out a comprehensive, complete and objective investigation of 
the case, resulting in the clarification of the relevant facts in the dispute. The parties were given the 
opportunity to give opinions and to file requests, to submit evidence and to become acquainted with 
the materials of the case. The Commission's decision is correct and properly reasoned, including the 
application of the methodology for the individualisation of the seriousness of the offence and the 
amount of the sanction. 
The Court considers that the Bulgarian Commission for the protection of competition has defined 
the relevant market, which appears to be affected by the above - mentioned distribution contracts 
between "Star" and "Trade and Tourism" in its decision. Within the meaning of §1, Point 15 of the 
Supplementary Provisions of the Bulgarian Law on the Protection of Competition, the “Relevant 
market” shall consist of: 
(a) the “Product market” --including all goods or services which could be accepted by consumers 
as being interchangeable in respect of their characteristics, intended use and price; 
(b) the “Geographical market” -- including a specific territory on which the corresponding 
interchangeable goods or services are offered, and on which the conditions of competition are 
the same, while differing from those in neighbouring areas. 
The Court of First Instance consider legitimate and well-founded the conclusions of the Commission 
for the protection of competition that, in this case, the relevant product market should be defined as the 
trade in bottled sunflower oil for final consumption, while the affected market is limited to the vertical 
agreements (distribution agreements) between the supplier-manufacturer of bottled sunflower oil and 
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the buyer (distributor) in the wholesale market, whose business is focused on the realisation of the 
product in the retail market. Properly, the Commission defined the geographical market as being 
national, as evidenced by the signed distribution contracts, "Trade and Tourism" performs trade 
services throughout the country. 
The CPC, says the Court, has correctly identified the relevant period of action for the agreements 
between "Star" and "Trade and Tourism", covering the period from the signing of a distribution 
agreement in 09.2004 until the termination of the contractual relations between “Zvezda’’ and "Trade 
and Tourism" on 17.12.2009. The Court accepted as being unfounded the objections in the complaints 
that the contractual relationship between ‘’Trade and Tourism’’ and ‘’Star’’ lacks an anticompetitive 
purpose and / or effect upon the market for bottled sunflower oil for final consumption within the 
national territory and the behaviour of the two companies as held under the hypothesis of Article 15 
Para. 1 P. 1 of the Law on the Protection of Competition /LPC/. 
With the provision of Article 15, Para. 1 of the LPC it is established that there is a general 
prohibition on all types of agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of 
undertakings, as well as the concerted practices of two or more undertakings that have, as their object 
or effect, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the relevant market, such as those 
which: 
1. directly or indirectly fix prices or other trading conditions; 
2. share markets or sources of supply; 
3. limit or control production, trade, technical development or investment; 
4. apply to certain partners dissimilar conditions for equivalent transactions, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
5. make the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance by the other party of supplementary 
obligations, or to the conclusion of additional contracts which, by their nature, or in 
accordance with commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the main contract 
or its performance. 
According to Para. 2: any agreements and decisions referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be null and void.  
In order to implement the ban under Article 15, Para. 1 of LPC it is necessary to establish the 
cumulative existence of all of the elements of the provision: 
- the parties to the proceedings must have the quality of " undertakings,"; 
- the existence of an agreement and / or concerted practice between the parties, and  
- that there is an anticompetitive effect that represents, as its object or effect, the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition.  
The Court agrees that, in this case, the three constituent elements of Article 15 Para. 1 p. 1 of the CPA 
are evident for the following reasons: 
- According to §1, Pt. 7 of the Additional Provisions of the CPA: “Undertaking” shall mean any 
natural person, legal entity, or unincorporated entity which carries out economic activities, 
regardless of its legal and organisational form. In this case, "Star" produces and sells bottled 
refined sunflower oil and "Trade and Tourism" operates activities for the wholesale / 
distribution of bottled refined sunflower oil/, which by their nature are economic activities. 
Consequently, “Star” and "Trade and Tourism" constitute undertakings within the meaning of 
§ 1, Item 7 of the AP of LPC. 
- The term "agreement between undertakings" within the meaning of the CPA covers all forms 
of agreement or understanding between parties in relation to their market behaviour. 
According to European practice (Case T-7/89 SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission 
[1991] ECR II- 1711, Case T-41/96 Bayer AG v. Commission [2000] ECR II- 3383, Case 
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28/77 Tepea Bv v. Commission [1978] ECR 1391, etc.), in order for an agreement to be 
established, the matching desires of at least two undertakings should exist. Agreement may 
have any form or name, but what matters is its essence. It may be written or oral, signed or 
unsigned, named or unnamed, can be objectified in a document that has a different name, can 
be highlighted and implied in the activities of businesses as being their specific line of conduct 
on the market. In this case, there was a signed contract for the distribution of bottled refined 
sunflower oil between the parties. General Terms and Conditions and Annexes in which they 
both have expressed their will to conduct a certain market behaviour and, in particular, to 
implement a certain price policy. In these agreements the parties have reached a mutual 
understanding of their market behaviour and therefore these are agreements between 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 15 of the CPA. 
- The last item that is relevant to Article 15, Paragraph 1 of the LPC: is the agreement in its 
purpose or effect, likely toe able to cause certain anticompetitive effects by preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition because of the very nature of the agreement or in view of 
its result. It should be pointed out that an anticompetitive effect may consist in their businesses 
aim of restricting competition between them, and in its actual restriction (i.e., a certain 
anticompetitive effect to appear on the market - both real and potential). In this sense, 
agreements which have as their object, directly or indirectly, the fixing of prices, the 
allocation of markets or customers, or limiting production and sales, always have as their 
object the restriction of competition between companies. Their potential for damage to market 
relations and consumer interests is so strong that when there are such agreements, they need 
not to have been actually performed by participants and/or have given rise to a certain result 
being banned by law. Vertical agreements for fixing prices may be expressed in terms of 
fixing resale prices or of a minimum resale price at which the distributor or dealer can provide 
certain goods or services on the market, depriving themselves from the opportunity freely and 
independently to determine the prices of products to customers under the effects of natural 
market forces and pressure from competitors. 
The parties thus voluntarily draw back from the risk of effective competition by replacing it with the 
agreement concluded between them. The very fact that there is denial of competition concerning the 
main element of a trade policy, namely, pricing, means that both companies primarily waive 
competition with each other. This in itself, in terms of competition law, is a violation, which aims to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition in the relevant market, without requiring the occurrence of any 
particular result. In this sense European practice is established (Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten 
and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299; Jointed Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v. 
Commission [1966] ECR 299; Case C- 199/1992 P, Huls AG v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287; 
Joined Cases 96-102, 104, 105, 108, 110/82, IAZ International Belgium v Commission [1983] ECR 
3369). 
The Second Instance of the Court, in its decision, confirms that the anticompetitive object is one of 
the two alternatives unlawful consequences to which we have referred, whose presence is sufficient 
proof of the infringement of the general prohibition, without having to prove also that there was an 
anticompetitive effect. Moreover, an anticompetitive object, within the meaning of the general 
prohibition, may exist even if the undertakings involved in the prohibited agreement are not aware of 
it and do not realise that they infringe the general prohibition. The practice of the EU Court of Justice 
is quoted in this sense: Case 246/86 BELASCO v. Commission. The final court instance founds lawful 
the argument of the defendant in cassation, that when implementing the competition law what matters 
are not the subjective intentions but the objective nature of the contracts and the potential effect that 
they are able to produce in the relevant markets that are affected. 
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IV. Comment 
The case presented is a typical example of a prohibited vertical agreement between producer and 
distributor which is able to restrict and destroy price competition in the relevant market, which in turn 
would reflect negatively on the interests of the consumers of bottled sunflower oil. The agreements of 
the kind presented are illegal in themselves (per se), even if they have still not produced a real effect in 
the market. The case is therefore not covered by the exceptions from the General Prohibition of 
Anticompetitive Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices, which is regulated by Bulgarian law, 
and which cannot be defined as being an agreement of minor importance, so it is an ordinary case and 
is thus subject to penalties. 
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6. Decisions of associations of undertakings and factors facilitating concerted practices 
6.1. PIETRO SPERA (COURT OF GENOA) 
Introduction  
The Law 4/8/2006 started the liberalisation of freelance professions in Italy, and this included the 
profession of private attorney. Before this Law there was a strict system of tariffs and various other 
limitations, for instance, about commercial advertising and law firms in the form of limited 
companies. 
After a long process, the matter is now regulated by Law 31/12 2012 n. 247 which, among other 
things, states: 
- Article 13: the fees can be freely agreed between client and attorney; 
- Article 10: the attorney is allowed to advertise his/her legal business. 
 
--------------------- 
The decision of the Antitrust 
1. On 19/11/2012 the Italian Antitrust Authority learned that on the website of the Italian Bar 
Association (IBA) an old circular, n. 22-C/2006, had been published since 2008.  
This circular contained a questionable interpretation of the new rules about the liberalisation of 
professions, and of tariffs in particular: the circular states that disciplinary matters can be more 
restrictive than ordinary laws. The consequence is that – even if from a legal point of view the 
minimum tariffs stated in the old professional law were no longer binding (from a deontological point 
of view), however, the agreement between a lawyer and his/her client about a fee under those 
minimum charges set could be illicit/unfair, because compensation that is ridiculously low is offensive 
and goes against the dignity of the profession. 
The Antitrust asked for information. The IBA answered that the publication on the website of this 
old circular (y. 2006) was a mistake, and it would be moved to the section of the website about the 
History of the Legal Profession. 
2. Additionally, on 28/5/2013 the Antitrust discovered that the IBA had published, on its website, an 
opinion (no. 48 of 11/7/2012), in which they stated that the promotion of a legal business/firm on a 
website that specialised in advertisements could be subject to disciplinary action. 
3. Based on these facts, in July, 2013, the Antitrust started an investigation that aimed to verify if the 
two mentioned acts – Circular 2006, about minimum fees, and opinion 2012 about the advertising of 
business – constitute violations of Article 101 TFUE.  
In 2014, after the investigation, the Authority deemed that those acts were “decisions by 
association of undertakings which restricted the competition among professionals (101 TFEU)”. The 
Authority also believed that the two Acts were a part of a unique plan, which aimed to limit the 
economic freedom in the market of private attorneys. At the end, the Authority sanctioned the IBA 
with a fine of 913.000 €. 
--------------------- 
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The complaint/appeal of the IBA to the Administrative Court 
The IBA challenged the decision of the Authority before the Administrative Court in Rome. The 
complaint was based on the following major reasons: 
1. The Authority wrongfully applied Article 101 of TFEU; 
2. The circular and the opinion of the IBA did not fall into the provision of Article 101; 
3. The Authority did not have the power to judge the acts of the IBA; 
4. The decision about the fees did not impose minimum mandatory prices; 
5. As for commercial advertising, lawyers may advertise their business through websites, but 
they cannot utilise a system where a broker intermediates between the professional and the 
client (as in the present case); 
6. The sanction (€913.000) was too high. 
We will now briefly discuss the reasoning and the decision of the Administrative Court, starting with 
the circular n. 22-C/2006 which is related to the minimum fees. 
The decision of the Court (1/7/2015) on the Circular (fees) 
1. On the wrongful application of Article 101, according to the IBA, the same IBA cannot be qualified 
as an “association of undertakings” under Article 101 because the IBA is a public body. 
The Court took into consideration Italian Competition Law and the precedent decisions of the ECJ 
(18/7/13 C-136/12). According to these principles: 
- “agreement between undertakings” and “decisions by associations of undertakings and similar 
bodies” are equivalent (under 101) and no intention to earn profits is required: public bodies 
are not excluded; 
- Additionally, the concept of an “undertaking” for the purpose of EU antitrust law, includes 
any entity engaged in an economic activity, that is to say, any activity that offers goods or 
services in a given market, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed: 
the profession of an attorney is therefore included. 
As a consequence of this definition, since the profession of lawyers is included, the IBA can be 
considered to be an “association of undertakings” under Article 101. 
The first reasoning of the NLC was then rejected. 
2. The second defence of the IBA was that the circular of the IBA did not fall into the provision of 
Article 101 because it did not set up fees for lawyers services. 
The Court referred to the definition under letter a) in Article 101: “directly or indirectly fixing 
selling prices”. According to the Court, a wide interpretation of this definition includes all the 
decisions that could affect the freedom of a professional in deciding the price at which s/he offers his 
services, as in this case. 
This second argument was therefore also rejected. 
3. With a further defence, IBA argued that the sanction applied by the Authority had essentially the 
nature of a criminal sanction. However, the Authority did not have the power to apply criminal 
sanctions because its structure did not separate the investigative role and the adjudicative role, 
concentrating both the functions into the same body. This structure would then affect the impartiality 
of the Authority itself and violate Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. 
This argument was not shared by the Court. 
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Indeed, it is true that the Antitrust Authority concentrates the investigative and the adjudicative 
functions into the same body. However, the solid jurisprudence of the ECHR states that in a case 
where an administrative body issues penal sanctions, what really matters is the possibility for the 
defendant to challenge such a decision before an independent judicial body. 
This is indeed what happened in the specific case:  
- the IBA appealed the decision of the Authority before the Administrative Court; 
- the decision of the Administrative Court can be further appealed before the State Council 
(Consiglio di Stato); 
- both Courts are fully independent, impartial, judicial bodies, in which a full right of defence is 
effectively guaranteed. 
4. The further defence of the IBA referred only to the publication (in 2008) of the circular (issued in 
2006) about the fees (not that about advertising, which will be discussed later). 
According to the IBA, in fact, the circular about the fees did not impose any minimum mandatory 
prices because when the document was published (in 2008), the circular was already abrogated (in 
2007) by another decision with different content. 
The Court indeed shared with the defence with the following arguments: 
- it is undisputed that the 2006 circular was published after 2007, that is to say, when the 206 
circular had already been abrogated, and it was credible that that publication was caused by a 
mistake – no matter whether this was committed by the IBA or by the company which runs its 
website –. The reason for that publication was thus not with the intention of imposing a 
limitation on the economic freedom of lawyers; 
- this conclusion was confirmed by the fact that, after 2007, no disciplinary proceedings were 
ever initiated against any lawyers for requesting fees under the old minimum tariffs. 
The decision of the Court about the opinion of the IBA (commercial ads) 
1. With reference to opinion no. 48/2012 about commercial advertising, according to the IBA 
lawyers may advertise their business through a website, but they cannot use a system where a 
broker acts as an intermediary between the professional and the client (as – according to the 
IBA – happened in the actual case). 
The Antitrust deemed that the IBA’s opinion constitutes a violation of Article 101 TFEU because it 
prevents lawyers from the possibility of advertising their business, reducing competition in the market. 
Additionally, the Authority denied that the website where the ads were published acted as a broker 
between the lawyer and the client. 
In the appeal, the IBA presented a number of grounds. The major ones were: 
 its opinion was not binding; 
 its opinion was not public, it was only internally released after a request from a local branch of 
the IBA; 
 the website effectively acted as a broker between the lawyer and the client; 
 the fine was too high. 
On the 1
st
 complaint, the fact that the opinion of the IBA was not binding was not relevant. Indeed, it 
is clear that the opinion of the IBA, even if not binding, in fact discourages a lawyer from the intent of 
advertising his/her business. 
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On the 2
nd
 complaint, again, the fact that the opinion was not public was not relevant. Indeed, what 
really matters is the capacity of the act to restrict competition, and the capacity of the opinion to 
restrict competition among lawyers was undisputable. 
On the 3
rd
 complaint, it was not true that the website acted as a broker between the lawyer and the 
client. In fact, the service provided by the website was that same service that any newspaper or 
magazine can provide to any professional who wants to advertise his/her business: a public space 
where the description of a business is shown to a public of potential clients. 
The appeal against the decision of the Authority that related to the opinion on advertising was then 
rejected. 
------------------- 
In the end, the Court granted only the appeal against the decision of the Authority about the circular on 
fees.  
As a consequence, the Court ascertained that the violation of Article 101 by the IBA did not start in 
2008 (with the publication of the circular about the minimum fees), but in 2012 (with the publication 
of the opinion on advertising).  
As a further consequence, the 4
th
 complaint about the size of the fine (about € 913.000) was 
partially granted.  
The case was therefore sent back to the Authority for new consideration of the sanction. In 
November, 2015, the Authority re-determined the sanction to about € 513.000. 
Conclusion 
The case is relevant because it is about the application of Article 101 to a public body, like the IBA. 
The Court’s reasoning is also interesting: the concept of an “undertaking”, for the purposes of EU 
antitrust law, includes any entity that is engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status 
and the way in which it is financed. 
The profession of an attorney is therefore an “undertaking”, and the IBA should consequently be 
qualified as being an “association of undertaking”. 
This case also shows how it is difficult to establish a culture of competition – in Italy, but I think it 
is the same in most of Europe, at least in continental Europe – and how the idea of a transparent 
market and an efficient economic contest among professionals is still far from being accepted and, 
perhaps, even from being understood. 
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6.2. OLLI WIKBERG (FINNISH MARKET COURT) 
The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority’s proposal to the Market Court (24th June, 
2015, Dno. 831/14.00.00/2010) 
The Market Court’s decision, Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority v The Finnish 
Bakery Federation (29th February, 2016, Decision No. 121/16, Dno. 2015/414) 
The Market Court imposed fines on the Finnish Bakery Federation for forbidden price 
recommendations 
Introduction 
The Finnish Bakery Federation (FBF) is a trade association that was established in 1900 to represent 
the professional and economic interests of bakery proprietors and businesses in Finland. FBF engages 
in lobbying to improve the general operating conditions and status of the bakery industry, to promote 
bread culture and cooperation between industry actors, as well as looking after the interests of its 
members in relation to employment contracts. The members of the FBF decide on its activities. The 
organisation’s highest decision-making organ is the Annual General Meeting, where members can 
exercise their power. The AGM elects a chair and a deputy chair for the Board of Directors, while the 
other Board members are elected by the Council, which oversees the activities of the Finnish Bakery 
Federation and sets the operational guidelines to be followed. 
There were about 700 bakeries in Finland in 2010. Most of the companies were very small, with 
not more than five employees. Only two of the bakeries, Fazer Leipomot Oy and Vaasan Oy, were big, 
with over 1,000 employees. The members of the FBF (about 300 bakeries, including Fazer and 
Vaasan) had a market share of 2/3 of the relevant market. 
The facts 
The FBF had published press releases, newsletters to members, and the editorials of the Leipuri 
(Baker) magazine, which contained information regarding increased costs and recommendation that 
the increased costs be moved into the prices of the relevant products. In 2007, 2008 and 2010 FBF 
brought up the need to raise the prices of bakery products on a national scale. It simultaneously 
encouraged its members to raise their prices by 10 to 20 percent. The need and the level of the 
mentioned rises in prices were given to the public by a percentage in using either a range or price 
increases or exact levels of price increases that were informed by information given to the members of 
the FBF. 
In its autumn, 2008, newsletter the FBF made some estimations regarding the need to raise the 
prices, but it also stated that the increasing of the prices of bakery products between early 2009 and 
spring/autumn 2010 would be extremely difficult due to the upcoming decrease in the VAT percentage 
for grocery products. The VAT percentage for grocery products was lowered from 17 to 12 percent on 
1st October, 2009. At the same time, the editorials of the Leipuri magazine dealt specifically with the 
pricing of certain bakery products (especially of rye bread) and opened the price level and its 
profitability to question. It was clearly stated that “too low prices would spoil the products”, and asked 
“who will buy such a cheap product?” The speeches held at the annual meetings of the FBF also dealt 
with the same matter. Although the FBF didn’t act as openly, as they had earlier in promoting the 
raising of prices, it still broached the need to raise the prices and the profitability of the pricing of 
certain products in 2009 and 2010. It thus tried to affect pricing in 2009, and in 2010 also. The last 
recommendations were made in 2010. According to the proposal of the Finnish Competition and 
Consumer Authority (FCCA) the violations of the Competition Act lasted from 2007 to 2011.  
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The procedure 
It was the annual meeting of the FBF in autumn, 2010, which drew the FCCA’s interest to the case. 
The FBF had noted the press release of the FBF, which was published during the annual meeting. The 
press release dealt with the low profitability of bakery products and stated that the pressure to raise the 
prices was great. Soon afterwards, the investigation of the FCCA began. The two big bakeries, Fazer 
and Vaasan, were informed in spring, 2015, that they were no longer part of the investigation. On 24th 
June, 2015, the FCCA submitted a proposal to the Market Court for a €55.000 penalty, payable by the 
FBF. According to the law, the maximum penalty is 10 percent of the turnover of an undertaking or 
association of undertakings. Where an association is concerned, turnover also includes income from 
the actual operations and membership fees.  
The proposal is based on the unlawful price recommendations that the Federation gave its members 
between 2007–2010. In its proposal, the FCCA refers both to the Competition Act (4 §) and to Article 
101 (TFEU). 
The oral hearing of the case in the Market Court started on 27th November, 2015. During the 
hearing the FCCA adjusted the proposed penalty sum to €41.855, based on the actual turnover of the 
FBF of 2014, which was €418.558. 
The FBF firstly rejected the proposal of the FCCA and, secondly demanded that the Market Court 
should impose a lower penalty. 
The decision of the Market Court 
On 29th February, 2016, the Market Court imposed a €15.000 penalty on the FBF’s unlawful price 
recommendations, made between 2007–2011. According to the Market Court’s decision (No. 121/16) 
and press releases, newsletters to members and the editorials of the Leipuri, the magazine of the 
Finnish Bakery Federation contained recommendations whose purpose was to raise the prices of 
bakery products on a national scale. The Market Court considered that the recommendations for price 
increases are, by nature, a serious restriction of competition. 
The decision of the Market Court refers extensively to the case law of the CJEU. When considering 
the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition, the Court referred to judgments 
of the CJEU, like Expedia, C-226/11, EU:C:2012:795, Para 36; Toshiba Corporation v Commission, 
C-373/14 P, EU:C:2016:26, Paras 25 and 26; ING Pensii, C-172/14, EU:C:2015:484, Para 32; CB v 
Commission, C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, Para 52; Maxima Latvija etc., C-345/14, EU:C:2015:784, 
Paras 17 and 18, and Allianz Hungária Biztosító etc., C-32/11, EU:C:2013:160, Paras 37 and 38. 
The Market Court had, among other things, to decide if the conduct of the FBF met the 
requirements of the concept of a “single, overall agreement”. The FBF argued that the infringements 
were separate and therefore the claimed infringements of 2007 and 2008 were time-barred, because of 
the period of limitation. The Court again referred to both national and European case law (judgments 
of Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens, C-441/11 P, EU:C: 2012:778, Para. 41 and Anic 
Partecipazioni, C-49/92 P, EU:C:1999:356, Paras. 81 and 82) and discovered that the conduct of the 
FBF lasted continuously from 2007 to early 2011. It was stated that, despite the fact that the “language 
changed” in 2008, it was still a question relating to the recommendations that had as their object the 
raising of prices. The Court didn’t accept the view of the FBF regarding the separate infringements. 
The FBF also argued that the conduct led to the benefits mentioned in the Competition Act (5 §) 
and Article 101(3) (TFEU). The Market Court rejected this argument and stated that the FBF had not 
proved evidence to fulfill the requirements set forth in the law. The FBF had not shown any 
convincing argument or evidence to the FCCA. The Competition Act (5 §) and Article 101(3) (TFEU) 
didn’t apply. 
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As a result, the Market Court decided that the FBF had, as a trade association, given forbidden 
price recommendations. The purpose of the press releases, newsletters to members, and the editorials 
of the Leipuri magazine was to raise the prices of bakery products on a national scale. The conduct 
was also found to have had an effect on trade between member states (especially trade that related to 
Sweden and other countries in the Baltic area) which meant that there was also an infringement of 
Article 101 (TFEU), in addition to Competition Act (4 §). The two biggest bakeries, Fazer and 
Vaasan, in particular, operate both in Sweden and in the Baltic states. The value of the exports (€56 
m.) and imports €(260m.) in 2010 was also noted. 
The decision of the Market Court is not yet final. Both the Finnish Bakery Federation and the 
Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority decided to appeal against the decision of the Market 
Court before the Supreme Administrative Court. It could easily take one or two years before we see 
the final decision on the case. 
The judgment in question is interesting in many ways. Firstly, it concerns forbidden price 
recommendations given by a trade association. This is not the first case in which the FCCA has 
addressed violations of the Competition Act committed by a trade association. The FCCA has 
previously addressed violations of the Competition Act committed by the Finnish Hairdressers’ 
Association and the Finnish Association of Appliance Service Centres. It is interesting to note that the 
Finnish Competition Act does not apply to agreements and concerted practices that are related to the 
labour markets (2 §). This has not, however, stopped the FCCA from applying the provisions of the 
Competition Act to an Association like the FBF, or the Finnish Hairdressers’ Association. The 
judgment is also of interest because of the question that relates to the maximum penalty level and to 
consideration of whether there was a single, continuous infringement, as discussed in the judgment. It 
will be very interesting to see the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court that relates to these 
questions in the future. 
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6.3. DALIA VISINSKIENE (LITHUANIAN SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT) 
Case No I-765-331/2013 of Vilnius Regional Administrative Court  
Eturas’ UAB, Freshtravel’ UAB and twenty-three other companies, as well as Lithuanian travel 
agencies versus the Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter – the CC) 
A decision of the CC imposed fines for participation in an anticompetitive concerted practice that 
resulted in the restriction of the maximum level of discounts that are applicable to bookings made via 
the common on-line system 
Facts of the case 
Eturas is the holder of exclusive rights to, and the administrator of, the online travel booking system 
E-TURAS (hereinafter - the E-TURAS system). The system is controlled by a single administrator and 
it may be integrated into the individual websites of travel agencies which have acquired a licence from 
Eturas. The standard licensing contract with Eturas does not contain any provisions which would 
allow the administrator to alter the pricing of the services provided by travel agencies using the 
system. In 2010, the CC launched an investigation, on the basis of the information received from one 
of the users of the E-TURAS system, stating that the travel agencies that were distributing organised 
tours were coordinating among themselves the discounts which were offered to consumers purchasing 
tours online via the E-TURAS system. The investigation established that some time prior to the 
alleged restriction, the director of Eturas sent an e-mail to several travel agencies asking them to vote 
on a reduction of discount rates from 4% to 1% - 3%. While there is evidence in the case-file that one 
of the travel agencies concerned received this e-mail, no evidence exists as to whether other travel 
agencies either received or responded to it. On 27th August, 2009, at 12:20 pm, a technical restriction 
was set into the E-TURAS system limiting to 3% the discounts available for online bookings. This 
was preceded by the following system notice (‘the system notice of 27th August, 2009’) which 
appeared, earlier on the same date, in the ‘Information Notices’ field of the E-TURAS system:  
‘Following an appraisal of the statements, proposals and wishes … expressed by the travel 
agencies, we will enable online discounts in the range of 0% to 3%, to be chosen individually ... For 
travel agencies which offered discounts in excess of 3%, these will automatically be ... reduced to 3%. 
…’.  
Later, during the investigation, the director of Eturas stated that such a notice was sent to all of the 
travel agencies which used the system. The possibility of offering additional discounts to individual 
clients (e.g., by offering a loyalty discount code) was not restricted. The investigation further 
established that the majority of travel agencies which applied a discount rate above 3% before 27th 
August, 2009, thereafter decreased the discount rate to 3%. Several travel agencies had, however, 
already offered a lower discount rate before 27th August, 2009, and they continued to apply the same 
lower rate. Some travel agencies did not offer services via E-TURAS before 27th August, 2009. Some 
of the other travel agencies concerned did not sell a single tour via E-TURAS over the period under 
investigation. After 27th August, 2009, the websites of eight travel agencies displayed advertisements 
concerning a discount of 3% on the travel packages offered. When a booking was made, a window 
appeared indicating that the travel package chosen was subject to a discount of 3%. The investigation 
carried out by the CC established that, as a result of the technical modifications made to the E-TURAS 
system following the dispatch of the message at issue in the main proceedings, although the travel 
agencies concerned were not prevented from granting their customers discounts greater than 3%, they 
were nevertheless required to take additional technical steps in order to do so. 
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Decision of the CC and proceedings before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court 
In its decision of 7th June, 2012, the Competition Council found that 30 travel agencies, as well as 
Eturas, had participated, between 27th August, 2009, and the end of March, 2010, in an 
anticompetitive concerted practice, by limiting the level of discounts that were applicable to bookings 
made on-line via the E-TURAS system. According to the CC, the concerted practice started on the 
date on which the message at issue in the main proceedings, concerning the reduction of the discount 
rate, appeared on the E-TURAS booking system, and the systematic limitation of that rate in the 
operation of that system was implemented. The CC considered that the travel agencies which used the 
E-TURAS booking system during the period in question, and which had expressed no objection, were 
liable for an infringement of the competition rules, since they could reasonably assume that all the 
other users of that system would also limit their discounts to a maximum of 3%. It inferred from this 
that those agencies had informed each other of the discount rates which they intended to apply in the 
future, and had thus indirectly — by way of implied or tacit assent — expressed their common 
intention with regard to conduct in the relevant market. It concluded that the conduct of those agencies 
in the market in question was to be treated as constituting a concerted practice and held that, although 
Eturas was not active in the market in question, it had played a role in facilitating that practice.  
The CC took the view that the travel agencies, as prudent economic operators, should have been 
aware of that restriction from the moment the systematic limitation of that rate in the operation of that 
system was implemented. The CC considered that the travel agencies which used the E-TURAS 
system during the relevant period, and which had expressed no objection, were liable for the 
infringement. Those agencies could reasonably assume that all other users of the system would also 
limit their discounts to a maximum of 3%. They had therefore informed each other of the discount 
rates which they intended to apply in the future and thus indirectly – by way of implied or tacit 
approval – expressed their common agreement with regard to conduct in the relevant market. It further 
noted that such conduct on the part of the travel agencies in the relevant market was to be treated as 
constituting a concerted practice. In fact, the CC thus applied the presumption that the travel agencies 
which received the notice knew, or should have known, about the restriction. The CC held that 
although Eturas was not active in the relevant market, it played a role in facilitating the infringement. 
The CC therefore found that Eturas and the travel agencies concerned had infringed Article 101(1) 
TFEU, as well as Article 5 of the Law on Competition of Lithuania, and imposed fines (more than 
€1.5 million). The travel agency which provided the CC with the information about the infringement 
was granted immunity from the fine under the leniency programme. 
The applicants, Eturas and the travel agencies, challenged the decision of the CC before the Vilnius 
District Administrative Court. By its judgment of 8th April, 2013, the First Instance Court found in 
favour of the respondents (the CC). The Court, in the main, upheld the arguments of the CC as regards 
the infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 5 of the Law on Competition, but reduced the 
fines for certain applicants.  
Proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania and referral to the 
ECJ 
Both the applicants and the CC lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania 
(hereinafter – the SAC). The applicants, Eturas and the travel agencies, contended that they did not 
engage in concerted practices within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU or national law. The travel 
agencies concerned claimed that their intention to reduce discounts was not established, and that the 
technical restriction was a unilateral act by Eturas. Some applicants claimed not to have read the 
system notice. Due to the system’s low importance – the income from tours sold via E-TURAS 
representing just a fraction of their total revenue (e.g., 0.12%, 0.2% or 0.0025%) – the travel agencies 
did not monitor it closely. They explained that they used the system because of its convenience for 
online sales, the absence of any alternative systems on the market and the prohibitive cost for the 
Pier Luigi Parcu and Giorgio Monti 
66 
development of their own online systems. In principle, discounts were not restricted, since the travel 
agencies maintained the possibility of applying additional loyalty discounts to individual clients.  
The CC contended that the E-TURAS system served the applicants as a tool for coordinating their 
actions and eliminated the need for meetings, as the conditions of use of the system enabled them to 
reach a ‘concurrence of wills’ on discount restrictions without the need for direct contact. Failure to 
oppose the discount restrictions is equated with their tacit approval. The E-TURAS system functioned 
under uniform conditions, and was easily recognisable on the websites of the travel agencies, which 
contained information on the applicable discounts. The travel agencies did not object to the restriction 
imposed and, thus, made it clear to each other that they were applying limited discounts, thereby 
eliminating any uncertainty as to the discount rates. The applicants were obliged to be circumspect and 
responsible and they could not ignore or disregard notices concerning the practices affecting their 
economic activities.  
The SAC had doubts about the correct interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU, in particular, in 
regard to the allocation of the burden of proof for the purposes of applying that provision. By the order 
of 17th January, 2014, the SAC decided to stay the proceedings and referred the following questions to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter – the ECJ) for a preliminary ruling:  
‘(1) Should Article 101(1) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which 
economic operators participate in a common computerised information system of the type 
described in this case, and where the Competition Council has proved that a system notice on 
the restriction of discounts and a technical restriction on discount rate entry were introduced 
into that system, it can be [presumed] that those economic operators were aware, or must have 
been aware, of the system notice introduced into the computerised information system and, by 
failing to oppose the application of such a discount restriction, had expressed their tacit 
approval of the price discount restriction and, for that reason, may be held liable for engaging 
in concerted practices under Article 101(1) TFEU? 
(2) If the first question is answered in the negative, what factors should be taken into account 
in the determination of whether economic operators participating in a common computerised 
information system, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, have engaged in 
concerted practices within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU?’ 
It seems from the order, that the SAC had raised doubts about what factors are capable of establishing 
the participation of the travel agencies concerned in a horizontal concerted practice in the digital 
environment. The SAC noted that, in the present case, the principal piece of evidence supporting the 
finding of an infringement, produced by the CC, were the sending of a systemic note and the 
establishment of the technical restriction – thus, a mere presumption that the travel agencies concerned 
read, or should have read, the message at issue, and that they should have understood all of the 
consequences arising from the decision concerning the restriction on discount rates on bookings. In 
that respect, the SAC pointed out that the presumption of innocence applies in the context of punishing 
infringements of competition law, and it indicated its doubts about the possibility of finding that the 
travel agencies concerned committed an infringement solely on the basis of the first of those 
presumptions, particularly since some of those agencies denied having any knowledge of the message 
at issue in the main proceedings, whereas others sold their first travel package only after the technical 
modifications had been made or, indeed, did not make any sales at all through the E-TURAS booking 
system. The SAC acknowledged that the travel agencies using the E-TURAS booking system knew, or 
ought to have known, that their competitors also used that system, as a result of which it might be 
considered that they were obliged to act with care and diligence and, accordingly, could not disregard 
the messages that they received. The Court noted that some of the agencies fined by the CC admitted 
having had knowledge of the content of the message at issue in the main proceedings. The SAC sought 
to establish whether, in the circumstances of the case before it, the mere sending of a message 
concerning a restriction of the discount rate could constitute sufficient evidence to confirm, or to raise 
a presumption, that the economic operators participating in the E-TURAS booking system knew, or 
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ought to have known, about that restriction, even though some of them claim not to have had any 
knowledge of it, some did not change the actual discount rates applied and others did not sell any 
travel packages at all via the E-TURAS system during the relevant period. The SAC indicated that this 
aspect was decisive in reviewing whether or not the CC had established sufficient facts to conclude 
that there was an infringement and to determine the moment from which the duration of the 
infringement should be calculated. It is apparent from the reasoning of the challenged decision that, in 
establishing the infringement, the CC relied mainly on the existence of the system notice of 27
th
 
August, 2009. In fact, the CC thus applied the presumption that the travel agencies which received the 
notice knew, or should have known, about the restriction. 
The SAC took the view, that, on the one hand, it was possible to maintain that the applicants used 
the E-TURAS system together with their competitors and, therefore, were obliged to act with care and 
pay attention to the notifications sent via the system. Some admitted to having known about the 
discount restriction and having observed that restriction in practice. Bearing in mind the clandestine 
nature of anticompetitive practices, proof based on a system could perhaps, in the light of all the 
circumstances of the case, be considered sufficient. On the other hand, infringements of competition 
law are subject to the presumption of innocence. In the present case, there was no evidence that the 
applicants had actually read the system notice and realised that it represented a concerted 
anticompetitive action that would be implemented by all of the users of the system. 
The ECJ delivered preliminary ruling on 21st January, 2016, (case C-74/14) and 
provided the answers to the questions posed by the SAC: 
(1) Article 101(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that where the administrator of an 
information system, that is intended to enable travel agencies to sell travel packages on their 
websites using a uniform booking method, sends to those economic operators, via a personal 
electronic mailbox, a message informing them that the discounts on products sold through that 
system will henceforth be capped, and, following the dissemination of that message, the 
system in question undergoes the technical modifications necessary to implement that 
measure, those economic operators might have — if they had been aware of that message — 
been presumed to have participated in a concerted practice within the meaning of that 
provision, unless they publicly distanced themselves from that practice, reported it to the 
administrative authorities, or other evidence to rebut that presumption is adduced, such as 
evidence of the systematic application of a discount exceeding the cap in question.  
(2) It is for the referring court to examine — on the basis of the national rules governing the 
assessment of evidence and the standard of proof — whether, in view of all the circumstances 
before it, the dispatch of a message, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, may 
constitute sufficient evidence to establish that the addressees of that message were aware of its 
content. The presumption of innocence precludes the referring court from considering that the 
mere dispatch of that message constitutes sufficient evidence to establish that its addressees 
ought to have been aware of its content. 
The ECJ started by recalling its case-law, according to which each economic operator must determine 
independently the policy which it intends to adopt in the common market. Such a requirement of 
autonomy thus strictly precludes any direct or indirect contact between economic operators of such a 
kind that it either influences the conduct in the market of an actual or potential competitor, or reveals 
to such a competitor the conduct which an operator has decided to follow itself or contemplates 
adopting in the market, where the object or effect of those contacts is to give rise to conditions of 
competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question. The ECJ 
recalled that passive modes of participation in the infringement, such as the presence of an undertaking 
at meetings at which anticompetitive agreements were concluded, without that undertaking clearly 
opposing them, are indicative of collusion that is capable of rendering the undertaking liable under 
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Article 101 TFEU, since a party which tacitly approves of an unlawful initiative, without publicly 
distancing itself from its content or reporting it to the administrative authorities, encourages the 
continuation of the infringement and compromises its discovery. 
Then, as regards the allocation of the burden of proof, the ECJ noted that under Article 2 of 
Regulation No. 1/2003, in any national proceedings for the application of Article 101 TFEU, the 
burden of proving an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU is to rest on the party or the authority 
alleging the infringement.  
On the one hand, the ECJ pointed out, that Article 2 of Regulation No. 1/2003 expressly governs 
the allocation of the burden of proof, that regulation does not contain any provisions on more specific 
procedural aspects. It does not contain any provision in relation to the principles governing the 
assessment of evidence and the standard of proof in national proceedings for the application of Article 
101 TFEU. In that regulatory environment, the ECJ recalled its case-law national procedural 
autonomy, the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
The ECJ noted also the existence of the presumption of a causal connection between a concertation 
and the market conduct of the undertakings participating in the practice, according to which those 
undertakings, where they remain active in that market, take account of the information exchanged with 
their competitors in determining their conduct in that market, as part of EU law. 
The ECJ noted that the principle of effectiveness requires, however, that national rules governing 
the assessment of evidence and the standard of proof must not render the implementation of EU 
competition rules impossible or excessively difficult and, in particular, must not jeopardise the 
effective application of Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU, and that, in most cases, the existence of a concerted 
practice or an agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken 
together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement 
of the competition rules  
On the other hand, the ECJ stressed that the presumption of innocence is a general principle of EU 
law. In the case at issue this means that the presumption of innocence precludes national courts from 
inferring, from the mere dispatch of the message at issue in the main proceedings, that the travel 
agencies concerned ought to have been aware of the content of that message. Still, the presumption of 
innocence does not preclude the national court from considering that the dispatch of the message at 
issue in the main proceedings may, in the light of other objective and consistent indicia, justify the 
presumption that the travel agencies concerned were aware of the content of that message from the 
date of its dispatch, provided that those agencies still have the opportunity to rebut it. The ECJ noted 
that national courts cannot require that those agencies take excessive or unrealistic steps in order to 
rebut that presumption. The travel agencies concerned must have the opportunity to rebut the 
presumption that they were aware of the content of the message at issue from the date of that 
message’s dispatch, for example, by proving that they did not receive that message, or that they did 
not look at the section in question, or did not look at it until some time had passed after that dispatch. 
As regards the participation of the travel agencies in a concerted practice within the meaning of 
Article 101(1) TFEU, the ECJ pointed out that under that provision the concept of a concerted practice 
implies, in addition to the participating undertakings concerting with each other, subsequent conduct 
in the market and a relationship of cause and effect between the two, and also that the case at issue in 
the main proceedings is characterised by the fact that the administrator of the information system at 
issue sent a message concerning a common anticompetitive action to the travel agencies participating 
in that system, a message which could only be consulted in the ‘Notices’ section of the information 
system in question, and to which those agencies did not expressly respond. Following the dispatch of 
that message, a technical restriction was implemented which limited the discounts that could be 
applied to bookings made via that system to 3%. Although that restriction did not prevent the travel 
agencies concerned from granting discounts greater than 3% to their customers, it nevertheless 
required them to take additional technical steps in order to do so. The ECJ took the view that those 
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circumstances were capable of justifying a finding of a concertation between the travel agencies which 
were aware of the content of the message at issue in the main proceedings, which could be regarded as 
having tacitly assented to a common anticompetitive practice, provided that the two other elements 
constituting a concerted practice were also present.  
However, the Court stressed that if it cannot be established that a travel agency was aware of that 
message, its participation in a concertation cannot be inferred from the mere existence of a technical 
restriction implemented in the system at issue, unless it is established on the basis of other objective 
and consistent indicia that it tacitly assented to an anticompetitive action. 
Finally, the ECJ dwelt on the issue of how travel agencies may distance themselves from 
anticompetivive practice. The Court noted that in a case such as that at issue, which does not concern 
an anticompetitive meeting, public distancing or reporting to the administrative authorities are not the 
only means of rebutting the presumption that a company has participated in an infringement; other 
evidence may also be adduced with a view to rebutting that presumption. The Court pointed out that, 
in particular circumstances such as those at issue, it cannot be required that the declaration by a travel 
agency of its intention to distance itself be made to all of the competitors that were the addressees of 
the message at issue in the main proceedings, since that agency is not in fact in a position to know who 
those addressees are; nationals courts may accept that a clear and express objection sent to the 
administrator of the E-TURAS system is capable of rebutting that presumption. Besides, in regard to 
the possibility of rebutting the presumption of participation in a concerted practice by means other 
than public distancing or reporting it to the administrative authorities, the ECJ noted that the 
presumption of a causal connection between the concertation and the market conduct of the 
undertakings participating in the practice could be rebutted by evidence of a systematic application of 
a discount exceeding the cap in question. 
It should be noted that, at the time of writing the presentation, no final judgment had been adopted, 
and the case is still pending before the SAC (Case No A-97-858/2016). 
Comment 
Given that it is one of the first ECJ judgments concerning the sharing of on-line platforms and possible 
implications from the point of view of establishing a concerted practice among undertakings, the ECJ 
judgment is important and interesting from several different perspectives. 
First of all, from the perspective of public enforcement and adjudication, it clarifies the boundaries 
between the presumption of innocence and the effectiveness of EU law. The ECJ makes it clear that 
despite the existence of national procedural autonomy (and the burden on national courts to evaluate 
evidence on the basis of national procedural rules that are subject to the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence), the presumption of innocence is a part of EU law and is applicable in this context. This 
principle thus has implications for the distribution of the burden of proof. From the point of view of 
the distribution of the burden of proof, the finding of the ECJ, that in such on-line environment an 
anticompetitive concerted practice may not be inferred from the mere dispatch of the „system“ 
message, i.e. – this fact is not enough to establish that the travel agencies concerned ought to have 
been aware of the content of that message, besides, the Court made it clear that if it cannot be 
established that a travel agency was aware of a message, its participation in a concertation cannot be 
inferred from the mere existence of a technical restriction implemented in the system at issue, is of 
particular importance. In practice, this means that in order to establish an anticompetitive concerted 
practice the competition authorities will be forced to undertake a deeper investigation and to gather 
evidence pointing to the fact that undertakings knew about the restriction, in order that the authorities 
can establish concertation among undertakings. 
From the point of view of corporate behaviour, the judgment explains how undertakings may 
distance themselves from anticompetitive practice in order not to be held liable for it. It seems that the 
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ECJ took into account the specificities of the on-line business and provided for more flexible rules if 
compare, for example, with the rules on membership in associations, etc. 
It is apparent from the judgment that those undertakings that were aware of the content of the 
system notification might distance themselves by different means. First of all, a presumption of the 
participation of a given undertaking in a concerted practice may be rebutted by its publicly distancing 
itself from that practice, or by reporting it to the administrative authorities. Still, given the specificities 
of the situation, it may not be required that an undertaking distances itself in the eyes of all other 
addressees, a “clear and explicit objection” addressed to the system administrator would be sufficient 
to rebut the presumption. Finally, differently from the Advocate General Szpunar, the Court admitted 
that distancing may be shown by conduct in the market, provided that it is “systematic”: and, thus, 
evidence of a systematic application of a discount exceeding the cap in question would be enough to 
rebut the presumption of participation in the concerted practice. 
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6.4. ALENKA BERGER ŠKRK (SLOVENIA SUPREME COURT) 
Supreme Court Decision No. X Ips 234, delivered on 16th April, 2015. 
(Case on public enforcement of Article 101 TFEU and national competition law) 
1. Legal Context 
The market for medicines in the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter: Slovenia) is highly regulated, 
especially for “prescription drugs”. In Slovenia, the pricing of medicinal products is regulated by the 
Medicinal Products Act and falls under the competency of the Agency for Medicinal Products and 
Medical Devices of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter: JAZMP), while their financing from public 
revenues is regulated by the Health Care and Health Insurance Act, and it falls within the competency 
of the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia. JAZMP is the national authority that is responsible for 
the pricing of medicinal products for human use that are financed from public revenues. The 
procedures for medicinal product pricing are based on the provisions of the Medicinal Products Act 
and the provisions of the Rules on the Pricing of Medicinal Products for Human Use. The maximum 
allowed prices (MAP) of medicinal products are formulated on the basis of the value of the 
manufacturer’s element of price plus the wholesaler’s margin. However, a general provision of Article 
95 of the Medicinal Products Act stipulates that “the prices of medicinal products shall be formed 
freely according to the market conditions, except for the cases stipulated herein”.  
2. Facts 
In several public tenders set up by “public pharmacies” as contracting authorities, four pharmaceutical 
suppliers (wholesalers) perpetually offered identical prices for almost all products, although the 
primary selection criteria were determined on the “lowest price offer”. Their final offers were thus 
practically identical. It is important to note that on the list of the “offered product” were not just 
medicinal products but also other products which could be freely obtained in grocery stores 
(cosmetics, childcare products, etc.). Moreover, in various tenders, these four undertakings abstained 
from participating in tenders in which another of the four suppliers was also participating, or else they 
only participated via a joint bid. Finally, in the subsequent contractual phase of the public procurement 
proceedings, they all offered various discounts and rebates.  
3. Procedure before the NCA and the Administative Court 
After the investigation, the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (hereinafter:CPA) concluded 
with the assessment that these practices constituted a violation of Article 6 of the Competition Act and 
of Article 101 TFEU. The condemned concerted practices were characterised as price-fixing, market 
sharing and collusive tendering (bid rotation) in public procurement procedures that were conducted 
by public pharmacies. On the basis of different forms of written evidence, the CPA established that 
infringers exchanged information between themselves on matters such as pricing practices, discount 
policies and market sharing strategies.  
The Administrative (High) Court, under judicial review, rejected the arguments of the plaintiffs 
(the alleged infringers) and confirmed the CPA’s decision. However, with regard to the alleged error 
in law (misuse of Article 101 TFEU), it partially granted the appeal and remitted the case to the CPA 
for a re-assessment. In the reasoning, the Administrative Court adjudicated that the CPA, in applying 
Article 101 TFEU, failed to establish the element of an appreciable effect on trade between Member 
States. Against the High Court decision (which, in part, confirmed the CPA’s findings and decisions 
on the infringement of Article 6 of the Competition Act), the four wholesalers lodged an appeal.  
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4. Supreme Court Decision 
As to the points of law, the Supreme Court emphasised that although the maximum allowed price 
(MAPs) of medicinal products for human use were, in effect, determined by the competent authority 
for medicinal products, the Medicinal Products Act should not be interpreted in such a way as to 
establish a system of fixed prices for all medicinal products. Moreover, the Medicinal Products Act 
should be interpreted as enabling medicinal product providers, payers and buyers, to negotiate prices 
that would be below the set MAPs. With regard to other “products”, the Supreme Court referred to the 
general provision of the Medicinal Products Act, that prices of medicinal products should be formed 
freely according to the market conditions. In this legal context, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 
wholesalers' practices constituted restrictions of competition “by object”, so it was not necessary to 
establish anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the explanation of merely 
“parallel behaviour” of the undertakings under the highly regulated price system. It took a stand that 
scrutinised practices were a clear case of prohibited concerted practices under Article 6 of the 
Competition Act. In the assessment, if the adduced evidence was capable of demonstrating the 
existence of “concerted practices”, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of clear, written records 
on the exchange of price information. Since the Supreme Court was dealing with issues of national 
competition law, it did not decide to refer the (proposed) preliminary questions to the CJEU.  
The revision was rejected.  
5. Comment 
This decision is a landmark “national competition law decision” in the pharmaceutical sector. It is 
important to note that this sector is highly problematic (also) in Slovenia. Arguably, therefore, under 
further sector inquiries other agreements that hinder competition could be discovered.  
It is interesting that the Supreme Court, in its reasoning, cited CJEU case law extensively, although 
the dispute was formally in the domain of national competition rules. It would also be interesting to 
follow the subsequent CPA decision of the alleged infringement of Article 101 TFEU. Perhaps in that 
context the Supreme Court would be prepared to stay the proceedings and to refer the matter on some 
issues to the CJEU. 
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7. Abuse of dominance 
7.1. DAVID RAMSJÖ (SWEDISH MARKET COURT) 
Information concerning the judgment 
- Name of the Court: The Market Court (Sweden) 
- Name of the parties: Pizza24 Nordic AB (Claimant) vs. OnlinePizza Norden AB (Defendant) 
- Case reference number: MD 2015:122 
- Date of the judgment: February 10th, 2015. 
Legislation 
According to Chapter 2, Article 7 of the Swedish Competition Act (2008:579)
23
 any abuse by one or 
more undertakings of a dominant position on the market is prohibited. This legislation is modelled 
after Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 82 
of the EC Treaty).  
According to Chapter 3, Article 1 of the Swedish Competition Act, the Swedish Competition 
Authority (SCA) may require an undertaking to terminate an infringement of any of the prohibitions 
laid down in Chapter 2, Article 7, or Article 102 of the TFEU.  
Chapter 3, Article 2 of the Swedish Competition Act contains the provision that if the SCA decides 
in a particular case not to impose such an obligation, pursuant to Chapter 3, Article 1, the Market 
Court may do so at the request of an undertaking that is affected by the infringement.  
Background 
Pizza24 Nordic AB (Pizza24) provided customers – i.e., restaurants offering home delivery services 
(mainly pizzerias) – with an Internet online ordering system for pizza/restaurant food, acting as a 
middle-man between Pizza24’s customers (restaurants, etc.) and its end users. Through a web 
interface, the end user could access the online ordering system, choosing which food to order from a 
particular restaurant/pizzeria, and pay for the food directly to Pizza24. After deducting a certain 
commission fee from the affiliated restaurant, Pizza24 would then pay the rest of the amount for the 
ordered food to the affiliated pizzeria/restaurant and forward the order to a computer terminal placed 
at the restaurant’s facility. The pizzeria/restaurant, having received the order from Pizza24 through the 
computer terminal, in its turn delivered the fast food directly to the end user.  
OnlinePizza Norden AB (OnlinePizza) offered a similar service to pizzerias/restaurants as Pizza24. 
To OnlinePizza’s customers – i.e., restaurants and pizzerias – OnlinePizza furthermore applied an 
agreement which included certain conditions stating that it was not prohibited for the restaurant to 
cooperate with a competitor to OnlinePizza. If, however, the restaurants initiated cooperation with a 
competing business, OnlinePizza reserved the right to immediately end the cooperation with the 
restaurant. 
Pizza24 claimed that OnlinePizza abused its dominant position by applying the aforementioned 
condition in the business agreements with restaurants that were affiliated with OnlinePizza. Pizza24 
initially filed a complaint against OnlinePizza with the SCA, who decided not to act on the complaint. 
Pizza24 then brought an action before the Market Court. 
                                                     
22
 http://www.marknadsdomstolen.se/Filer/Avgöranden/Dom2015-1.pdf  
23
 http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/english/competition/the-swedish-competition-act.pdf  
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Facts of the dispute in the Market Court 
Pizza24 argued that OnlinePizza was a dominant actor in the Swedish market for providing online 
ordering systems for pizzerias with home delivery or, alternatively, the market for online ordering 
systems for restaurants in general, with home delivery. By applying the said condition in 
OnlinePizza’s business agreements, Pizza24 claimed that the restaurants were prevented from 
cooperating with OnlinePizza’s competitors, since a number of restaurants were already affiliated with 
OnlinePizza.  
On the subject of defining the relevant market, Pizza24 had referred to two different market 
calculations relating to financial statements for companies supplying restaurants with online ordering 
systems. One calculation was based on statistics that related the market for online ordering systems for 
pizzerias with home delivery for the year 2013, stating that OnlinePizza practically held over 90 
percent of the market share. The alternate calculation, relating to the market for restaurants in general 
using online ordering systems which provided home delivery, stated that OnlinePizza held more than 
85 percent of the market share.  
OnlinePizza contested the claim, and they argued, on their part, that the company did not hold a 
dominant position and that the relevant product market could not be limited merely to such online 
ordering systems/platforms, such as that used by OnlinePizza or Pizza24. OnlinePizza further 
challenged the market calculations provided by Pizza24, arguing that the relevant market was difficult 
to determine, but, under all circumstances, this should at the least be determined by the ordering of 
food online in general. OnlinePizza further held that their agreement with OnlinePizza’s customers 
(restaurants) did not include any exclusivity undertaking. 
The Ruling of the Court 
The issue in question in the Market Court was whether Pizza24 had fulfilled their burden of evidence 
and whether they had provided sufficient investigation through which to determine the relevant 
product and geographical market, showing that OnlinePizza held a dominant position in that market.  
First, the Market Court emphasised that the party who claims that a certain conduct by a competitor 
is in conflict with the Competition Act has the burden of evidence in this regard. This burden of 
evidence, furthermore, has to be supported by an investigation showing how the relevant market is 
defined and has to be robust in the sense that an additional investigation will not affect the evidence 
value of the first investigation presented.  
In its reasoning for determining the relevant product market, the Market Court noted, with 
extensive references to the Commission’s Relevant Market Notice24 and the Michelin judgment25, that 
a relevant product market comprises of all those products and/or services which are regarded as being 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their 
prices and their intended use. The exercise of a market definition consists of identifying the effective 
alternative sources of supply for the customers of the undertakings involved, in terms both of 
products/services and of the geographical location of the suppliers.  
The Market Court went on to conclude that additional factors – which can be relevant for the 
assessment whether there exist any possibilities for substitution in the product market – include 
product characteristics and its intended use, factors other than the product characteristics and pricing 
that effect the customer’s choices and whether the demand side has any distinctive features. For this 
assessment, such relevant factors may include evidence of previous examples of switching, consumer 
preferences, trade barriers and the costs to consumers of switching to possible substitute goods, and 
                                                     
24
 Definition of the Relevant Market, OJ 1997 C 372/5 
25
 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission 
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price discrimination that may have occurred. The Market Court further stated that in order to 
determine the relevant product market, the submitted investigation must sufficiently clarify any 
possible demand substitution for the affected restaurants. 
However, the investigation presented by Pizza24 was relatively scarce and it did not include any 
detailed investigation of market conditions, including what owners of pizzerias and restaurants take 
into account when considering whether to provide a service for ordering food for consumption 
elsewhere. The investigation, for example, neither revealed the types of restaurants that provide 
special services for the ordering of foods, nor what types of ordering services restaurants have that 
offer such kinds of services, nor how the food is distributed when it has been ordered through services 
of this kind. 
The Market Court finally concluded that the investigation presented by Pizza24 did not sufficiently 
clarify how the market was defined. It was therefore not possible to rule out, with a sufficient degree 
of certainty, that the relevant product market was broader than Pizza24 had argued. Pizza24 had 
therefore not proven that the product market was limited to the market for companies providing online 
ordering systems for pizzerias with home delivery, or to online ordering systems for restaurants. 
Consequently, the Market Court dismissed Pizza24’s claim upon its merits.  
Comments 
The case illustrates the rules of evidence that are related to the issue of defining the relevant product 
market and shows the importance of a substantiated investigation, in particular when it is objected that 
the product market does not constitute a clearly defined and uniform market. With extensive referral to 
the Commission’s Relevant Market Notice, the Market Court, in its judgment, further emphasises what 
kind of evidence may be used in order to establish the relevant market. 
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7.2. MIRA RAYCHEVA-SHEKERDZHIEVA (BULGARIAN SUPREME 
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT) 
Decision No. 1054/29.07.2014 of the Bulgarian Commission for the Protection of Competition; 
Decision No. 7131/16.06.2015 on case no. 11 271/14 of the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Bulgaria (First Instance Court); 
Decision No. 10 524/12.10.2015 on case no. 9059/15 of the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Bulgaria (Second Instance court). 
Facts of the case 
Bulgargaz EAD (single trade joint-stock company) is a company whose entire capital belongs to the 
Bulgarian State. According to Article 39, Paras. 1 and 43(1) of the Energy Act (EA), it is the sole 
provider of natural gas in Bulgaria and it possesses a license to carry out this activity for a term of 35 
years, which expires in 2041. 
Bulgargaz EAD receives its natural gas supplies from the Russian company Gazpromexport Ltd. 
According to the contract that is binding for both companies, Bulgargaz EAD, as buyer, is obliged to 
indicate the quantity of natural gas it will buy for a specific period of time (e.g.,, in the course of a 
year). Irrespective of whether the negotiated quantity becomes the subject of an actual transaction, the 
buyer owes the price to the seller (“take-or-pay” clause). 
Pursuant to Article 21 of EA, the Bulgarian Energy and Water Regulatory Commission has key 
powers in regulating the activities in the energy sector, amongst which is to carry out price regulation 
in the cases provided for in EA. The prices approved by the Energy and Water Regulatory 
Commission are binding on Bulgargaz EAD, as far as contracts with clients from the domestic market 
are concerned. 
Sofiagas EAD, Overgas North EAD, Overgas West AD, Overgas South AD and Overgas East 
EAD (the Applicants) are all providers of natural gas, each of them in a different region of the country. 
They receive and transport natural gas from a certain regulatory gas station to the final customer. 
The share of the above-mentioned companies in the natural gas market in Bulgaria is around 50%, 
as far as the deliveries to the final customers are concerned. Bulgargaz EAD is the sole provider of 
natural gas to the regulatory stations. 
Each of the above-mentioned companies had a valid one-year contract for the delivery of natural 
gas with Bulgargaz EAD (the duration is in accordance with the established practice concerning the 
public natural gas provider’s customers). The contracts in question were all valid for 2010 and were 
due to expire on 31st December, 2010. 
On 2nd August, 2010, Bulgargaz EAD sent a letter with identical contents to all its clients, 
including Sofiagas EAD, Overgas North EAD, Overgas West AD, Overgas South AD and Overgas 
East EAD. The letter set forth new conditions for the conclusion of contracts in 2011, namely, that 
clients were obliged to fill in applications to the contract (Applications 1 and 2) stating the quantity of 
natural gas to be consumed, on a monthly and quarterly basis, over the course of the next year. 
Additional documents that are relevant to certain technical parameters, such as the quantity and quality 
of the gas, were also required; and these included "The characteristics of the gas cargo", "Data", 
"Background (basic) data with regard to the possibilities for work in cases of a black-out or the 
restraint of the gas supply". The information had to be provided to Bulgargaz EAD both in tabular and 
written form by 1st October, 2010. The letter explicitly stated that the delivery of natural gas would be 
carried out solely on the basis of the provision of the required documents. 
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The Ancillary Agreement provided for a unilateral termination of the contract by Bulgargaz EAD 
in the case of: legislative changes concerning the public delivery of natural gas; changes in the 
requirements for conveying natural gas; changes in the requirements for the delivery of natural gas; or 
any other changes in the factors that are relevant to the conditions in which natural gas supply is 
carried out. The Contract also provided for a written 45-day prior notice in the case of unilateral 
termination. It also provided for a 10% "take-or-pay" clause in relation to any quantity of natural gas 
that was contracted for but not received. 
In response to the proposal from Bulgargaz EAD, Sofiagas EAD, Overgas North EAD, Overgas 
West AD, Overgas South AD and Overgas East EAD lodged a complaint against the possibility of the 
unilateral termination of the contract by the provider. Bulgargaz EAD rejected the objections on the 
grounds that the domestic regulatory body – the Energy and Water Regulatory Commission – had 
approved two decisions that declared it inadmissible for Bulgargaz EAD to incur losses - "take-or-
pay" clauses, sanctions, etc., as a result of its failure to properly fulfil obligations arising from the 
contract with the external provider, due to the fault of the obligations of its contractual counterparties 
in the internal market. 
During the negotiations on the Ancillary Agreement, Bulgargaz EAD changed some of the disputed 
clauses. It accepted that the unilateral termination of the contract by the buyer was also possible under 
the same conditions, i.e., with a 45-day prior written notice. Bulgargaz EAD also withdrew the clause 
that provided a 10% "take-or-pay" clause for quantities of natural gas that were contracted for but not 
received. 
On 23rd December, 2010, Bulgargaz EAD, and all the above mentioned companies, signed 
contracts that were in accordance with the substance of the contractual agreement that was proposed 
by the provider. The terms of the contracts was by the end of 2011. 
In August, 2011, Bulgargaz EAD’s clients received letters proposing that a new additional 
agreement be signed with identical contents to that signed the previous year. By the end of November, 
2011, new contracts were signed between the natural gas public provider and the companies, and these 
re-created the clauses from the previous year. After signing the contracts with Bulgargaz EAD, each of 
the companies included analogical clauses in their respective contracts with the final consumers. 
Decision of the Bulgarian Competition Authority 
In 2014, Sofiagas EAD, Overgas North EAD, Overgas West AD, Overgas South AD and Overgas 
East EAD appealed directly to the Commission for the Protection of Competition (the Commission) by 
lodging a complaint against Bulgargaz EAD on the basis of a suspected violation of Article 21, Paras. 
2, 4 and 5 of the Protection of Competition Act – abuse of a dominant position. 
In particular, the complaints related to: 
- Limiting or controlling the production, trade or technical development to the detriment of 
consumers (Para. 2); 
- Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other party of supplementary 
obligations or to the conclusion of additional contracts which, by their nature or according to 
normal commercial usage, have no connection with the object of the main contract or with its 
performance (Para. 4); 
- Refusing without a valid reason to deliver any goods or to provide any services to existing or 
potential customers in order to impede their business operations (Para. 5). 
In its decision the Commission held as follows: 
Bulgargaz EAD has a dominant position in the use of natural gas. The Commission took into 
consideration the existing domestic licensing regime for the public supply of natural gas and the fact 
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that Bulgargaz EAD is the sole licensed natural gas provider. The Commission also assessed the fact 
that Bulgargaz EAD constituted an "enterprise" within the meaning of Para. 1.7 of the Additional 
Provisions of the Protection of Competition Act and thus its activities fell within the scope of Article 
21 of the Protection of Competition Act. 
What is essential in the case is that Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) is not applicable since the consumption of natural gas in the country is under 1% (in 
relation to the one in the European Union). 
According to the Commission, Bulgargaz EAD acted in a manner that constituted the abuse of a 
dominant position because all of the companies that wanted to sign a contract for the delivery of 
natural gas with the public provider were obliged to fill in detailed fact sheets on the monthly 
quantities of needed gas. Moreover, the failure to submit this information could serve as a reason to 
refuse gas deliveries. 
The Commission also concluded that there was another infringement of the law in so far as the 
Additional Agreements laid down as prerequisites for a unilateral termination (cancellation) of the 
contract not only legislative changes, but also the relationships of the public provider with its 
counterparts outside the country or with those who provide the transition of natural gas. The 
Commission accepted that the above-mentioned prerequisites were not related to the behaviour of any 
of the parties and should not give grounds for the termination of the contract. 
According to the Commission’s decision, the unwillingness of Bulgargaz EAD to lead a normal 
negotiation process when signing the new contracts should also be regarded as an infringement, 
especially as the company had been maintaining that in the case of a lack of the full acceptance of all 
the proposed conditions, no contract should be signed. In the Commission’s view, this infringement 
could be qualified as being one of a "procedural" nature. 
As an argument in favour of the existence of infringements of the substantive law, the Commission 
pointed out that the Ancillary Agreements introduced unequal treatment among parties who should be 
treated equally. The Commission highlighted the fact that the contracts unlawfully included different 
prerequisites for the termination of their effect for the opposite parties. 
Proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court 
1. Bulgargaz EAD appealed the Commission’s decision before a three-member panel of the Supreme 
Administrative Court (the Court). In its judgment, the Court decided to leave the Commission's 
decision as it stood, ruling that the conclusions that the company was an enterprise with a dominant 
position on the domestic natural gas market and, as such, should not act in a way that might prevent, 
limit or distort competition and thus affect consumers' interests, were accurate. The Court stated that 
the Commission had correctly defined the relevant market, its structure and its mechanism for 
functioning. 
The Supreme Administrative Court considered that the other complaints against the Commission's 
decision. It decided that they were manifestly ill-founded, including the complaint that each of the 
applicants was pursuing a similar activity (supply of natural gas to final consumers). According to the 
First Instance Court, what was important in this case was who had the right to carry out natural gas 
deliveries on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and to transport the gas to the relevant 
regulatory gas stations from where other participants in the market, applicants included, received gas 
in order to deliver it to the final consumer. 
The Court agreed that the actions of Bulgargaz EAD constituted a violation of Article 21, Para. 1 of 
the Protection of Competition Act, in so far as the company had imposed unfair trade conditions on its 
counterparts. In the Court’s view, these conditions were: the possibility for the unilateral termination 
of the contract due to circumstances that are outside the parameters of the contract; the lack of a 
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reciprocal clause enabling the buyer to terminate the contract unilaterally; the buyer’s obligation to 
provide information regarding the quantities and a delivery date in tabular and written form; the 10% 
"take-or-pay" clause for any quantity of natural gas that was contracted but not received. 
The Court disagreed with Bulgargaz EAD's assumption that the new terms had been accepted 
without any challenge from an overwhelming number of clients other than the applicants. It stated 
that, in so far as the latter carried out around 50% of the total amount of all natural gas deliveries to the 
final customer, the effect on their interests was important for the normal functioning of the market.  
The First Instance court rejected the assertions of Bulgargaz EAD that no violation of the rights of 
the applicants could be proven. These assertions were based on the statement that the disputed clauses 
were reproduced also in the applicants' contracts which were signed with the final consumers. The 
Court accepted that the applicants had no dominant position in the market and the rules that were 
applicable to the public provider should not be considered applicable to the applicants. 
The First Instance court also rejected the applicant's allegation that there was no lack of 
exploitative abuse, based on the statement that, irrespective of the changed clauses in the contracts, 
Bulgargaz EAD had not made excessively high profits. The Court found this argument irrelevant 
because, in this particular case, the effect of on trade from Bulgargaz EAD’s side was irrelevant. 
According to the Court, the reason for this is that the natural gas market has the characteristics of a 
regulated market whose aim is laid down in legislation. 
With its judgment the First Instance Court concluded that the Commission's decision was 
procedurally and substantially lawful. 
2. An action for annulment was brought by Bulgargaz EAD against the decision of the three-
member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court to a five-member panel of the same Court. The 
company disagreed with the Court's finding of a violation of Article 21 of the Protection of 
Competition Act. 
The highest court instance accepted that the First Instance Court properly established the factual 
side of the case, but its conclusions regarding the violation of the substantive rule of National 
Competition Authority were unwarranted. 
The Supreme Administrative Court, five-member panel, as Second Instance, further elaborated that 
the conclusions in the contested decision concerning the relevant market, the mechanisms for its 
functioning, and the conclusions about the existent dominant position of Bulgargaz EAD, were 
accurate. The Court pointed out, however, that the additional agreements and introduced changes did 
not constitute an abuse of a dominant position (the imposition of unfair trade conditions, in particular). 
The Court pointed out that the changes proposed by the additional agreements with Bulgargas 
EAD’s clients were dependent on changes that related to the public delivery of natural gas, to the 
conditions of its transportation, or on changes in the legal framework. According to the Court's ruling, 
any of those changes, even though they were not imminently connected with the contracts at issue, 
were closely related to any delivery of natural gas and to the necessity for its guarantee. 
According to the Court's ruling, the provided possibility for unilateral termination of the contracts 
arose from obligations that occurred on the basis of entirely different contracts between the public 
provider and third parties. As a result, they could not constitute abuse of a dominant position because 
their aim was to guarantee the seamless delivery of natural gas. As an additional argument, the Court 
emphasised that an analogical possibility – for the unilateral termination of the contracts under certain 
conditions – was also provided to Bulgargaz EAD’s clients. 
In its judgment, the Court pointed out that the requirement to provide the expected natural gas 
consumption in a tabular, or in any other form, could not be considered to constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position. According to the Court, this requirement was a form of commitment toward an 
international provider and corresponded to the requirements of the relevant natural gas market. The 
Pier Luigi Parcu and Giorgio Monti 
80 
Court elaborated the thesis that the provision of information of this kind could neither harm the 
interests of the counterparties, nor distort the competition. 
The Second Instance Court finally concluded that any of the proposed changes in the contracts with 
the Bulgargaz EAD clients refers to all clients without exception - a fact that predetermines not only 
the lack of significant change in the relevant market, but also the lack of increase in the gas prices in 
the profits of the public provider. 
A special place in the Court's motives was given to Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. 
Commission of the European Communities, which the domestic court found to be relevant to the 
present case, accepting that the behaviour of Bulgargaz EAD did not hinder the existing level of 
market development, and did not harm the competition, and that the measures undertaken by the 
public provider were no different from those typical in a normal market. 
On these grounds, the appealed judgment was annulled and another judgment was pronounced on 
the merits of the case in which the Commission's decision was also annulled in all its parts. 
Comment: 
The case is a good example of the fact that competition law can provoke many contradictory theses – 
that of the National Competition Authority, that of the First Instance Court and that of the highest 
Court Instance.  
I think that the case is a good illustration of the necessity to safeguard the rights of the consumers 
of a given service or goods. Even in the case of a certain divergence from the standard trade practice, 
in the case of posing atypical conditions predetermining the continuation of the delivery of a certain 
service or of goods, this could not be defined as being an infringement as long as the rights of the final 
consumers are not infringed. 
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7.3. MARGET HENRIKSEN (HARJU COUNTY COURT) 
Estonian Competition Board vs AS Eesti Telefon  
Judgment of Estonian Supreme Court 
Case no. 3-3-1-66-02 
1. AS Eesti Telefon is an undertaking that provides a national telephone service and has a dominant 
position in Estonian market. On the 24.04.2001the Estonian Competition Authority made a decision, 
in which it was found that AS Eesti Telefon had committed an offence in relation to unfair pricing 
practices and the imposition of conditions, which consisted of the implementation of price increases 
for domestic call services. As Eesti Telefon had implemented a price increase at an average of 26.9 % 
for national telephone services. With the same decision, Eesti Telefon was made to implement lower 
prices on the basis of fair pricing, traditional proportions between prices and the consumer price 
growth rate and between acceptable return on equity at the level of the economy, including those that 
competed with other countries with similar markets. Since the prices had increased on the previous 
occasion on 1st October, 2000, the average price increase for the last six months would thus be 73.7 
per cent. According to § 14 of the Estonian Competition Act any direct or indirect abuse by an 
undertaking, or several undertakings, of a dominant position in the goods market is prohibited by 
directly or indirectly establishing or applying unfair purchase or selling prices or by other unfair 
trading conditions. The Estonian Competition Authority found that the price increase applied by Eesti 
Telefon was undertaken by taking advantage of its dominant position. Additionally, the Estonian 
Competition Authority found that the dominant position of a company is also regulated by the 
Telecommunications Act, under which the Communications Board shall exercise state supervision. 
2. AS Eesti Telefon submitted a complaint to the Administrative Court, asking the Court to cancel 
the decision of the Competition Board. The Administrative Court upheld the appeal. The Competition 
Authority then brought the appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed it and left 
the Administrative Court’s decision unchanged, on the following grounds: It was found that, according 
to § 14 of the Estonian Competition Act, AS Eesti Telefon has the opportunity to harm competition 
but, in practice, this has not happened. Furthermore, it was pointed out that harm in completion can 
occur only to undertakings and not to individuals. Accordingly, it was pointed out that the imposition 
of unfair prices without being affected by another undertaking’s activities in a product market does not 
constitute an offence within the meaning of § 14 of the Estonian Competition Act. The Competition 
Authority filed cassation to the Supreme Court of Estonia. The Supreme Court upheld the appeal, 
cancelled the decision of the Court of Appeal and sent the case back to the Administrative Court for a 
new revision of the case.  
3. The Supreme Court found that it is considered to be an abuse of a dominant position, and that it 
is prohibited under the competition law when the undertaking establishes unfairly high prices for 
goods. The provisions of the Competition Act apply to a company with a dominant position in the 
telecoms sector, which is governed by the Telecommunications Act. The Competition Authority is 
competent to exercise state supervision on pricing over a company which has a dominant position, 
although the Communications Board has jurisdiction of supervision of the pricing of telephone 
services. The §16 of the Competition Act prohibits the imposition of unfair prices by the dominant 
undertaking regardless of other operators. A dominant company has already undermined the 
competition and cannot fully play its role in order to protect the market’s participants. The state can 
tolerate such a restriction of competition only if it simultaneously prevents the abuse of a dominant 
position. According to the Competition Act the subject of the Act is just the company. However, free 
competition does not mean the freedom for one operator to compete with another operator, but it also 
means the right of the buyer of a product or a service to be free from the dictating of the terms of a 
contract by the seller. The task of the Competition Act is to protect both individuals and the public 
interest from the distortions of competition. If a telecommunications network operator or 
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telecommunications service provider has a market share of at least 40 per cent of a particular 
telecommunications service market’s turnover, the activities of that undertaking are regulated also by 
the Competition Act. The Communications Board has the right to take an injunction against the 
operator to stop the implementation of the rate if the fee does not meet the requirements of the Act. 
The Communications Board and the Competition Authority thus have a responsibility to cooperate, 
and they must avoid conflicting decisions. 
4. Comment: Perhaps the most important aspect of this case is that here the Supreme Court has 
dealt for the first time with substantive restrictions of the activities of an undertaking with a dominant 
position. The Supreme Court found that in the presence of an undertaking with a dominant position we 
cannot talk about damaging competition as an abstract phenomenon. In that case, the competition has 
been harmed anyway. The direct or indirect abuse of dominant position does not therefore mean that 
the activities of another undertaking are damaged. The state is committed to protecting the consumers 
of the goods from the company with a dominant position. Among other things, the state needs to avoid 
the imposition of unfair prices. The Supreme Court has thoroughly explained, in this decision, what is 
meant by unfair prices. The standpoint provided that the profit of the company with a dominant 
position should not be too high, is particularly remarkable. 
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7.4. Mafalda Correira (Braga Court of Commerce) 
Portuguese Competition Authority vs. Sport TV Portugal, SA 
Cabovisão, SA (dedicated to broadcasting by cable and satellite, and the exploitation of electronic 
communications) placed a complaint against Sport TV, SA (an undertaking dedicated to the 
production, direction and commercialisation of TV entertainment, in the sports area), which retained 
the monopoly of broadcasting rights for the main sport events, namely, the matches of the Portuguese 
Football League. 
The complaint was based on the discrimination against the different cable broadcasting operators, 
which was consubstantiated in an abuse of dominance. This undertaking is paid monthly by the 
broadcasters who subscribe its services.  
The price is established by taking in account several factors: 
- Recommended sale price (PVR); 
- Number of subscribers; 
- The ranking of each client; and 
- The minimal penetration rate (TPM), complemented by the minimal absolute number concept 
(NAM). 
The price paid monthly to Sport TV was found by multiplying the PVR by the numbers of subscribers, 
and then applying a discount according to the ranking. The NAM variable was introduced only for 
new contracts, leaving the existing ones untouched. The NAM applied to each client from January, 
2006 to December, 2010. 
The Portuguese Competition Authority (NCA) considered that the defendant, Sport TV, had 
violated Articles 6; 4,1,c) and e), 42; 43,1,a); 44; 45,1,a) of Law 18/2003, of 11/06, and that their 
conduct was likely to affect trade between Member States, thus violating Article 102 TFEU (Any 
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market, or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as being incompatible with the common market, insofar as it 
may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (…) applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage). 
The NCA sentenced the defendant to pay a €3.730.000 fine, and to publish an extract of the 
decision in the Portuguese Official Journal (DR) and in a nationwide newspaper. 
The defendant appealed to the Tribunal da Concorrência, Regulação e Supervisão, which decided 
that there had been violation of Articles 6,1 and 3,a); 4,1,e) and 43,1,a) of Law 18/2003, of 11/6, and 
sentenced Sport TV to pay a €2.700.000 fine (value calculated by the use of Law 19/2012 – The New 
Competition Law, which is more favourable to the defendant). 
The Court considered that the defendant, a TV channel that specialises in sports, working under the 
logic of pay tv, abused its dominant position, throughout the years 2005-2011, by defining 
discriminatory conditions, for providing the same service to the clients who bought the broadcasting 
rights of the defendant’s TV contents.  
Sport TV established different prices for the same contents, according to the final number of clients 
that each of the purchasing channels has (applying discounts to the channels with more clients, in 
theory, but this did not reflect the real number of clients, due to the use of “minimal quotas” – TPM 
and NAM - Market Penetration Rates, and Absolute Minimal Numbers), and the technology used 
(which has penalised the channels with the most advanced technology, since 2007).  
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In summary, the Court came to the conclusion that the defendant´s clients (who are a part of the 
distribution contracts) didn´t obtain due compensation for the loss of independence, which is caused 
by integration into the commercial promotion of the supplier, which supports narrow or negative 
margins of profit. This action caused a distortion of the market, by benefitting the larger and older 
broadcasting company, in contrast with smaller, more recent ones. For instance, ZON had to reach a 
TPM of 17-21%, while other smaller companies had to reach at least 29 %. 
Unhappy with this ruling, Sport TV appealed to the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa. 
This Appeal Court decided to maintain the ruling of the First Instance Court. 
In summary, it defined the defendant´s action as being an abuse of its dominant position, due to the 
fact that they held 100 % of the sports broadcasting rights, establishing discriminatory prices or 
services with the intention of restricting competition. 
The defendant argued that the imposition of “minimal quotas” (market penetration rates – TPM, 
and Absolute Minimal Numbers – NAM) was intended to increase subscriptions, and not to 
manipulate the market. 
However, as the Appeal Court decided, by not valuing the real number of the clients of each 
company, but, instead, the market penetration rate inside each company´s market, the value obtained 
was variable, and so this placed the clients in different categories. These categories were not related to 
the real and effective numbers, but to fictitious ones.  
This imbalance was worsened through the introduction of another item that was used to calculate 
the fee – the technology used. As the defendant did not support the costs of broadcasting with newer 
technology, the difference in cost should be reflected in the price stated, but this wasn´t the case. 
This decision is not yet final, since Sport TV placed an appeal with the Tribunal Constitucional, 
last September, and this is still pending. 
Personal comment 
This case is of extreme importance in Portugal since it relates to a true example of the abuse of a 
monopoly that may be classified as exclusionary as it was meant to safeguard the undertaking´s 
dominant position, and to facilitate the subsequent exploitation of dominance. 
The national courts have decided to sentence the defendant by using the National Competition 
Law, which reflects TFUE Article 102.  
The criteria used in this Article are the same as those in national law, and they were applied with 
the rulings, namely, the undertaking concept, and the intention of safeguarding the undertaking´s 
dominant position, and facilitating the subsequent exploitation of dominance.  
European Court Jurisprudence was also used throughout the decisions so as to define an abuse of 
dominance, its elements and effects. 
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8. The Private enforcement of competition Law  
8.1. MIEKE DUDOK VAN HEEL (AMSTERDAM DISTRICT COURT) 
AIRCARGO CARTEL (or not?) 
Equilib Netherlands B.V. v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. and several other airlines 
(hereinafter: “KLM et al.”) 
Judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
24th September, 2013. 
Case no.: 200.109.253/01 (ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:3013)  
1. The facts 
On 9th November, 2010, the European Commission announced in a press release (IP/10/1487) that it 
had imposed fines on eleven airlines, including KLM, et al. (with the exception of Lufthansa) totalling 
€799,445,000 due to their involvement in an international cartel involving air cargo services in the 
period from December, 1999, to February, 2006 (and that Lufthansa had received complete immunity 
from fines under the leniency programme). In its decision (hereinafter: the Decision) the infringement 
of competition law was described as follows:  
“The contacts on prices between the airlines that were concerned initially began with a view to 
discussing fuel surcharges. The carriers contacted each other so as to ensure that worldwide 
airfreight carriers imposed a flat rate surcharge per kilo for all shipments. The cartel members 
extended their cooperation by introducing a security surcharge and refusing to pay a commission 
on surcharges to their clients (freight forwarders).  
The aim of these contacts was to ensure that these surcharges were introduced by all the carriers 
involved; and that increases (or decreases) in the surcharge levels were applied in full and without 
exception. By refusing to pay a commission, the airlines ensured that surcharges did not become 
subject to competition through the granting of discounts to customers. Such practices are in breach 
of the EU competition rules.”  
KLM, et al., lodged an appeal against the Decision with the General Court of the European Union 
(EU) in good time and (inter alia) applied to the Court to annul the Decision.  
In the case before the national courts, the parties disagreed as to whether this follows from the 
judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) of 14th December, 2000 (case C-
344/98, Masterfoods) and the consequent case-law and regulations that these proceedings must, or 
may be, stayed at this stage, given that the validity of the Decision is the subject of an appeal for 
nullification that is pending before the Courts of the Union. According to Equilib, the proceedings 
may not be stayed. KLM, et al. submitted that the proceedings must be stayed.  
2. The proceedings 
Amsterdam District Court (Court of First Instance) 
In a writ dated 30th September, 2010, Equilib summoned KLM, Martinair and Air France to appear 
before the Amsterdam District Court and applied to the District Court to declare, put briefly, that they 
had acted unlawfully under the applicable law, against the injured parties listed in an annexe, by 
participating in a cartel that is outlined in the summons, and that they are jointly and severally liable 
for the damages caused to those injured parties, and to order them to compensate, jointly and 
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severally, for those damages and to pay, jointly and severally, the costs of the proceedings. Equilib 
submitted that the injured parties had assigned their claims to it.  
In a writ of 24th December, 2010, KLM, et al. added seventeen other airlines as third parties. 
Equilib amended its claim in the sense that it based its claims on the Decision. 
KLM, et al., subsequently filed a number of motions, amongst which (to the extent relevant for this 
case note) was a motion to stay the present proceedings until the Decision is irrevocable.  
The District Court stayed the proceedings until the Decision, or the decision of the Courts of the 
Union, had acquired the force of res judicata. The District Court, inter alia, found as follows in that 
regard (at Para. 4.10):  
 “The Masterfoods judgment, Article 16 (1) of the Regulation and the Commission Notice aim to 
preclude a national court from giving a decision that runs counter to a Commission decision which 
is not yet irrevocable. It is up to the national court to decide (…) whether the proceedings should 
be stayed earlier than the point at which a judgment can be given. This Court finds that this 
weighing of interests at this stage of the proceedings means that the hearing of the case will be 
stayed now, pending the final decision of the EJC on the appeal against the Decision. In this 
regard, with due observance of the requirements of the due process of law, it is relevant that a 
discussion of the merits of Equilib’s accusations is not possible at this stage. Essentially, Equilib 
had not based those accusations on any specific submissions of fact, other than that, according to 
the Decision, KLM, et al., had participated in a cartel. In making its accusations, Equilib places 
reliance on the binding evidential value of the Decision. However, the entire Decision has been 
challenged before the General Court and, accordingly, does not yet have the force of res judicata. 
A discussion of the merits would therefore, at this stage, in fact amount to an exchange between 
the parties of presumptions and expectations about the outcome of the proceedings before the EJC. 
With a view to the requirements for due process, KLM, et al., cannot be required to conduct the 
discussion in this manner. The proceedings will therefore be stayed.”  
The District Court also presumed that the judgment of the EJC regarding (inter alia) the specific 
nature, duration and scale of participation in the cartel (end of Para. 4.10) is relevant to an assessment 
of the unlawfulness of KLM et al.’s actions. According to the District Court  
“it is not only relevant whether, in a general sense, KLM, et al., participated in a cartel, but also 
and particularly what KLM, et al., actually did, and in what places, in what manner and during 
which periods, with regard to which services and shipments, and what possible consequences that 
may have had for the various injured parties. As opposed to the submissions of KLM, et al., 
Equilib has not sufficiently explained that, given the legal dispute in the appeal lodged by KLM et 
al., the judgment of the EJC is not relevant to the assessment of these aspects.”  
Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
In a summons dated 5th June, 2012, Equilib lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Amsterdam 
District Court to stay the proceedings.  
3. Judgment of the Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal considered as follows. 
It does not appear from the text of the Masterfoods judgment, and its various language versions, that 
the national court must stay the proceedings in all of the cases in which one of the parties has brought 
an action for the annulment of the underlying decision of the Commission in national proceedings. Nor 
does this follow from the rules that were subsequently introduced by the Council and the Commission. 
According to the Masterfoods judgment (at Para. 55), it is for the national courts to decide whether to 
stay the proceedings until a definitive decision has been given in the action for annulment, or in order 
to refer a question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.  
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Article 16(1) of Council Regulation No. 1/2003 also appears to proceed from this same 
presumption. This Article provides that the national courts must avoid giving decisions that would 
conflict with a decision of the Commission, or with a decision contemplated by the Commission, and 
to that end may assess whether it is necessary to stay the proceedings. That discretion is limited, as 
stated in the Masterfoods judgment (at Para. 57), to the situation in which the outcome of the dispute 
depends on the validity of the Commission’s decision, as the national courts cannot give a decision 
that runs counter to the Commission’s decision.  
In the Court of Appeal’s opinion, it is therefore only mandatory to stay the national proceedings in 
cases where the national proceedings turn on questions of fact or of law, the answers to which depend 
on the validity of the Commission’s decision. The Court of Appeal finds, moreover, that it can only be 
concluded that the answer to such questions depends on the validity of the Commission’s decision in 
cases where the validity of such a decision is reasonably in doubt. In that sense, a stay of proceedings 
therefore requires reasonable doubt in relation to the validity of the Commission’s decision.  
The Court of Appeal also refers to the view taken by the Advocate-General, P. Cruz Villalón, as set 
out in his opinion of 26th June, 2012, which accompanied the Otis judgment (at Para. 52):  
“Therefore, if the District Court had doubts regarding the validity of the decision and, furthermore, 
noted that the decision is sub iudice before the Courts of the Union, staying the national 
proceedings would avoid any risk of conflict between the decisions given by the Courts of the 
Union and the Belgian Court.”  
The Court of Appeal ruled that when one party relies on a Commission decision in support of its 
claims it is for the other party, who disputes the validity of that decision and who would like to stay 
the proceedings:  
a. to demonstrate that it has brought the action for annulment in good time;  
b. to explain that it reasonably opposes the Commission’s decision in the proceedings before the 
ECJ;  
c. to submit the defence that it wishes to raise in the follow-on proceedings so that the national 
court can assess if, and to what extent, the assessment of that defence depends on the validity 
of the Commission’s decision.  
Based on the documents and the explanations given, the national court can subsequently decide if, and 
to what extent, the proceedings must be stayed. This will do justice, on the one hand, to the interests of 
the claimant in precluding unnecessary delays in exercising its claims for compensation for the 
damage suffered by the competition law infringement and, on the other, the interests of the defendant 
in limiting the costs of raising a defence against those claims, as long as the validity of the 
Commission’s decision is not irrevocable.  
4. Personal comment 
Once the statements of defence had been filed and KLM, et al., no longer pleaded that the proceedings 
should be stayed completely, in view of the judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, the 
Amsterdam District Court (further to the suggestions of the parties) decided to continue the 
proceedings with the debate (to the extent that was possible) between the parties, and the assessment 
of the Court on the questions of applicable law, the statutes of limitation, and the validity of the 
assignments to Equilib. On 22nd July, 2015, the Court ruled, in an interim judgment, that Equilib had 
to provide further data and information in order to substantiate its claims. 
According to the Court's provisional assessment, this information should include:  
- a matrix of the most important flight routes, with reference to the period, the country of 
departure and the country of arrival (e.g., in 1999, x flights between Germany and France, y 
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flights between Germany and Italy, z flights between the Netherlands and England; in 2000, x 
flights between Germany and France, etc.);  
- the Airlines which carried out the flights on these flight routes;  
- the forwarders concerned, and the manner in which they passed on the fuel surcharge to their 
customers. , 
Before this information was provided to the Court and the debate between the parties had been 
completed in their written statements, on 16th December, 2015, the General Court of the European 
Union annulled the Decision (see inter alia KLM v. European Commission, case T-28/11). In its 
decision(s), the Court emphasises, first of all, that the principle of effective judicial protection requires 
that the operative part of a decision which is adopted by the Commission, finding infringements of the 
competition rules, must be particularly clear and precise, and that the undertakings that are held liable 
and penalised must be in a position to understand and to contest that imputation of liability and the 
imposition of those penalties, as set out in the wording of the operative part.  
The Court notes that the national courts are bound by the decision that is adopted by the 
Commission, and, consequently, the meaning of the operative part of that decision must be 
unambiguous. In particular, the national courts must be in a position to understand the scope of that 
infringement and to identify the persons who are liable, in order to be able to draw the necessary 
inferences as regards claims for damages that are brought by persons harmed by that infringement.  
Likewise, the Court points out that the wording of the operative part of a decision that finds an 
infringement of the competition rules is such as to establish the mutual rights and obligations of the 
persons concerned.  
In the present case, it is apparent from an overall reading of the grounds of the Decision that the 
Commission describes a single cartel, constituting a single and continuous infringement in relation to 
all of the routes that are covered by the cartel, and in which all of the carriers at issue participated. 
Those carriers, in the context of a single overall plan and by means of a single network of bilateral and 
multilateral contacts, allegedly coordinated their behaviour in relation to the development of the fuel 
and security surcharges and the payment of commissions on those surcharges to the freight forwarders 
with which they worked. That coordination is said to have taken place at a worldwide level, and 
therefore simultaneously affected all the routes that are referred to in the Decision.  
However, the operative part of the Decision refers to either four separate single and continuous 
infringements, or to just one single and continuous infringement, the liability for which is attributed 
only to the carriers which, as regards the routes mentioned in Articles 1 to 4 of the Decision, 
participated directly in the unlawful conduct that is referred to in each of those Articles, or were aware 
of the collusion on those routes. The Court therefore finds that there is a contradiction between the 
grounds of the Decision and its operative part. 
Furthermore, the Court notes that the grounds of the Decision are themselves not entirely internally 
consistent. Indeed, those grounds contain assessments which are difficult to reconcile with the 
existence of a single cartel that covers all of the routes that are referred to in the operative part, as 
described in those grounds.  
The question now arises: can we continue the follow-on proceedings that have been initiated in the 
national courts (in the Netherlands, Great Britain and Germany) and, if so, how? The assumption that 
there had been an infringement of competition law (a cartel), as described in the Decision, is gone. The 
Amsterdam District Court has instructed the parties in the Equilib-case (and in other cases that are 
pending before this Court) to inform the Court of the effect of the judgment of the General Court on 
the national proceedings. The Court is expecting the written statements of the parties on 30th March, 
2016. 
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8.2. CHRISTINA FARCAS SURPANU (BUCHAREST TRIBUNAL) 
Name of the court of First Instance: The Bucharest Tribunal  
Name of the Appeal Court: The Bucharest Court of Appeal 
Names of the parties:  
- Claimant: Mailers Serv SRL 
- Defendant: The Romanian National Post Company (Romanian Post)  
Date of the First Instance judgment: December 19th, 2014. 
Date of the appeal judgment: October 30th, 2015. 
The case opposing Mailers Serv SRL and Romanian Post is an interesting litigation, not only because 
the Court of Appeal awarded damages for prejudice that is said to have been caused by an abuse of a 
dominant position, but also because the effect of the anticompetitive behaviour manifested in a 
different market than that where the dominant position existed. In fact, the Romanian Post Company 
has a monopoly in the national market of advertising mail
26
 and, between 2005 and 2009, its market 
share exceeded 90%. Its anticompetitive behaviour had instead adversely affected the companies who 
were competing in the market for direct marketing services. This litigation also reflects the different 
views of the national courts on the force of the NCA’s decision in a private proceeding, on the 
principle of the harmonious interpretation of the national law in the light of Directive 2014/104/EU, 
and on the proof of the causality in a private enforcement action.  
Facts  
1. Since April 18th, 2005, Romanian Post applied a new rebate scheme for its customers in the market 
for advertising mail. The rebates were standardised and were offered to all customers on the same 
publicly available terms. They applied to periods of one year.  
2. Mailers Serv SRL is a small company which provides direct marketing services to its customers. 
In order to deliver the advertising material (catalogues, mailers and fliers), the company has to buy 
services for advertising mail from Romanian Post. Those services are resold to its own customers. 
In 2005, Mailers Serv SRL signed a contract with Romanian Post on the terms that are applicable 
to everyone. The contract was renewed annually until 2011.  
3. At the same time, Romanian Post concluded a similar contract with a competitor of Mailers 
Serv, Infopress. This contract stipulated a superior rebate if compared to those that are publicly offered 
(5% more for each rebate threshold). The parties applied these contractual clauses until 2009. Between 
2005 and 2009 the Infopress’s market share increased steadily compared with those of its competitors.  
4. Following a complaint from Mailers Serv and other competitors, NCA decided that Romanian 
Post’s decision to apply preferential rebates to Infopress was discriminatory and it represented an 
abuse of its dominant position in the market for advertising mail that distorted the competition 
between its customers. The NCA concluded that such conduct had infringed Article 102 TFEU and 
Article 6.1. c, of the Romanian Competition Law. In December, 2010, the NCA thus imposed a fine 
on the Romanian Post Company.  
5. In 2011, Romanian Post appealed the NCA’s decision to the administrative section of the Court 
of Appeal and, after a detailed procedure, the Court delivered its judgment in December, 2013, 
reducing the fine imposed by the NCA. That judgment was appealed by the NCA, and in April, 2015, 
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the Supreme Court reversed the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal and upheld the NCA’s 
decision. 
6. Whilst the Administrative Court proceedings were ongoing, Mailers Serv started an action for 
damages against the postal company. Mailers Serv sought to receive as compensation for its material 
loss, the difference between the rebates that were unlawfully applied to Infopress and the rebates 
applied to the rest of the competitors, the claimant included. The claim was presented in July, 2011, 
before the Bucharest Tribunal and it was based on the NCA’s decision which was delivered in 2010.  
7. In November, 2011, the Tribunal decided to stay the action for damages until the end of the 
administrative proceedings. Mailers Serv appealed that decision before the Court of Appeal, and by a 
judgment delivered in April, 2012, the Court of Appeal obliged the Tribunal to continue the procedure 
on the ground that the NCA’s decision is not the only evidence that could be produced by the claimant 
in an action for damages. 
8. The Tribunal ordered an expert to quantify the damages. Apart from the expert witness and 
NCA’s decision, Mailers Serv only presented its first contract with the postal company. Based on the 
evidence presented, in December, 2014, the Tribunal dismissed the action for damages, arguing that 
the claimant did not prove that the conditions of the tort liability were met. 
9. Mailers Serv appealed the judgment and, in October, 2015, after the end of the administrative 
proceedings, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and awarded partial damages of those sought 
by the claimant. The postal company was obliged to pay compensation for the damages produced 
between July 14th, 2005, and August 1
st
, 2009. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the prejudice was 
proved by the expertise that was called on in the First Instance, and the facts, the defendant’s 
culpability, and the causal link were all proved by the NCA’s decision, which was now definitive.  
10. Romanian Post appealed before the Supreme Court the decision that obliged it to pay damages 
and the first hearing is scheduled for October, 2016.  
Comment  
Perhaps the most important and intriguing aspects of this litigation are the appreciation of evidence 
and the standard of proof that has been used by the Court of Appeal. Although, in principle, is 
undeniable that a discriminatory treatment applied to customers may generate damages for those 
customers who were not privileged, it is also true that the causality has to be proved and could not 
simply be deduced from the NCA’s definitive decision.  
In this particular case, the claimant alleged that the harm suffered is represented by the difference 
between the illegal superior rebate that was conceded to its competitor and the common rebate, and 
asked to be compensated for this difference between the rebates applied to the deliveries it had sent. 
However, by seeking such compensation, the claimant wanted, in fact, to obtain for its own profit the 
same treatment from the postal company that had previously been judged to be illegal and 
anticompetitive by the NCA and the Administrative Courts. 
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8.3. NATALIE SWALENS (BRUSSELS COMMERCIAL COURT) 
The decision of the Brussels Court of Appeal of October 28
th
, 2015, in the European Commission 
versus KONE, Otis, Schindler and ThyssenKrupp.  
In a decision of February 21st, 2007, the European Commission fined KONE, Otis, Schindler and 
ThyssenKrupp, manufacturers of lifts, escalators and elevators, for an amount of €992 million, for an 
infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
27
 The 
Commission found that the manufacturers had made an agreement to:  
(i) allocate public tenders between themselves and other contracts for the sale, installation and 
servicing of elevators and escalators;  
(ii) not to compete with each other; and  
(iii) had exchanged commercially sensitive information. All this took place in Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands from 1996 to 2004.  
On December 20th, 2008, the Commission filed a claim for damages before the Brussels Court of 
Commerce
28
 and against the cartel participants, on behalf of the European Institutions. The European 
Institutions felt they had suffered losses due to the cartel, because of higher prices in agreementson 
calls for tenders for maintenance and the modernisation of their equipment during the infringement 
period. The Commission asked that the contracts for Belgium and Luxemburg with the manufacturers, 
based on the established fraud, be declared null, and they claimed damages of about €9 to €11 billion 
(depending on the method of calculation). Subsidiarily, the Commission asked for a provision of €5 
billion and the designation of an expert for advice on the exact amounts.  
In a first phase, the Court of Commerce referred two preliminary questions to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union in relation to the authority of the Commission to represent the European 
Institutions, and the right to a fair trial, as the Commission based its claim on its own earlier decision 
about the cartel practice. The Court of Justice stated, in its decision of November 11th, 2012, that only 
the Commission could (and should) represent the European Institutions in trials, and that access to 
justice could not be denied to the Commission for its claim, as any party should be able to seek 
damages to guarantee the effective enforcement of competition law. The Court of Justice saw no 
infringement of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights or to Article 6 of the European Treaty 
on Human Rights in the action of the Commission for damages that were based on its own decision.  
On November 24th, 2014, the Brussels Court of Commerce dismissed the claim.
29
 The Court 
applied (classic) Belgian tort law, as in Article 1382 of the Belgian Civil Code, which requires proof 
of a harmful event, of damages, and of the fact that the harmful event was the cause (or one of the 
causes) of those damages (the link of causality). Under Belgian civil and procedural law, the “burden 
of evidence” of these three elements is on the claimant (Article 1315 of the Belgian Civil Code and 
Article 870 of the Belgian Code of Procedure). As the decision of the Commission established the 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU, only the damages and the link of causality had to be proven. The 
Belgian Judge is bound by the Commission’s decision; which is a result of European law,30 but which 
has also been a principle of national, Belgian law since 1971 (the Franco-Suisse Le Ski case).
31
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The Court of Commerce found that the Commission did not provide sufficient evidence of real and 
certain damages that had been suffered due to the cartel. The Court felt that bid-rigging does not 
necessarily lead to higher prices, especially when the cartel does not represent a monopoly. In this 
case, the cartelists had 70 per cent of the market, so that the Court believed that the other 30 per cent 
of the players could still compete for maintenance contracts. The Court of Commerce cited a report of 
the Commission itself, which stated that the actual effect of the cartel was difficult to measure, 
“because it is, in particular, not known if and how many other projects were subject to bid-rigging, nor 
how many projects may have been subject to allocation between cartel members without there being a 
need for contacts between them.” The Court of Commerce also found that the Commission did not 
establish that it lost the serious chance of lower prices for the maintenance contracts.  
After this decision of the Court of Commerce, which is essentially based on the lack of evidence, 
the Commission tried to acquire more elements about the real and exact damages. In appeals before 
the Brussels Court of Appeal, the Commission therefore asked for a preliminary decision about the 
documents that the defendants could submit to the Court. The decision of the Brussels Court of Appeal 
of October 28th, 2015, did indeed order the manufacturers to produce documents.  
The Commission based its claim on the production of documents, firstly on Article 19.3 of the 
Belgian Code of Procedure, which enables parties to ask the judge, at any phase of the procedure, to 
take a preliminary measure. This preliminary measure can be a provisional organisation of the 
relations between parties, or, as in this case, a decision concerning the evidence. Often expertise is 
requested about facts or technical matters. 
Here, the Commission filed for a measure of enquiry consisting of an order to the cartelist 
manufacturers to produce certain documents, based on Article 877 of the Belgian Code of Procedure. 
This order can be given by the judge if he feels that there are reasons to believe that the defendant (or 
a third party) has those documents available. The party that asks for the order is not required to prove 
that the defendant does possess the documents, but must convince the judge of the existence of 
serious, consistent and precise presumptions to that effect. Furthermore, s/he must show that there is 
reason to suppose that these documents contain evidence of the relevant facts. It is clear that Article 
877 tends to facilitate fact finding and evidence relating to a party in a situation of inequality of access 
to certain facts and documents, but it cannot allow a “fishing expedition”. This is especially true where 
privacy, confidentiality and/or intellectual property may be concerned. It is to be noted that Directive 
2014/104 contains rules about disclosure of evidence in actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of competition law that are not yet transposed.
32
  
The decision of the Brussels Court of Appeal that I discuss in this note, dealt only with this 
preliminary question.  
The Court opened by stating that its decision on the preliminary question on the production of 
documents does not imply any decision on the merits of the case itself. On the contrary, as the 
requested measure tends to enable the production ofpossible evidence, the Court does not take a 
position about the existence of damages nor about the link of causality. At this stage of the procedure, 
the Court does indeed judge only at first sight (“prima facie”). In this, the decision is much like the 
“kort geding” of Article 584 of the Belgian Code of Procedure, literally, a short lawsuit, where the 
President of the Court takes provisional measures on urgent matters. A difference may be that the 
President does not hear the substance of the matter and that his decision is not binding for (another) 
judge that hears the suit that is at the heart of the matter, whereas the Court, after judging the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the 
Commission. 
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preliminary mattrr, will have to offer an opinion on the substance. Moreover, the judge who allowed a 
measure under Article 19.3 cannot change his opinion, since he may have shown his motivation when 
writing his decision on the grounds of the case. A decision on Article 19.3 of the Belgian Code of 
Procedure can, for that reason, be felt by the parties involved to be a prediction of the futurue 
outcome. This explains why the cartelist manufacturers, in this case, produced every possible 
argument against the measure the Commission sought to obtain. In its opinion on the preliminary 
measure, the Court calls indisputable only the fact of the cartel as established by the decision of the 
Commission of February 21st, 2007. This allows the Court to consider the order to produce the 
relevant documents under Article 877 of the Belgian Code of Procedure in relation to the need to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the enforcement of competition law. According to the Court of Appeal, 
it is normal that, in the case of the cartel here, relevant information was not available in a symmetrical 
way between parties, since the cartel was hidden.  
The Court feels that the documents that the Commission indicated may be relevant (although the 
actual relevance will be clear only after communication). This is the case for:  
A. the confidential version of the decision of the Commission of February 21st, 2007, which is 
limited to well indicated parts in relation to the Belgian market. This is also true for  
B. documents from the Commission’s investigation file to which the documents in (A) refer. The 
Court considers that these documents may make clear how the cartel operated.  
Referring to the same report as the Court of Commerce, the Court of Appeal cites the Commission 
where it says that the actual effect of the cartel was difficult to measure, but emphasises that the 
Commission also says there that the infringement of Article 101 TFEU was serious, and it must have 
had an effective impact on the market. This brings the Court of Appeal to conclude that – at first sight 
– the execution of the cartel agreement must have had an impact on the Belgian market, and that this 
impact implies losses for participants in this market.  
On this, the Court of Appeal adds that, under Belgian law, if damages cannot be calculated exactly, 
the judge can decide on a fair amount. This is relevant, since the Commission will not be able to prove 
definitively, and with exact figures, what would have been the situation without the cartel. The Court 
of Appeal refers to the link of causality under Belgian law, where the claimant has to prove that the 
damages would not have occurred had the fault not existed. Real evidence on this hypothetical 
situation is, of course, impossible, but the Court of Appeal says the documents asked for may 
contribute to a better understanding of the influence of the cartelists, and of their cartel, on the market, 
and to making it possible to estimate the damages.  
The Court of Appeal understands that this measure is not disproportionate, and there seems not to 
be an easier, faster or cheaper means of enquiry. In this the Court of Appeal refers to Article 875bis of 
the Belgian Code of Procedure, which urges the judge to be restrictive in his choice of measures of 
enquiry. The argument of the manufacturers that is based on confidentiality was dismissed for the 
already mentioned reason of the effectiveness of European competition law. The Court of Appeal 
points out that European Union law refers to the national judge and his/her national law for a decision 
about claims for damages from infringements of competition, abiding with the interests of European 
competition law. Confidentiality must not prevent claimants for damages from infringements to 
competition law obtaining access to documents that relate to a leniency procedure. Furthermore, the 
information in the documents is more than 10 years old, whereas 5 years is generally regarded as 
meaning that such documents have lost their confidentiality.  
Neither can the manufacturers complain, says the Court, about a loss of privacy (Article 8 of the 
European treaty of human rights), because any loss of reputation would be the sole effect of their own 
acts in organising and executing the cartel agreement.  
Pier Luigi Parcu and Giorgio Monti 
94 
Conclusion  
To me, it is interesting to see how European competition law and European institutional law contribute 
to a solution of the case under national law. The case is indeed essentially a problem of Belgian tort 
law, judged by a competent Belgian judge, but the decision of the Commission provides essential 
elements in this judging. In its decision, the Court of Appeal respected the classic Belgian theory of 
the priority of International and European law. The decision of the Commission on the elevator 
manufacturers’ cartel not only constituted for the Court of Appeal the fact of the tort, but also a 
presumption of causality between the tort and the principle of damage.  
Indeed, one cannot say that the cartel meant a serious infringement on Article 101 TFEU (as stated 
by the Commission) also and maintain that it did not have an influence on the market. This is 
confirmed in Article 17.2 of the Antitrust Damages Directive of 2008, which was not yet applicable in 
this case.
33
 This reasoning brought the Court of Appeal to sustain the preliminary claim of the 
Commission to produce documents. It seems improbable to me that in a later decision on the heart of 
the matter the Court of Appeal will refuse to accept that the European institutions must be suspected of 
having suffered losses, and that the amount of these losses cannot be calculated exactly, and that they 
therefore must be accorded in fairness. I am thus looking forward to a final decision from the Court of 
Appeal which will hold an effective enforcement of competition law. 
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8.4. LIJANA VISOKAVICIENE (THE VILNIUS DISTRICT COURT) 
The claimant company,“SDG”, brought a civil action for damages caused by unlawful competition 
against the defendants, G.L. and G.L., the company “Business Alliance”, the third parties - S.Z., E.R., 
V.S., S.Š., J.B., B.K., G.K., R.J., A.V., R.Š., D.Š., G.M., the institution providing a conclusion – The 
Competition Council. The claimant claimed €30.000 damages from the defendants plus, 5 percent of 
interest and costs. The claimant argued that the main areas of his activity were business consultations, 
training, the safety and health of employees, labour law, fire security, civil security, the environment, 
the investigation of professional risk and its evaluation, engineering facilities, the installation of ISO 
standards. The claimant stressed that the defendant offered the same services, mentioning that the 
structure and areas of his activities were similar to the claimant’s. The claimant pointed out that the 
company “Business Alliance” was set up in 2009. However it had not carried out any commercial 
activity until the beginning of 2011, when the defendants, G.L and G.L., left and started working at 
“Business Alliance”. The sole shareholder and general director of the company, “Business Alliance”, 
was the defendant, G.L., who had formerly been the director of the company, “SDG”. His spouse, 
G.L., who had formerly been the director of the company, “SDG”, of the Department of Kaunas, 
started running “Business Alliance”. The defendants, G.L. and G.L., persuaded a lot of SDG’s 
employees to leave the company and to start working at “Business Alliance” and some employees 
were lured away by them. According to the claimant, the defendants had also benefited from the 
commercial (manufacturing) secrets of the company, “SDG”, and its clients’ data. In addition, 
defendants had entered into agreements with the former clients of the company “SDG”l and had 
competed dishonestly with it. As a result, the company, “SDG”, suffered damages. The claimant 
pointed out that while the defendants had been performing their duties in the company, “SDG”, they 
could obtain the data on the claimant’s clients, as well as the prices of services, and they learnt about 
other clients from the employees who had been lured away. The claimant stated that the defendants 
had used all of the information of the company, “SDG”, as they were heads of the company and the 
information had been later used to develop the entity in order to gain profit. In the view of the 
claimant, the above mentioned information had been appropriated and used by the defendants 
unlawfully. Due to the large migration of employees to the company, “Business Alliance”, in January 
and February, 2011, the claimant suffered a loss of approximately €13.000 in income. Due to the 
unlawful actions of luring away the employees and clients of the company, “SDG”, the claimant 
suffered approximately €30.000 of damage. 
By the judgment of 11th June, 2013, the Kaunas District Court dismissed the claim. It held that at 
the time the company, “Business Alliance”, was established on 7th April, 2009, the defendant, G.L., 
was not a director of the company, “SDG”. The Court pointed out that as the company “Business 
Alliance” had been searching for employees through the Labour Exchange, the media and on the 
internet, this implied that the employees who were working in the claimant’s company and who 
migrated to “Business Alliance” had not been lured away by the defendants unlawfully. The Court 
considered that the list of commercial secrets of the company, “SDG”, was only confirmed on 16th 
December, 2010, and then the defendants were dismissed from the company, as well as the claimant, 
having adopted the order for the list of commercial secrets did not stipulate any order for the usage of 
that information, did not appoint any persons responsible for the usage of commercial secrets, and as 
did not determine the rules for the protection of secrets. For these reasons, the Court found that the 
claimant neither made official, nor preserved, the information properly, which, in the view of the 
claimant, constituted a commercial secret and could be considered to be confidential, inaccessible 
publicly, unknown to the third parties, and which would have an apparent value. Under these 
circumstances, and after the examination of the agreements with clients, the Court found that the 
agreements of the two companies had not been identical. Their form and the style of their preparation 
were different, whereas the appraisals (tariffs) of payment were similar. As regards the contracts, the 
Court noted that the former clients had terminated contracts with the claimant in good faith and 
according to the law and agreements, and the former clients entered into the contracts with the 
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company “Alliance of Business” at their own will. These actions were in compliance with the Civil 
Code. The Court concluded that entities have the freedom to utilise honest competition and the law 
does not prohibit the setting up of enterprises of a similar profile.  
By a judgment of 14th March, 2014, the Kaunas Regional Court revoked the decision of the First 
Instance and delivered a new judgment which satisfied the claim in part. The Court awarded the 
claimant €16.500 in damages from the defendants. The Court found that the defendants had performed 
dishonest actions in relation to competition, as prescribed by the Competition Law. In the Court’s 
view, the termination of the Labour agreements by an initiative of the employees simultaneously, 
ratherthan through cooperation breached de facto, between the parties, employment in the defendant 
company, “Alliance of Business”, by assessing the nature of both companies, confirmed that the 
willingness of the employees to terminate agreements with the claimant had been influenced by the 
dishonest actions of the defendants. According to the Court, these dishonest actions had occurred as a 
result of the claimant’s employees encouraging the termination of agreements with the claimant and 
then entering into the agreements with the claimant’s direct competitor. As the major part of the 
defendant’s employees were former employees of the claimant, the Court found that the defendant had 
obtained a competitive advantage after he employed the employees of the competitor. 
As regards the disclosure of commercial secrets, the Kaunas Regional Court stressed that the 
absence of the list of commercial secrets should not be absolute. The Court assessed the provisions of 
the Competition Law and the fact that the list of commercial secrets of the company, “SDG”, was 
confirmed by the order of the General Director of the company, “Business Alliance”, on 16th 
December, 2010. The employees of “SDG” had been introduced in written form and were warned 
about unlawful usage of commercial secrets. The Court stressed that all of the information on the 
commercial secrets of the claimant was known to the former Director, G.L. Under these 
circumstances, the Court found that the information on commercial secrets (the data about clients, 
contracts, the forms of commercial proposals) had been transferred to the defendant’s company, 
“Business Alliance”, and were used for the daily activities of the company. In the light of the 
foregoing, the Court pointed out that the possibility of the defendant successfully operating on the 
market was based on resources that were created by the claimant. In the present case, the Court found 
that the competitive environment of the claimant had obviously deteriorated in the same specific 
segment of the market in which the defendants had also acted. For these reasons the Court 
acknowledged that the claimant had suffered loss. On the basis of the above-mentioned facts, the 
Court found that the value of contracts reflected the damage suffered by the claimant. Bearing in mind 
the value of the contracts, the Court came to the conclusion that the value of the contracts amounted to 
the damage suffered by the claimant, which had been influenced by the dishonest competition of the 
defendants. The Court found that the claimant had entered into both long term and termless contracts 
with eleven companies. If these contracts had not been terminated, the claimant would have received 
€16.500 in income.  
By a final judgment of 6th February, 2015, the Supreme Court of Lithuania overturned the decision 
of the Appellate Court and remitted the case for re-examination to the Appellate Court. The Court 
noted that the findings of the Appellate Aourt related to actions relating to dishonest competition by 
the defendants which were found. The dispute arose only in respect of damages. In this context the 
Supreme Court had to ascertain the appropriate level of compensation for the damages, since they 
were caused by the actions of dishonest competition (the luring away of employees and taking 
advantage of commercial secrets). In the present case, the Supreme Court analysed the relevant law 
and practice. The Court noted the international law and, more specifically, the provision “Dishonest 
Competition” of The Convention of Paris “For the security of industrial property”, and in the 
provisions “The security of commercial secrets” of the Agreement on Trade - Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS agreement). These documents did not stipulate any view as to 
the quantification of damages. The Chapter “Civil and administrative process and remedies for 
damage compensation” of the TRIPS agreement Article 45 “Compensation for damages” stipulates 
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that courts have a right to require the offender to compensate the possessor, and the compensation 
should be sufficient for the infringement of intellectual property, as the offender knows, or has serious 
grounds to assume, that he has infringed the right, despite the fact that the offender has already 
performed an unlawful activity. According to the mentioned Article, the State is able to authorise the 
courts to recover the profit or to compensate for plausible damages, even if the offender does not 
know, or have the serious grounds on which to assume that s/he has performed an unlawful activity. 
The Court observed that the provisions of the TRIPS agreement were of a minimal standard for 
members of the State, and thus the different regulation for compensation for damage could be 
envisaged in national law.  
The Court noted that EU members have not had a general stance on the 29th April, 2004, Directive 
(2004/48/EB) of the European Parliament and Council for the protection of intellectual property, on 
whether it has to be applied (and to what extent) to commercial secrets also. The proposal of the 
Directive for the protection of non-disclosed practical experience and business information 
(commercial secrets) against unlawful receipt, usage and disclosure (COM/2013/0813 final-2013/0402 
(COD) (hereafter – the Directive proposal) was issued. According to the Article 13, “The 
compensation for damage” of the Directive proposal, which had enshrined the requirement for 
Member States to guarantee that competitive judicial authorities having received an application by an 
aggrieved party should require the offender who had known, or should have known, that they had 
received, disclosed or used the commercial secret unlawfully, to compensate for the damages to the 
possessor of the commercial secret and these damages should be in compliance with factual damage. 
In addition, the Article stpulates that competitive judicial authorities, having determined the amount of 
the damage, should consider all the factors as negative economic effects, including the loss of profit by 
the aggravated party as well as the entire amount of the profit that was received dishonourably by the 
offender. 
The Supreme Court pointed out that the national Lithuanian law had no prescribed special 
provision in relation to compensation arising from the dishonest actions of competition. In this respect, 
the provisions of the Civil Code were applied. The Supreme Court started forming the practice due to 
compensation for damage caused by dishonest competition, and it had stated that one of the criteria for 
the calculation of damages might be the loss of revenue which could be proven by the claimant. The 
views of the Supreme Court were developed further in jurisprudence through the clarification that loss 
of revenue ought to be understandable in these circumstances as (non-received) pure profit, which 
should be proven and be considered to be awarded damage. According to the Court, the entire loss of 
income should not be claimed as it was profit from which expenses had not been deducted. The Court 
noted that taxable profit is received once expenses are deducted from the entire income (receipts). The 
Court stressed that taxable profit does not constitute the entire loss of revenue as damages. According 
to the Income Tax Law, pure profit is gained by deducting the income tax from this amount. 
Accordingly, the pure profit is the part of the received general income minus the expenditure of 
financial activity, particular losses and paid taxes. 
In the present case, the Appellate Court decided that the value of the contracts had been deemed to 
be damages incurred by the claimant due to the dishonest competition of the defendants. In the view of 
the Supreme Court, the conclusion of the Appellate Court had been unfounded for the following 
reasons: firstly, the damages for loss of revenue should be considered to be pure profit. Secondly, the 
Appellate Court should determine the amount of damages according to the criteria of pure profit, but 
not in respect of the forecast incomes which the claimant would have received (perhaps) if the 
mentioned contracts had not terminated with the claimant and had entered into contracts with the 
defendant company, “Business Alliance”. The Court thus found that the criteria applied for the 
calculation of damages by the Appellate Court did not comply with the practice of the Supreme Court, 
and the amount of damages awarded with regard to the findings of the Appellate Court, could not be 
deemed to be proven.  
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8.5. IKO NÕMM (THE TALLINN COURT OF APPEAL) 
1. On 31
st
 March, 2009, Aktsiaselts Starman filed an action against Elion Ettevõtted Aktsiaselts with 
Harju County Court and demanded the return of €381,818.20 which were acquired without a legal 
basis and through interest on arrears. Alternatively, the plaintiff demanded compensation for damage 
and interest on arrears. 
Pursuant to the circumstances of the case, the defendant owns over 95% of the cable conduit 
situated on the territory of Estonia, which the defendant leases to other communications undertakings 
for the provision of electronic communications services. The plaintiff leases cable conduit from the 
defendant, as it needs this to compete in the electronic communications services market. Other 
communications undertakings do not have any other options in order to provide their services, except 
for the defendant’s cable conduit network. The plaintiff has concluded written cable conduit lease 
contracts with the defendant. 
The cable conduit, which belongs to the defendant, is an essential facility within the meaning of § 
15 of the Competition Act, and thus the defendant has a dominant position in the market as a provider 
of cable conduit rental services, wherefore it has to take into account, in its activities, the restrictions 
arising from the Competition Act. Among other things, it is prohibited to abuse the dominant position 
of an undertaking in the market. 
Before 1st February, 2006, the plaintiff paid rent to the defendant for the cable conduit in the 
amount of 81 cents per meter for the installation of the cable. Starting from 1st February, 2006, the 
defendant established new rental rates, which were significantly higher than the uniform price had 
been thus far. In addition, several extra charges were established. Accordingly, the rent of the cable 
conduit built before 2006 increased nearly 20%, and the rent of cable conduit built after 2006 
increased nearly 40%. As of 1st January, 2008, the defendant established again a uniform rent of 67 
cents per linear metre of installation. 
The plaintiff is of the opinion that the price list which was applicable from 1st February, 2006, until 
1st January, 2008, was in conflict with the Competition Act and was therefore void. The defendant has 
to return the rent relating to the part exceeding the rent pursuant to the price list which was applicable 
before 1st February, 2006. The defendant has acquired €381,818.20 without a legal basis. In addition, 
the defendant has to pay to the plaintiff the interest on the arrears in the amount of €78,74.83 and 
interest. Alternatively, the defendant asked to order the plaintiff to pay compensation for damage in 
the same amount together with interest. 
2. The defendant opposed the action. According to their objections, special rules apply in electronic 
communications, primarily regulations No 312 and No 313 of the Government of the Republic, which 
have been passed pursuant to § 205 (2) of the Electronic Communications Act and § 53 (6) and § 51 
(7) of the Telecommunications Act, which regulated the leased line and interconnection services and 
established the methodology for the calculation of charges. The provisions of the Competition Act do 
not therefore apply to the defendant. 
3. Harju County Court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the action by their judgment of 5th 
November, 2012. 
4. Tallinn Circuit Court upheld, by its judgment of 18th April, 2013, the judgment of the Harju 
County Court. 
5. The Supreme Court annulled the judgments of the lower courts due to incorrect application of 
substantive law, and sent the case for a new hearing. 
The parties are not arguing over the fact that, during the disputed period, the defendant was an 
undertaking in control of an essential facility within the meaning of § 15 of the Competition Act, or 
over the fact that the Communications Board had designated, by Directive No 1-3/04/269 of 29th 
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November, 2004, the defendant as an undertaking with significant market power in the territory of the 
Republic of Estonia for the year 2005 in the market of telephone services, leased line services and 
interconnection services. 
Pursuant to § 15 of the Competition Act, an undertaking is deemed to be in control of an essential 
facility if it owns, possesses or operates a network, infrastructure, or any other essential facility which 
other persons cannot duplicate or for whom it is economically inexpedient to duplicate, but without 
access to which, or the existence of which, it is impossible to operate in the goods market. In 
conjunction with § 13 (1) and (2) of the Competition Act, the undertaking in control of an essential 
facility has a dominant position in the market. Pursuant to § 16 (1) 1) of the Competition Act, any 
direct or indirect abuse by an undertaking of their dominant position in the goods market is prohibited, 
including directly or indirectly establishing unfair purchase or selling prices, or other unfair trading 
conditions. Pursuant to § 18 (1) 1) of the Competition Act, an undertaking that is in control of an 
essential facility is required to permit other undertakings to gain access to the network, infrastructure, 
or other essential facility, under reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions, for the purposes of the 
supply or sale of goods. 
During the disputed period, electronic communications were regulated by the Telecommunications 
Act and, pursuant to § 3 (17) of the Telecommunications Act, the interconnection of 
telecommunications networks were technical and logical connection in a manner that allows the 
provision of telecommunications services to the users who have access to the connected 
telecommunications networks. Pursuant to § 2 (6) of the Telecommunications Act, the interconnection 
service was defined as being the telecommunications service which consists of the interconnection of 
two telecommunications networks, and the conveyance, switching or transmission of signals between 
these networks. The Telecommunications Act did not contain the definition of a leased line service, 
but it did provide the definition of a leased line. Pursuant to § 3 (16) of the Telecommunications Act, a 
leased line means a connection for the non-switched transmission of signals between two points in the 
telecommunications network, which may be accompanied by the auxiliary systems that are necessary 
for the efficient use of the technical parameters and management opportunities of the route. 
The Supreme Court found that leasing the cable conduit is not a leased line service within the 
meaning of § 3 (16) of the Telecommunications Act, nor an interconnection service within the 
meaning of § 3 (17) of the Telecommunications Act. Accordingly, Regulations Nos 312 and 313 of the 
Government of the Republic do not apply to the rent which the defendant, as the undertaking in 
control of an essential facility, demanded from other communications undertakings for the use of the 
cable conduit that is necessary for the installation of communications cables. Granting the use of the 
cable conduit that is necessary for the installation of communications lines is not comparable to 
granting the use of communications lines, or to the establishment of a connection between 
telecommunications networks. 
Even if the legislation regulating the communications establishes the rules for sector-specific 
pricing for some service types, these rules cannot be in conflict with competition law. The 
establishment of unfair prices cannot be justified by relying on sector-specific rules or the decisions of 
the administrative authorities. 
An undertaking in a dominant position in the market, within the meaning of § 13 (1) of the 
Competition Act, is not allowed to abuse its position pursuant to § 16 (1) of the Competition Act, 
including by directly or indirectly establishing unfair purchase or selling prices, or other unfair trading 
conditions, even if it is subject to sector-specific rules and special rules have been established for it for 
pricing. The same follows from Subsection 2 of Article 102 of the consolidated version of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the Union (see also e.g., the judgment of the Court of Justice of 14th October, 
2010, in case No C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom vs European Commission). 
The Supreme Court explained its thoughts on the first alternative ground set out in the plaintiff’s 
claim, i.e., unjust enrichment, that if the price increase is in conflict with the rules of fair pricing that 
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are prescribed in the Competition Act, the price increase, as the defendant’s unilateral act, is void, and 
the defendant is required to return the money on the basis of unjust enrichment. If the defendant delays 
the repayment of money, the plaintiff has the right to claim interest on arrears, and this right is 
provided by law. 
As is evident from the statement of the claim that the defendant increased the price, relying on the 
contract concluded by the parties, which presumably contains standard terms, the County Court has to 
assess, on its own initiative, whether the defendant has relied on standard terms when demanding the 
charge from the plaintiff, and whether this standard term is applied in a case where the defendant is 
relying on the standard term. The standard term is void if this, taking into account the nature, content, 
manner of conclusion, interests of the parties and other relevant circumstances, unreasonably damages 
the other contracting party, in particular, when the balance of rights and obligations arising from the 
contract has been significantly damaged by the standard term, to the detriment of the other contracting 
party. 
The Supreme Court stated, with respect to the second alternative ground set out in the plaintiff’s 
claim, i.e,. the claim for compensation for damage, that § 78 of the Competition Act prescribes that 
proprietary or other damage caused by acts prohibited by the Competition Act shall be subject to 
compensation by way of civil procedure. The provision of the Competition Act does not constitute an 
independent basic norm for compensation for damage, but it merely repeats the general principle of 
compensation for damage. 
In order to enforce the claim, based on the general composition of delict, the plaintiff has to prove 
the defendant’s act, the damage, the causal link between the defendant’s act and the damage, and the 
unlawfulness of the act. If the plaintiff has proved that the defendant caused unlawful damage to the 
plaintiff, the defendant is relieved from liability if the defendant proves the absence of guilt. Upon 
filing the claim for compensation for damage, the plaintiff has relied on § 1045 (1) 7) of the Law of 
Obligations Act, pursuant to which the causing of damage is unlawful if the damage is caused by 
behaviour which violates a duty that arises from law. 
The causing of damage by the violation of a duty that arises from law is not unlawful if the 
objective of the provision which the tortfeasor violates is other than to protect the victim from such 
damage. Consequently, upon reviewing the matter, the County Court must discover, while addressing 
the plaintiff’s claim relative to the tort law, whether the objective of § 16 (1) 1) and § 18 (1) 1) of the 
Competition Act is to protect the person who has entered into the transaction with an undertaking that 
is in control of an essential facility against an unreasonably high service price (including the rent) as 
the damage. 
6. As a result of a new hearing, the parties reached an agreement through which the defendant had 
to pay to the plaintiff €235,000 in damages.  
7. The judgment is relevant since it addresses the establishment of competition law by private 
enforcement. The judgment refers to European Union law and the judgment of the Court of Justice. 
The judgment is also relevant, since it shows the compatibility of Estonian law with the competition 
law of the European Union, and therefore the possibility of adjudicating on the cases without any 
problems, primarily on the basis of national law. The position of the Supreme Court is also of 
fundamental importance, so that § 78 of the Competition Act, which stipulates that proprietary or other 
damage caused by acts prohibited by the Competition Act shall be subject to compensation by way of 
civil procedure, does not constitute an independent basic norm for compensation for damages, but 
merely repeats the general principle for compensation for damage. 
  
European Networking and Training for National Competition Enforcers ENTraNCE for Judges 2016 
101 
8.6. Anže Ozimek (The Ljubljana District Court) 
Case: TUŠMOBILE d.o.o. v. TELEKOM SLOVENIJE d.d. (no. IV Pg 2122/2007) 
Date of the Judgment: 13th February, 2015. 
1) Brief summary of the facts of the dispute 
The parties are telecommunications companies. The defendant is the first Slovenian 
telecommunications company (incumbent). It is also the proprietor of the only copper network lines in 
the country. Other telecommunication companies, which were founded later, and the plaintiff is among 
them, are therefore, at least to some extent, dependent on access to this network and also on the 
services of the defendant. 
The plaintiff brought a stand-alone damage action which alleged the abuse of a dominant position 
contrary to Article 9 of the Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act (“the Act“; the national 
equivalent of Article 102 TFEU). The plaintiff alleged that the dominant position was abused by 
preventing competitors entering the market, denying entrance to the defendant's network and 
wholesale services. The plaintiff demanded realised loss, ceased profits and future loss. He alleged:  
1/ a margin squeeze (CS/CPS services and granting internet services over bitstream),  
2/ unequal treatment in comparison with thedefendant's subsidiary (bitstream internet 
services), and  
3/ rejecting the infrastructure access for VPN-IP/MPLS, which was possible for the 
defendant's subsidiary. The plaintiff claimed the damages in the amount of €28,176,227.00 
2) Summary of the judicial proceedings 
It was a civil procedure with a larger scale of submissions. The Court had to acquire experts' opinions 
from the economics and telecommunications fields, to determine the relevant market and the scale of 
the damages. There was no need to examine a large number of the proposed witnesses. 
3) Ruling of the Court 
The Court granted the plaintiff's request on a smaller scale, granting him €1,709,000,00. The Court 
ruled in accordance with the Act and not with TFEU, while there was no cross border impact.  
Firstly, the Court analysed telephone market and concluded that the defendant had a dominant 
position in the wholesale market for the transmission and conclusion of calls. The National 
Communication Agency (the Agency) determined that the defendant had a significant market power in 
that market. The parameters of the market determination by the Agency were substantially equivalent 
to the competition law determination of the relevant market. The abuse of a dominant position was 
conducted by means of margin squeeze. With the help of an economics expert the Court determined 
that the difference between wholesale costs and retail prices was too small for competition to enter 
into the market. The method to determine the damage was the margin squeeze test, which is based on a 
loss that the plaintiff made on a minute’s call, while the defendant's price was impossible for the 
plaintiff due to the margin squeeze. It was concluded that the suffered damage was €50.000. 
The next market to consider was the broadband internet service for consumers, where there are 
three markets to analyse:  
i) retail broadband internet access,  
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ii) Local Loop Unbundling (LLU process of allowing multiple telecommunication operators to 
use connections from the telephone exchange to the customer's premises), and  
iii) wholesale bitstream access.  
The Court concluded that the defendant had a dominant position in the retail broadband internet 
service market with a 50 % market share, while other competitors had less than a 10 % share each. 
The proportion remained the same, even with new competitors or the expansion of the market. The 
expert calculated that there was no abuse of dominant position on the LLU market, while there was no 
negative margin between the wholesale costs and the retail price. In accordance with the broadband 
access market the Agency concluded that the defendant had a significant market power in it. The 
parameters of market determination by the Agency were substantially equivalent to the competition 
law determination of a relevant market. The Court concluded that unfair practice was conducted by 
non-price discrimination (favourable notifications to the subsidiary about system upgrades, denial of 
using plaintiff's own modems, while this was possible for the defendant's subsidiary, different 
malfunction reparation period and the denial of using an application for consumers to test if their 
connectors weresuitable for broadband access). The expert calculated that there was also a margin 
squeeze on the broadband access market, because the difference between the wholesale price to enter 
the bitstream services and the retail broadband price was too small. The expert calculated that the 
realised loss, lost profits and future losses was €1.550.0. It was calculated as the difference between 
the loss in a de facto scenario and a hypothetical profit in a hypothetical scenario (compared with EU 
27).  
The last abuse of a dominant position, which was part of the judgment, was the unequal treatment 
of the plaintiff in granting h VPN-IP/MPLS on broadband internet access. It was concluded that the 
plaintiff was disabled from using more VRN channels, which was possible only for the defendant's 
subsidiary. In consequence, they were unable to enter the market of business customers and to 
developtheir own added value. The estimated damage, determined with judicial discretion, was 
€109.00. The expert was not able to calculate the damage precisely, due to questionable assumptions.  
4) Personal comment 
The defendant is the incumbent in the Slovenian telecommunications market. Other 
telecommunications companies, such as the plaintiff, were mainly dependent on the defendant. As was 
decided in this case in some cases, the defendant abused his dominant position. 
The definition of a dominant position was, in some cases, based on the decision of the National 
Communication Agency. The agency would consider the same aspects for a dominant position as 
those defined in competition law, so there was no reasonable argument not to follow its conclusions. 
While the Slovenian telecommunications market is not big, and there are few proper economic 
experts, and eventhose that are, are connected with one of the parties. In Slovenian civil procedure the 
expert is appointed by the court. After an expert opinion is given, parties often oppose the opinion and 
the expert him/herself, for being close to one of the parties. In this procedure the parties agreed on an 
expert from abroad, one that is proposed by the judge in advance. Due to the competition dispute’s 
nature, it is often difficult to precisely determine loss and lost profits. In such cases, like the case being 
presented case too, the damages were determined by the expert's calculations and judicial discretion. 
Methods of calculating damage required simplification, due to a large amouont of relevant information 
that had to be considered. In some cases the expert could not calculate the damage, due to questionable 
assumptions, but the Court decided to grant the plaintiff and determined the damage in accordance 
with the ex aequo et bono principal. 
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8.7. IVANA MLINARIĆ (THE CROATIAN HIGH COMMERCIAL COURT) 
The Claimant, Ljiljana Hrnjak of Zagreb v. the Defendant 1. Medika d.d. of Zagreb, and 2. 
Ljekarne prima Pharma, Split 
Introduction 
By a judgment of the Commercial Court in Zagreb, the Claimant’s claim was rejected. Hrnjak had 
asked for payment of HRK 500 000 with the legal interest on arrears and the costs for Court 
proceedings. The Claimant owns a private pharmacy in Zagreb, which discontinued its business on 
28th February, 2001. The Claimant asserts that she had suffered damage due to the First Defendant’s 
infringement of competition rules by abuse of its dominant position in the relevant market, and this 
was established by the decision of the Croatian Competition Agency of 29th September, 2000, and due 
to the fact that the Second Defendant was unlawfully established in the immediate vicinity of the 
Claimant, by which the Claimant has also been damaged. Pursuant to the Agency’s decision, the First 
Defendant distorted free competition by abusing its dominant position in the relevant market, by 
applying dissimilar business conditions to equivalent transactions with particular pharmacy shops, 
placing them thereby at a competitive disadvantage in the market, in such a manner that the First 
Defendant has granted longer terms of payment to some pharmacies, depending on their founders. The 
First Instance Court established, by assessing the presented evidence, that there is no relationship of 
cause and effect between the harmful act of the First Defendant that has been established by the 
aforementioned decision of the Competition Agency, and the damage (material and non-material) 
which the Claimant asserts having been caused to her, and the fact that the First Defendant founded 
the pharmacy (of the Second Defendant) in the vicinity of the Claimant. Due to the aforementioned, 
the Court has therefore given a decision that none of the conditions provided by Art. 154 of the Civil 
Obligations Act have been fulfilled on damage liability. 
Against the Decision of the Commercial Court in Zagreb, the Claimant has lodged an appeal. 
From the decision of the High Commercial Court of the Republic of Croatia: 
The Claimant initiated this proceeding for compensation for damages, which she claims to have 
occurred due to the fact that the First Defendant abused its dominant position in the market, which 
caused the damage by loss of profit, the costs of closing down her pharmacy, and by the fact that the 
Second Defendant (the founder of which is the First Defendant) was unlawfully established in the 
immediate vicinity of the Claimant, thereby also causing her damage. 
A Decision of the Croatian Competition Agency (hereinafter: the Agency) is enclosed in the file, 
establishing thereby that the undertaking, Medika d.d., has distorted free competition by an abuse of 
its dominant position in the relevant market by applying dissimilar business conditions to equivalent 
transactions with particular undertakings (pharmacies), such that the Defendant has been granting 
longer terms of payment for some undertakings (pharmacies) depending on their founder. 
Furthermore, the decision indicates that the abuse of the dominant position of the First Defendant 
lasted permanently from the day of submitting the request to the Agency on 11th March, 1999, to the 
day of the passing of the Decision on 29th September, 2000 (Sheet 8 of the file). 
However, in this proceeding, the Claimant was not requesting damage compensation from those 
times when she was doing business with the First Defendant (until mid-1997), prior to the Agency’s 
decision sanctioning abuse of dominance by the First Defendant (from 11th March, 1999 to 29th 
September, 2000). The Court of Appeal stated, in its decision, that in this case, it should be established 
by this proceeding whether the First Defendant, conducting its business with the Claimant, had been 
abusing its dominant position in the market, thus bringing the Claimant into a disadvantaged 
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competitive position in the market. Due to the aforesaid, in order to establish the preconditions of 
damage liability, as a previous issue, the whole market and the acts of all the market participants 
should be analysed, in order to establish the situation of competitiveness in the market, in regard to a 
possible distortion of market competition in this market, as a consequence of which the damage 
occurred, and the Claimant attempted to remedy this through a Court proceeding. As the Claimant has 
ceased to conduct business with the First Defendant in 1997, in this proceeding, she should have 
proved a connection of causality between the abuse of the dominant position of the First Defendant 
which was established by the Agency’s decision, a (possible) disadvantaged position in the market and 
the damage occurred because of it. Namely, the existence of a competent authority’s decision on the 
abuse of a dominant position of the First Defendant in this proceeding, within the meaning of the 
provision relating to the burden of proof, requires from the other party (the Claimant) presentation of 
the facts and suggests that evidence is presented that by infringing competition rules, established in the 
said decision of the Agency of 29th September, 2000, the Claimant has suffered damage. 
The Court of Appeal established that the Court of First Instance correctly assessed the findings and 
the expert witness for finances and bookkeeping’s report, as well as the verbally given explanations in 
relation to the fact that the abuse of the dominant position of the First Defendant, which was 
established by the Agency’s decision, lasted from 11th March, 1999, to 29th September, 2000, so after 
that the Claimant (in 1997) had already discontinued her business with the First Defendant; and the 
fact that the Claimant had no expenses for financing shorter terms of payment, because she had 
discontinued the ordering of medicinal products from the First Defendant, and the Claimant was not in 
possession of any business records for the period for which she claimed the compensation for 
damages. Further, the expert witness for finances and bookkeeping’s report states that there is no 
information on whether the Claimant, after the termination of her business with the First Defendant (in 
mid-1997) had been purchasing products from other suppliers and under what conditions. The Court 
of Appeal deemed that the Court of First Instance had clearly explained its conclusion on the indicated 
fact in the meaning of provisions for the burden of proof. Furthermore, neither had the business of the 
Second Defendant executed any influence upon the business of the Claimant. Namely, this fact is a 
clear consequence of the report of the expert witness for marketing, who found that there is no causal 
connection between the closing down of her pharmacy and the opening of the Pharmacy Prima Pharm 
(here: the Second Defendant), being brought by the Court of First Instance t into a relationship with 
the provisions of the Ordinance on terms and conditions for determination of area in which pharmacy 
shops are to be founded, which provisions did not include a certain obligatory distance between 
pharmacies. Due to the aforementioned, the Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the Court of 
First Instance. 
Comment 
Competition in the market may be distorted in many ways, out of which those distortions that are 
relevant in cases of compensation for damages are classified in one of two groups of actions: those 
which are caused by the implementation of prohibited agreements and those that constitute an abuse of 
a dominant position. In the protection of subjective rights, in the case of violation of competition rules, 
the Croatian legal order has the following means of protection:  
1. to declare a contract null and void;  
2. to request a prohibition or discontinuation of unlawful behaviour;  
3. the imposition of an interim measure, and  
4. a request for compensation for damages. 
The Competition Act states that in damage claims proceedings that occurred due to an infringement of 
Croatian and EU competition rules, the Commercial Courts have jurisdiction in First Instance 
proceedings. The said provision is a consequence of the general subject matter competence of 
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commercial courts, which is stipulated by Art. 34 Paragraph 9 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the 
High Commercial Court of the Republic of Croatia decides on the appeal against the decisions of the 
Commercial Court. 
The Croatian Competition Act indicated that undertakings that have infringed the provisions of this 
Act, or of Arts. 101 or 102 of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU, shall be responsible for the 
compensation for damages incurred by such infringements. For such acts (compensation for damages) 
the general rules of extra-contractual damage liability are valid, as stipulated by the Civil Obligations 
Act, and before the Court they are to be proven to be consistent with the general regulations that are 
stipulated by the Civil Obligations Act. Action for damages in antitrust infringement proceeding, and 
the issue of the unlawful acts of the defendant, may appear to be a prejudicial issue, as this is an 
independent legal entity, which may be able to besubstantially resolved, as a major issue before the 
Competition Agency. Claimants in actions for damage proceedings that are due to antitrust 
infringements may initiate a proceeding before a Court (seeking compensation for damages) 
irrespectively of the previous decision of the Agency. However, in cases when there is no decision by 
the Agency on the distortion of competition rules, it should be indicated that action for damage 
proceedings are very complex, particularly those that are related to the evidence procedure, as they 
require a complex factual and economic analysis. In independent proceedings, the burden of proof is 
on the claimant, who must prove the unlawful acts of the counter party (distortion of competition 
rules), which is extraordinarily expensive, because in these cases, the market analysis of a certain 
industry must be conducted, with expert witness research that is very expensive. In these proceedings, 
the Court may not rely on the Agency’s findings, which is the main difference between private 
enforcement proceedings (actions for compensation for damages) and those that follow the Agency’s 
decision. As in the present case, the Claimant was not represented by an attorney, and has not used all 
the possibilities of proof, because of which the court of First Instance rejected her claim as being 
ungrounded. In antitrust damages actions proceedings that are preceded by a decision from a 
competition authority, the competent court would be bound by the non-appealable and legally valid 
decision of the Agency, if the decision concerned is directed at an undertaking that appears as a 
defendant in a compensation for damages proceeding, and even though there are the same unlawful 
acts. 
The relevant provision of Article 1046 of the Civil Obligations Act defines damages as being a 
reduction of someone’s property (simple damage), the prevention of its enlargement (foregone 
revenue), and the injury of a personal right (non-property damage). 
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9. The Interaction of competition and regulation in the telecoms industry 
9.1. EWA STEFANSKA (THE WARSAW COURT OF APPEAL) 
Case note on: 
Towarzystwo Budownictwa Społecznego Wrocław spółka z o.o. we Wrocławiu v. Prezes Urzędu 
Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów [2014] 
Abuse of a dominant position (based on the national competition law that runs parallel to Article 101 
TFUE) 
1. Telekomunikacja Internetowa Sp. z o.o. we Wrocławiu (the internet service provider) applied to 
Towarzystwo Budownictwa Społecznego Wrocław spółka z o.o. we Wrocławiu (the social housing 
association) for the conclusion of an agreement allowing it to assemble the telecommunications 
installation in the association’s buildings, with the aim of providing internet services. The 
Development of Telecommunications Networks and Services Act (national law) provides an 
obligation for the owners of a building to conclude a contract within 30 days after the request of a 
provider. The social housing association offered to the new provider conditions that were less 
advantageous than had been previously granted to its competitors. In particular, the association 
required payment for access to the premises after completion of the installation and demanded 
immediate removal of the installation in the case of total loss of customers. The internet service 
provider disagreed to such disadvantageous conditions and reported the situation to the President of 
the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (the national competition authority). 
2. On 29th March, 2013, the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection 
adopted a decision concluding that two of the practices of the social housing association constituted 
unfair competition and abused a dominant position, and it imposed on the association a financial 
penalty of 17.383,34 PLN (about €3.850). The competition authority alleged the infringement of 
Article 9 (l, 2 p 5) of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (national competition law), 
which provides that limiting competition and abusing a dominant position on the relevant market 
means a violation of the law. In the opinion of the Authority, the association held a dominant position 
in the local market (City of Wrocław) by making available its owned buildings for the assembling of 
telecommunications installations with the aim of providing internet services. 
3. The social housing association brought an appeal against the decisions of the national 
competition authority and claimed that, in the contested decision, the relevant market had been badly 
defined. The applicant alleged, in particular, that a properly defined relevant market should cover the 
local market (City of Wrocław) to make available buildings for the assembling of the 
telecommunications installation, with the aim of providing internet services, but not only those 
buildings owned by the association. In such a case the complainant wouldn’t hold a dominant position 
in the relevant market and couldn’t be fined. The association claimed also that its behaviour should be 
governed by another Act (the Development of Telecommunications Networks and Services Act) and it 
shouldn’t be fined on the basis of competition law. 
4. On 21st October, 2014, the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in Warsaw (the 
Competition Court) partly amended the decision of the national competition authority, reducing the 
imposed financial penalty to 15.645 PLN (about €3.475) and, in other section it also dismissed the 
appeal. According to the Court, the relevant market was properly defined by the Authority because it 
should be considered rather narrowly. It pointed out that the applicant is not justified in claiming that 
the relevant market should cover not only wired but also wireless access for the buildings. It explained 
that these two methods of providing internet are not close substitutes and, for purchasers, they have 
different characteristics.  
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5. The Court didn’t agree with the applicant’s point of view that ,because of the principle of 
freedom of contract, the association shouldn’t be forced into concluding unfavourable contracts. It 
indicated the existence of the doctrine of ‘essential facilities’, which it may be appropriate to apply in 
this case. Under this doctrine, a monopolist owning ‘a facility essential to other competitors’ is 
required to provide reasonable use of that facility, unless some aspect of it precludes shared access. 
The basic reasons for a legal claim under this doctrine are: the control of an essential facility by a 
monopolist; the competitor’s inability to, practically or reasonably, duplicate the essential facility; the 
denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors. 
According to the Court, the association didn’t prove that the refusal to deal was objective and non-
discriminatory.  
6. Because of an amendment to the Development of Telecommunications Networks and Services 
Act, on 16th December, 2012,the requirement for free access to the premises after the completion of 
the installation by the internet provider was abolished. In such a case the Court decided that the 
association had terminated one of the infringements and it amended the decision of the national 
competition authority reducing the financial penalty that had been imposed.  
7. The social housing association brought an appeal against the judgment of the CompetitionCourt 
and claimed that, in the contested verdict, the relevant market had been badly defined. The 
complainant claimed also that its behaviour should be governed by another Act (the Development of 
Telecommunications Networks and Services Act) and it shouldn’t be fined on the basis of competition 
law. 
8. On 10th February, 2016, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw dismissed the appeal. According to the 
Court the relevant market was properly defined by the Authority and by the Competition Court. The 
complainant held a dominant position in the relevant market and had abused this dominant position, 
thus limiting competition on that market. It explained that the existence of special provisions and Acts 
concerning the obligations of the building owner does not exclude the application of the rules provided 
in competition law. 
Comment: In my opinion, the most interesting aspect of the case presented is the relationship 
between the competition law and the law relating to the facilitation of the telecommunications 
networks and services’ development. The existence of special provisions and Acts relating to the 
obligations of the building owner does not exclude the application of the rules that are provided in the 
competition law. The use of the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine that specifies when the owner of an 
‘essential’ facility must provide access to that facility at a reasonable price, is also important. 
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9.2. ELSKE BOERWINKEL (THE GELDERLAND DISTRICT COURT) 
Application for the concept of abusively high pricing to Mobile Terminating Access (MTA) 
tariffs 
Case note by Elske Boerwinkel on: 
 Rotterdam District Court, July 3rd, 2013, UPC v. T-Mobile and KPN34 
 The Hague Court of Appeal, March 3rd, 2015, UPC v. T-Mobile and KPN35  
1. In one of the rare cases concerning the abuse of a dominant position that reached the Dutch civil 
courts which deal with (alleged) excessive pricing, the judgments to be discussed below provide an 
example of the application by these national judicial bodies of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)’s 
two-tiered test for the establishment of abusively high pricing, which was first developed in United 
Brands.
36
  
Background and facts of the case 
2. The case concerns the prices charged by mobile network operators (MNO’s), in particular, the 
former Dutch incumbent KPN and its competitor T-Mobile, to telecom and internet service providers, 
in this case UPC, for providing interconnection services enabling telephone communication between 
the users of the MNO’s mobile network and the users of the land lines offered by service providers 
like UPC. The prices for these interconnection services, the so-called Mobile Terminating Access or 
“MTA” tariffs, were higher in the period 2005 – 2010 than they are at present. These tariffs have been 
the subject of consecutive “market analysis decisions” issued by the Independent Post and 
Telecommunications Authority (“OPTA”, currently, but not during the period at issue here, part of the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, which also encompasses the Netherlands’ National 
Competition Authority) and of rulings by the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 
(College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, hereafter referred to as “CBb”).  
3. OPTA’s market analysis decisions sought, to put it briefly, to regulate the wholesale markets for 
mobile termination by imposing set MTA-tariffs. Without going into the specifics of the various 
OPTA decisions and CBb rulings (which are based on administrative law, and, in particular, the 
Telecommunications Act), it is, for the purpose of the civil cases to be discussed here, important to 
note that since all consecutive OPTA MTA tariff regulating decisions with regard to the period 2005-
2010 were successfully appealed to the CBb, it was clear at the time of the Rotterdam District Court’s 
judgment, which is discussed here, that the MTA tariffs charged by the MNO’s, had, ultimately, not 
been subject to ex ante regulation during the period in question.
37
 This does not mean, however, that 
the market analysis performed for those decisions and rulings that are concerned is irrelevant to the 
present case. 
4. OPTA’s and CBb’s market analysis was carried out with a view to, inter alia, the question of the 
level at which the MTA tariff ceilings should be imposed in order to overcome the competition 
problems (potentially resulting in an inefficient retail price structure) that were perceived by OPTA. 
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 ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:5992 
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 ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:405 
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 ECJ in case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207 [1978] 1 CMLR429. 
37
 In its final ruling of August 31st, 2011 (ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BR6195), the CBb, after concluding that the MTA tariffs 
set by OPTA in its latest decision could not be upheld, took matters into its own hands by setting the MTA tariff itself, 
effective from September 1st, 2012. This does not, however, affect the MTA tariff situation during the period at issue 
here. The CBb ruling in question has been discussed in a case note by a former ENTraNCE participant, H. Kerkmeester, 
which is included in the draft 2014 ENTraNCE Working Paper.  
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One of the cost price methodologies considered, and eventually opted for, by OPTA was the so-called 
“pure BULRIC” method, BULRIC being short for Bottom-Up Long-Run Incremental Costs. The pure 
BULRIC cost orientation method only allocates the incremental (i.e., the additional) costs of providing 
a termination service and it does not allow for a mark-up for the non-incremental fixed costs that are 
borne by the MNO’s (unlike the so-called “plus BULRIC” model, which was advocated as a basis for 
tariff regulation by some MNO’s). The pure BULRIC method was recommended by the European 
Commission in its 2009 Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile 
Termination Rates in the EU.
38
 In his ruling dated November 5
th
, 2010, in summary proceedings that 
were instigated by (among others) KPN and T-Mobile, with a view to obtaining a preliminary 
injunction for the duration of the appeal procedure against OPTA’s second MTA decision. The 
President of the CBb held that, should OPTA have imposed an MTA tariff ceiling that was based on 
the BULRIC tariff calculated in its second MTA decision, the resulting MTA tariff would not have 
been considered unlawful by the CBb.
39
 
5. UPC, a telecom service provider offering fixed telephone services to its customers in the 
Netherlands, had concluded agreements with both T-Mobile
40
 and KPN (hereafter also jointly referred 
to as “the MNO’s”) relating to the provision of mobile terminating access services, enabling the 
telephone calls initiated by UPC’s land line customers to be routed to numbers connected through the 
MNO’s mobile telephone networks (hereinafter referred to as “the agreements”). The agreements 
included the MTA tariffs to be paid by UPC in consideration of these services. The tariffs paid by 
UPC, in accordance with the agreements during the 2005-2010 period, were higher than the pure 
BULRIC tariffs. 
Judicial proceedings in two instances 
6. Through the civil procedures against KPN and T-Mobile,
41
 which were in the First Instance brought 
before the Rotterdam District Court, UPC soughtrepayment of the MTA tariff that they had paid to the 
MNO’s, insofar as it exceeded the BULRIC tariffs, plus compensation for the (additional) damage it 
allegedly incurred by having to pay an MTA tariff higher than the BULRIC tariffs. UPC based its 
claims on the doctrines of undue payment, unjust enrichment and “reasonableness and fairness”, as 
well as the Dutch law equivalent of the tort “breach of statutory duty”. For that purpose, UPC argued 
that the MNO’s had abused their dominant position in the market for interconnection services (and 
thereby infringed Article 102 TFEU and its Dutch competition law equivalent, Article 24 of the 
Competition Act) by charging (and forcing UPC to agree to) prices for the services provided to UPC, 
which were higher than those permitted by the Telecommunications Act and/or the Competition Act. 
Its claim that the MTA tariffs charged by the MNO’s were abusive was based solely on the 
aforementioned regulatory decisions and on CBb rulings concerning the BULRIC methodology.  
7. After the Rotterdam District Court had dismissed its claims in their entirety, UPC appealed to the 
Court of Appeal of The Hague where, as it had in the First Instance, the debate between the parties 
also centred to a large extent on the question of whether the MNO’s had abused a dominant position as 
is prohibited by Articles 102 TFEU and 24 of the Competition Act. A novel basis for its claims, which 
was brought forward by UPC in the appeal, was that KPN and UPC had not only abused their 
dominant position but had also infringed Article 6 of the Competition Act and Article 101 TFEU by 
concluding covenants (in which the other MNO’s active in the Netherlands also participated) with 
regard to the MTA tariffs.  
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 OJ 2009 L 124/67. 
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 ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BO3594 
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 More accurately: T-Mobile’s contractual predecessor. 
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 The two procedures were conducted jointly and resulted in a single judgment.  
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Rulings of the Courts 
8. The Rotterdam District Court commences its assessment of the case by stressing the fact that the 
amounts paid by UPC to the MNO’s during the period at issue are in accordance with the agreements 
and that, since OPTA’s attempts at ex ante regulation of MTA tariffs had all failed, the parties were, in 
principle, free to agree on tariffs. It goes on to find that this freedom to set rates is not without limit 
and that a party which possesses a dominant position acts unlawfully if it charges an abusively high 
tariff in contravention of Article 102 TFEU and/or Article 24 of the Competition Act, in which case a 
civil court may, the absence of any regulatory intervention notwithstanding, order the said party to pay 
damages or restitution on the basis of tort law or unjust enrichment.  
9. The Court then sets out the premise that, for the purpose of obtaining such damages or 
restitution, the plaintiff, with whom the burden of proof lies, needs to properly substantiate with facts 
its claim that the tariff in question is, in fact, abusively high. This, the court ultimately rules, UPC has 
not done, and therefore it did not allow UPC to furnish any (further) evidence, by expert opinion or 
otherwise, for its claim that the MTA tariffs charged by the MNO’s where abusive. This conclusion is 
reached in the following way. 
10. Firstly, the Court assumes, for the sake of argument, that the MNO’s have a dominant position 
in a relevant market for the provision of interconnection services in the Netherlands (which had, 
predictably, been contested by the MNO’s). It then refers to the ECJ’s case law on the abuse of 
dominance through excessive pricing, and, in particular, to its judgment in United Brands, from which 
it follows, according to the Rotterdam District Court, that in order to determine whether a tariff is 
abusively high one should first examine whether the difference between the tariff and the underlying 
costs is excessive and, if so, whether the tariff is unfair in comparison to the economic value of the 
service rendered. The excessive character of the tariff is established objectively by determining the 
size of the profit margin. The Court points out that UPC has failed to put forward any reasoned 
argument as to the profit margin that was realised through the MTA tariffs, but has based its claim that 
the MNO’s have abused their dominant position solely on the administrative decisions and the rulings 
of OPTA and the CBb concerning the BULRIC-system. The BULRIC system, however, is intended to 
impose on market parties, in advance, a reduction in their tariffs, which is considered desirable from a 
policy point of view; it is, according to the Court, not suitable for determining, after the event, whether 
tariffs already paid were abusive. There is a margin between the economically sound minimum at 
which tariffs can be set (BULRIC) and the maximum at which a tariff may be set (just) without being 
abusive. Making use of this margin results in extra profit, but it does not follow that doing so amounts 
to an abuse of dominance. The abuse of dominance requires that profits have been made which are out 
of all proportion, but there are no concrete indications that this was the case. The Court adds that there 
are also not any other indications that the tariffs were abusive, since  
a) the facts submitted by the parties make clear that the tariffs charged by the other MNO’s that 
are active on “the Dutch market” were set at the same level as those of KPN and T-Mobile, 
and  
b) the Netherlands was somewhere in the middle bracket pricewise, if one compares the MTA 
tariffs charged throughout the EU during the relevant period.  
11. The Court’s ruling that the abuse of dominance was notestablished lead to the conclusion that the 
MTA tariffs paid by UPC found their justification in the agreements, and hence to the dismissal of 
UPC’s claims.  
12. The Court of Appeal starts its assessment by quoting extensively from United Brands. It also, 
like the Rotterdam Court, stresses UPC’s obligation to furnish prima facie evidence of an abuse of 
dominance.  
13. The first argument brought forward by UPC in appeal was that, by examining its allegation of 
an abuse of dominance solely on the basis of the “excessive pricing” doctrine that was laid down by 
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the ECJ in United Brands, the Rotterdam Court had applied too-narrow a criterion. UPC argued that 
the tariffs charged by the MNO’s, though not excessive, were so high that they enabled the MNO’s to 
obtain economic advantages that they would not have had in a situation of normal competition, and 
they were therefore nevertheless abusive. According to UPC, these advantages, apart from the higher 
tariffs themselves, consisted of cross-subsidisation of the MNO’s own customers in the form of  
a) free or cheaper mobile phones,  
b) lower rates for mobile telephony, and  
c) attractive call bundles without distinction between calls to mobile and fixed telephone 
numbers.  
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. It held that in relation to the general rule that to establish 
abuse of dominance through unfair pricingthat the dominant undertaking has made use of the 
opportunities arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap benefits which it would not 
have had in a situation of normal and sufficiently effective competition must be ascertained. This has 
been refined by the ECJ in United Brands for a specific case where the alleged abuse consists of 
charging too high a price, into the more specific rule that high prices only constitute an abuse if the 
price is excessive, in the sense that it bears no reasonable relation to the value of the service rendered. 
Insofar as UPC’s arguments must be taken to mean that prices do not need to be excessive to be 
abusively high, they fail on these grounds. If the price is merely high, but not excessive, there is no 
abuse, regardless of the purpose for which the profit realised thereby is used, be it dividend payments, 
the forming of reserves, or, as in this case, investment in a form of cross-subsidisation.  
14. The Court of Appeal also did not agree with UPC that it follows from the ECJ’s judgment in 
Ahmed Saeed
42
 that, in addition to applying the two-tiered test prescribed by United Brands, it should 
carry out a separate assessment on the basis of the principles that underlie the sector-specific 
regulations for the telecoms sector. The “interpretative criteria” to be derived from these regulatory 
principles are no more than a sector-specific elaboration and interpretation of the proportionality 
requirement that is laid down in §252 of United Brands, according to the Court of Appeal. 
15. UPC’s complaint that the Rotterdam Court had wrongfully taken the size of the profit margin as 
being the measure for determining whether the MTA tariffs were abusive was dismissed by the Court 
of Appeal, on the grounds that it follows from United Brands that the excessive character of a price 
can be determined by comparing the selling price with the cost price, and thus determining the profit 
margin, and that other conceivable methods of determining disproportionality will be needed, mainly 
when determination of the cost price poses major difficulties, which is not the case here. The Court of 
Appeal furthermore points out that the Rotterdam Court had taken into account the fact that a 
comparison between MTA tariffs charged in other EU Member States had not yielded any indication 
that the rates charged by the MNO’s had been excessive, and that the MNO’s had not suggested any 
other methods for determining the abusive character of these tariffs.  
16. The foregoing led the Court of Appeal to conclude that, in the present case, the assessment on 
the basis of Articles 102 TFEU / 24 CA is limited to determining whether the tariffs charged are 
excessive/disproportionate, and that this should be done only on the basis of the profit margin. The 
Rotterdam Court was therefore justified in limiting its assessment as it did. 
17. As far as the BULRIC tariffs, as a measure of the excessiveness/abusiveness of the MTA 
tariffs, are concerned, UPC argued that the BULRIC tariffs are considerably higher than both  
a) the minimum price for which terminating services may be offered on an economically sound 
basis, and 
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b) the actual costs. The Rotterdam Court had therefore ruled on unsound grounds that the 
BULRIC method was not suitable as a means for the ex post assessment of abusiveness, 
according to UPC. This line of reasoning was alsodismissed by the Court of Appeal, simply 
by ruling that UPC had not substantiated its claim that pure BULRIC, on which its arguments 
are , and which only includes incremental costs (but not the costs of the fixed telephone 
network), reflects the actual cost of providing the termination services that are at issue. Since 
UPC had – even in appeal – not brought forward any (other) substantiated argument on the 
actual costs that were faced by the MNO’s, it is not possible to determine the profit margin 
enjoyed by them through the MTA tariffs, which lead to the conclusion that the alleged 
excessiveness and abusiveness of the MTA tariffs was not established. All of UPC’s claims 
founder on this verdict.  
17. The alleged infringement of Article 101 TFEU / 6 CA was not examined by the Court of Appeal, 
as it was not brought forward by UPC before the oral hearing and during the appeal procedure, which 
was considered too late under civil procedural law. 
Comment 
18. Although the Court of Appeal of The Hague had applied the ECJ’s two-tiered test from United 
Brands previously, in a case concerning docking dues charged by the Port of Rotterdam
43
, this seems 
to be the first case where Dutch civil courts, and especially the Court of Appeal, really concern 
themselves with questions on its interpretation and (exclusive) applicability.  
19. Particularly noteworthy is the decisiveness with which the Court of Appeal – apparently 
without even contemplating seeking a preliminary ruling from the ECJ – infers from United Brands, 
and categorically states, that high prices can only ever be considered abusive if they are excessive in 
the sense that they are disproportionate to the economic value of the service or product paid for. This 
shows that the ECJ’s judgment in its iconic “Banana case”, which is best known for its usefulness as a 
wonderfully easy-to-explain and evocative example of market definition (whatever economists may 
think of “babies and old people” as a distinct market for fruit!), has not lost its usefulness as clear and 
succinct guidance on other elements of competition law also, even after almost fifty years. 
20. It is also interesting to note the distinction made by the Courts, in both instances, between the 
goals of ex ante price regulation in a newly liberalised market, and the ex post assessment of the 
abusive nature of prices and the ramifications of this distinction for the usefulness of the BULRIC 
method, which is sanctioned by OPTA and the CBb, as a means for assessing abusiveness, which UPC 
seems to have failed to recognise. What it boils down to, it seems to me, is that UPC has, while 
preparing its arguments in the present case, lost sight of the fact that, while obliging undertakings with 
a significant market position to offer a service without making a profit may be appropriate from a 
regulatory point of view (as the CBb ruled with respect to BULRIC), it does not follow that they are 
therefore prohibited from making a profit by competition law. Through its exclusive reliance on the 
decisions and rulings concerning BULRIC, UPC also apparently neglected, even in the Second 
Instance, one of the main principles of civil procedural law: the obligation to substantiate a claim with 
facts. Its offers to submit expert opinions as evidence may be passed over by the Court because it had 
failed to elaborate which were the facts (pointing towards abusiveness in accordance with the two-
tiered test) it wished to prove. Due to this, the questions as to whether the MNO’s did have a dominant 
position between 2005 and 2010, and whether the MTA tariffs were indeed excessive, will likely 
remain unanswered, as UPC has exhausted the last instance where a court of law may rule on the facts.  
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9.3. EVA VIHAR KRANJEC (THE LJUBLJANA DISTRICT COURT) 
CASE NOTE - JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF LJUBLJANA
44
, No. IV Pg 
4477/2012 OF 19.12.2014 
1. The parties, facts of the dispute, the plaintiff’s claim and the defence 
 
1. 1. The parties 
The plaintiff, A. is a company providing telecommunications services between telecommunications 
operators. It has a contractual relationship with several foreign operators in relation to the between-
network connectivity. The operators forward to the plaintiff the traffic (in this case, mobile voice calls) 
which start in their network and end in the network of the defendant, with whom the plaintiff also has 
a contractual relationship.  
The original defendant, M., was a subsidiary of the company, T., which is a former monopolist in 
the telecommunications market and, at the time, was still the biggest telecommunications operator in 
Slovenia in the fixed lines telecommunications market. Its subsidiary, M., had the biggest market share 
in the mobile telecommunications market. During the process of this trial the company, T., had 
merged with the original defendant, M., so the trial continued against the company, T. 
1.2. The plaintiff’s claim 
The plaintiff explained that the operators of the outgoing-voice call-network pay the plaintiff the 
agreed contractual payment for its services (per minute of traffic). The plaintiff forwards the voice 
calls from their network to the network of the other operator, in this case, the defendant’s network. 
The defendant ends the incoming voice calls and charges the plaintiff a fee per minute for the 
forwarded traffic. The call to the defendant’s network user can only be ended by the defendant, 
therefore, the plaintiff claims that the defendant is a 100% monopolist in the market for ending voice 
calls for its users, regardless of whether the calls ending in its network have their origin in Slovenia 
(national voice calls) or in another country (international voice calls, both EU-origin and out of EU 
origin). 
The essence of the plaintiff's claim is that, in the time period from 2006 until 2009,  national and 
EU price regulation covered the ending of both national and international voice calls. The fee that the 
defendant charged the plaintiff in that time period should therefore have been equal for both types of 
calls. The defendant, however, charged the plaintiff more for the voice calls of international origin 
than for national voice calls until September 2009.  
The plaintiff was seeking damages in the amount of €1,502,242, 49, as the difference between the 
higher fees that were charged for ending international calls and the lower fees for ending national 
calls, which, in the plaintiff's opinion, should be charged at that rate. The claim was founded on 
several grounds: 
a) the Defendant’s breach of sector regulation, the legislation of the EU and the regulation Acts 
of the national regulatory agency – APEK45; 
b) An abuse of a dominant position (breach of ZPOMK-146); 
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c) Anticompetitive behaviour (breach of ZVK47); 
d) On other contractual grounds (Articles 35. and 45.,190. and 443. OZ48). 
1.3. The defence 
The defence was on the grounds that:  
a) The price of ending voice calls was not regulated in the given period, so there was no breach 
of sector regulation, the legislation of the EU or the regulation Acts of APEK;  
b) Different fees for ending national and international voice calls are not an act of 
anticompetitive behaviour; and c) There was no abuse of a dominant position because the 
market for ending voice calls in the network of the defendant is not a relevant service market.  
2. The judgment of the Court of First Instance 
The District court in Ljubljana dismissed the claim as unfounded for numerous reasons, the most 
important being that there was no price regulation for both types of voice call ending at that time (that 
is, until September, 2009) neither in Slovenia, nor in the EU, and the defendant did not abuse his 
dominant position. The plaintiff also did not meet his burden of persuasion (referring to the 
statements) and burden of proof (referring to the evidence) on other grounds. 
3. The plaintiffs' appeal 
The plaintiff appealed against the judgment in February, 2015. The case is currently awaiting the 
decision of a Higher Court on the plaintiff’s appeal. 
4. Facts of the case and the Court’s decision 
4.1. Facts admitted by both parties 
The contract on inter-network-connectivity between the parties was signed on 29.6.2006 and with this 
contract the higher fee for ending international calls was agreed between the parties. After the APEK’s 
Regulations Act, No. 38294-9/2009-3 dated 24.9.2009 (in continuance of the text: APEK Act 2009) 
was issued, the defendant started charging the plaintiff equal fees for ending both international and 
national calls. Most telecommunications operators at that time had a practice of charging different 
prices for fees for ending national and international calls. 
4.2. The facts as identified by the Court in the evidence procedure, and the Plaintiff's lack of burden 
of persuasion and burden of proof 
a) There was no breach of sector or EU regulation, no breach of APEK's regulatory acts 
From the Regulations Acts that APEK issued in the time period from 2006 to 2009, the Court found 
that there was no compulsory price regulation for the ending of international voice calls, neither on the 
EU level, nor on the national level. At the EU level, it was only recommended that there should be no 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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 Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act; Ur. l. RS, št. 36/08 and following changes. 
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 Protection of Competition Act; Ur. l. RS, št. 18/93 and following changes. 
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difference in fees. The prices for ending both types of calls were regulated and equalled with the 
APEK Act 2009, and the defendant was charging equal fees for both types of calls from that moment 
onwards. The plaintiff's statement about why a point of inter-network connectivity, based in Slovenia, 
would transform a call from an international to a national call was also not explained by the plaintiff. 
It was also not proven by the plaintiff that, in this particular time period, the defendant would have 
been charging equal fees for ending both types of call to other operators who had been ending calls in 
the defendant's network. 
APEK Act, No. 3824-14/2007-3 dated 13.4.2007 (APEK ACT 2007) equalled the ending of voice 
calls that have their origin on a fixed network and those that originated from mobile network. Calls 
forwarded by the plaintiff were from both mobile and fixed networks and cannot all be regarded as 
calls from a fixed network, since the plaintiff was not registered for service on a fixed location at that 
time. The plaintiff should also have differentiated calls for a period up to 01.9.2007 so as to show 
whether the defendant had or had not properly considered both types of call, but failed to do this (lack 
of persuasion and lack of proof). 
b) There was no abuse of a dominant position 
The Court appointed an expert witness from the economics field to determine the relevant services 
market for the ending of international calls between September, 2006, and September, 2009. The 
expert witness discovered that the defendant was acting independently, if compared with other 
participants in the market, but that the national and international calls were not a part of the same 
market, since they cannot be substituted. The expert witness also discovered that the middleman, i.e. 
the plaintiff, has absolutely no market power, because all of the changes in prices are passed up the 
chain to the foreign operator. As the price of the outgoing call is paid for by the end user - the caller - 
the end user who is being called has no economic interest in finding another alternative operator, 
There is therefore no substitutability on the demand side,. There is no other alternative to ending the 
calls made by the defendant’s network’s users other than to end them in the network of the defendant, 
M. Since the relevant geographical component of the market is the territory of the Republic of 
Slovenia, the expert witness concluded that in the given matter the relevant services market is the 
market for ending international calls in the network of the defendant, M. 
Regarding the state of the competition on each level, the expert witness analysed the passing on of 
the prices for call ending into the prices of the middlemen operators. In a case where the plaintiff 
would want to raise its prices to operators so as to make a profit, the operators would have found other 
middlemen operators, so the plaintiff would be left out of the traffic. The middlemen are picked by the 
operators at an “auction”, which means that the costs of forwarding calls is almost the same as the cost 
of ending calls. This means that the competition is the greatest between middlemen operators, but, on 
the other hand, the defendant is the most independent in the chain, since it is the only one that can end 
calls into its network and can therefore determine the prices for that independently. Since the expert 
witness reached the conclusion that the ending of national and international calls ware two separated 
markets at the time, the Court ruled that there was no abuse of a dominant position, since different 
prices for the ending of international and national calls are not part of the same market. 
c) There was no anticompetitive behaviour 
The Court ruled that the plaintiff did not meet the required burden of persuasion, since his claims were 
completely general, and he did not give any facts that would give all of the elements that are required 
with the general clause from Article 13/(2) ZVK.
49
 The Court also stated that charging different prices 
for different services is a typical market category and that being so, it is a part of the competition law. 
                                                     
49
 Article 13/(2) ZVK: „Anticompetitive behaviour is an act of a company operating in the market, which is contrary to 
good business practices and which causes, or threatens to cause, damage to other market participants. “ 
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5. Comment 
The respective judgment shows how important it is for the plaintiff to be able to provide the Court 
with enough facts and proof. Many of the grounds on which the damages had been sought in this case, 
have been rejected by the Court, mostly on the ground that the plaintiff was unable to meet the 
required burden of persuasion and the burden of proof. It also shows that not all acts of formerly 
monopolist companies, or their associated companies, which disable other participants in the market 
from making (bigger) profits, are due to breaches of the competition law. 
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10. Unfair competition and State aid law 
10.1. EVA CERÓN RIPOLL (THE SPANISH GENERAL COUNCIL FOR THE  
THE IMMOVABLE PLOT! 
- Request for a preliminary ruling — Competition — State aid — Article 107(1) TFEU — 
Concept of ‘State aid’ — Property tax on immovable property — Tax exemption). 
- Case C-522/13, REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the 
Juzgado 
Contencioso-Administrativo No 1 de Ferrol (Spain), made by decision of 12th April, 2013, 
received 
at the Court on 1st October, 2013, 
- Judgment of 9.10.2014- Case C- 522/13 
1. As money makes the world go round, NAVANTIA is an undertaking that is wholly owned by the 
Spanish State, and has a domestic market, NAVANTIA is the strategic industrial base of the Spanish 
Navy, and therefore our company has a vocation to invest in technology and innovation and to be the 
driver of naval activity in Spain. Thanks to NAVANTIA’s competitiveness and its core values, the 
company has received orders from the navies of foreign countries (such as Australia, Norway, 
Malaysia, Chile, Venezuela, India, Thailand, Egypt, etc.). 
NAVANTIA owns a shipyard that is located in the territory of the Concello de Ferrol, covering an 
area of 932 348 m2. In accordance with an agreement concluded on 6th September, 2001, the Spanish 
State, as owner of the plot of land on which the shipyard stands, made it available to NAVANTIA by 
transferring the rights of use in return for a payment of €1 per year (‘the 2001 Agreement’). 
The property tax on that plot of land, which amounted to €590,308.77 for the year 2010, was levied 
by the CONCELLO DE FERROL for the financial years prior to 2008. In accordance with Article 
61(1)(d) of the Law of 2004, the property tax is payable by the Spanish State, as the owner of that 
land, and given that only the rights of use has been transferred to NAVANTIA. Under the 2001 
Agreement, the Spanish State has to pass the amount of that tax on to NAVANTIA and, accordingly, it 
is NAVANTIA which must ultimately bear the tax burden. With respect to the financial year 2008 and 
following years, the SPANISH STATE and NAVANTIA applied to the Concello de Ferrol, on the 
basis of Article 62(1) (a) of the Law of 2004, for an exemption from the property tax payable for the 
land on which the naval shipyard is established. That application was refused. The refusal was 
contested before the competent courts and it is that dispute which is the subject of the main 
proceedings. 
2. By a judgment of 22nd October, 2012, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Supreme 
Court of Justice for Galicia, heareafter, TSJG) set aside an earlier judgment of the Juzgado 
Contencioso-Administrativo No 1 de Ferrol (Court for Contentious Administrative Proceedings No 1, 
Ferrol; or ‘the Referring courthereafter, JCA) of 25th November, 2011, dismissing the action brought 
before it, since the TSJG held that it was necessary to grant the tax exemption sought. The case was 
therefore referred back to the JCA. 
3. Then, the JCA found that since the exemption would be granted through public resources to a 
Company owned by the State, it would be capable of distorting, or threatening to distort, competition. 
The Referring Court found that NAVANTIA would havee a selective advantage and be privileged in 
the shipbuilding business, since their budget would be lightened and, on the contrary, this would 
produce a loss of income for the CONCELLO DE FERROL. 
Pier Luigi Parcu and Giorgio Monti 
118 
3. Under those circumstances, the Juzgado Contencioso- Administrativo Nº 1 de Ferrol (JCA) 
decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling and to ask, in essence, whether, under a proper construction of Article 107(1) 
TFEU, the exemption from property tax of a plot of land belonging to the State and made available to 
an undertaking whose capital is wholly State-owned, which produces, from that plot of land, goods 
and services that may be traded between Member States on markets that are open to competition 
constitutes state aid that is prohibited by that provision; taking note that the Court is not called upon to 
consider whether it is compatible with Article 107 TFEU for a Member State to make a plot of land 
available to a private undertaking for a token price. 
4. According to the settled case-law of the Court, for a measure to be categorised as ‘aid’, within 
the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, all the conditions set out in that provision must be fulfilled (see, 
to that effect, the judgment in Commission v Deutsche Post, C-399/08 P, EU:C:2010:481, Paragraph 
38, and the case-law cited). 
5. Accordingly, for a national measure to be categorised as state aid within the meaning of Article 
107(1) TFEU, there must, firstly be an intervention by the State or through State resources; secondly, 
the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member States; thirdly, it must confer an 
advantage on the recipient (judgment in Commission v Deutsche Post, EU:C:2010:481, Paragraph 40, 
and the case-law cited); and fourthly, it must distort, or threaten to distort, competition (judgment in 
Commission v Deutsche Post, EU:C:2010:481, Paragraph 39, and the case-law cited). 
6. On those grounds, the Court (Seventh Chamber) ruled: Under a proper construction of Article 
107(1) TFEU, the exemption from property tax of a plot of land belonging to the State and made 
available to an undertaking whose capital is wholly State-owned, which produces, from that plot of 
land, goods and services that may be traded between Member States on markets that are open to 
competition may constitute state aid that is prohibited by that provision. It is for the Referring Court, 
however, to determine whether, in the light of all the relevant evidence in the dispute before it, 
assessed by reference to the interpretative guidance provided by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, that tax exemption is to be categorised as state aid within the meaning of that provision. 
7. Comment: Thinking out loud, how did the JCA interpret this? After searching for a while, I 
succeeded in finding the judgment that was rendered 8th January, 2015, by the Referring Court, which 
set aside the action brought before it that applied by the SPANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE and 
NAVANTIA, separately, calling upon the meaning, in the light of the Article 107(1) TFEU, and, 
accordingly, to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (C- 399/08, C- 6/12, C 71/09, C- 76/09, C- 
78/08, C- 80/08, among others) and concludes (FD4º) saying that “(…) Applying the previous 
pronouncements to the present subject, [the Court] must conclude by pointing out that we are facing a 
public measure trough an exemption of property tax for NAVANTIA, of whose activity, besides 
military defence, it is more than its half of their volume of business.” Finally, I share my thoughts and 
agree with Judge Pablo Álvarez López, as he expressed it in the FD6º, that NAVANTIA cannot be the 
beneficiary of the exemption sought, since that exemption would be granted through public resources 
to a company that is owned by the State and thist would mean that such a judgment would enable it to 
be capable of altering competition. 
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10.2. ENRIQUE GABALDÓN (THE SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) 
STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY OF A MEMBER 
STATE  
1) Summary of the facts of the dispute 
The Spanish Government´s Royal Decree number 1652/2004 of 9th July, 2004, which approved the 
Regulation governing compulsory investment for the pre-funding of European and Spanish 
cinematographic feature films, short films, and films made for television.  
This Royal Decree put into effect part of the Spanish legislation in the field of television and 
cinematography. In essence, these provisions imposed on television operators the obligation to 
earmark each year 5% of their operating revenue from the previous year for the funding of European 
cinematographic films and films made for television. 60% of that funding had to be used for 
productions whose original language was any one of the official languages of Spain. The aim of Royal 
Decree 1652/2004 was to resolve certain uncertainties arising as a result of the legislative amendments 
that had previously been introduced, such as how to calculate the turnover of television operators and 
how to calculate the amount earmarked for acquiring European cinematographic productions. 
The Decree also refers to the Community’s legal framework: Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3rd 
October, 1989, on the coordination of certain provisions that are laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, 
and this was amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
th
 
June, 1997. 
2) Judicial proceedings 
On 16th September, 2004, the Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (Union of Associated 
Commercial Television Companies) brought a contentious administrative action before the Spanish 
Supreme Court, in order to annul the Royal Decree. The applicant considered that the Royal Decree 
and the Articles of the national laws on which it was based, ought to be set aside, due to the fact that 
they all infringed a number of the provisions of the Spanish Constitution and also certain provisions of 
European Union law. 
According to the the Spanish legal system, in those cases relating to a general provision that has 
been adopted by the Consejo de Ministros (Council of Ministers), it is for the Sala de lo Contencioso-
Administrativo (Chamber for Contentious Administration) of the Supreme Court to rule on direct 
actions, as the Court of First and Last instance, reviewing the lawfulness of the acts of the 
Government. By virtue of the principle of supremacy, in the course of that legal review, the Supreme 
Court consistently takes EU law as a ground for review. 
It is important to note that the applicant submitted a further plea in its application, demanding a 
reference for a preliminary ruling to be submitted to the Court of Justice. Having heard all the parties 
concerned in the procedure, the Supreme Court decided to refer the following questions to the Court of 
Justice, pursuant to Article 234 EC (now Article 267 TFEU): 
A) Does Article 3 of Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3rd October, 1989, on the coordination of 
certain provisions that are laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, as amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 30th June, 1997, permit Member States to impose on 
television operators the obligation to earmark a percentage of their operating revenue for the pre-
funding of European cinematographic films and films made for television? 
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B) If the reply to the previous question is affirmative, is a national measure which, in addition to 
laying down the pre-funding obligation referred to above, reserves 60% of that compulsory funding 
for original Spanish-language works compatible with that directive and with Article 12 EC, taken in 
conjunction with the other special provisions to which that Article refers? 
C) Does an obligation that is imposed by a national measure relating to television operators, to the 
effect that the latter must earmark a percentage of their operating revenue for the pre-funding of 
cinematographic films, where 60% of that amount must be earmarked specifically for original 
Spanish-language films, the majority of which are produced by the Spanish film industry, amount to 
state aid in favor of that industry within the meaning of Article 87 EC? 
3) Ruling of the Court 
In its judgment, the Court (Second Chamber) of 5th March, 2009, in Case C-222/07, considered that, 
by its first and second questions, the Referring Court had asked whether the Directive and, more 
particularly, whether Article 3 thereof, and Article 12 EC, were to be interpreted as meaning that they 
preclude a measure that is adopted by a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings: 
requiring television operators to earmark 5% of their operating revenue for the pre-funding of 
European cinematographic films and films made for television, and, more specifically, to reserve 60% 
of that 5% for the production of works of which the original language is one of the official languages 
of that Member State. 
The Court noted that the Directive does not contain any provision governing the extent to which a 
Member State may require television operators to earmark part of their operating revenues for the 
funding of European cinematographic films and films made for television, or those whose original 
language is one of the official languages of that Member State. Pursuant to Article 3 (1) of the 
Directive, the Member States remain free to lay down more detailed, or stricter, rules with regard to 
television broadcasting bodies that are under their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when exercising that 
right, they must respect the fundamental freedoms that are guaranteed by the EC Treaty. Finally, the 
Directive does not completely harmonise the rules relating to the areas which it covers, but it lays 
down minimum rules for broadcasts which emanate from the European Community and which are 
intended to be received within it. It follows that, irrespective of whether the measure adopted by a 
Member State, such as the measure at issue in the main proceedings, is in an area covered by the 
Directive, the Member States retain, in principle, the jurisdiction to adopt such a measure, provided 
that they respect the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. 
Consequently, the answer to the first and second questions is that the Directive and, more 
particularly, Article 3 thereof and Article 12 EC must be interpreted as meaning that they do not 
preclude a measure that is adopted by a Member State, such as the measure at issue. 
The third question posed the problem of state aid.  
The Court considers that by its third question, the Referring Court asks, essentially, whether Article 
87 EC is to be interpreted as meaning that a measure adopted by a Member State, such as the measure 
at issue in the main proceedings, constitutes State aid in favour of the cinematographic industry of that 
Member State. 
On that question, the Court reminds us that, in accordance with settled case-law, classification as 
aid requires all the conditions that are set out in Article 87 EC to be fulfilled, that is to say, first, there 
must be intervention by the State, or through State resources; second, the intervention must be liable to 
affect trade between Member States; third, it must confer an advantage on the recipient and, fourth, it 
must distort, or threaten to distort, competition (Case C 280/00 Altmark Trans and 
Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I 7747, Paragraphs 74 and 75, and the case-law cited). 
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More particularly, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that only advantages that are granted 
directly or indirectly through state resources are to be considered aid within the meaning of Article 
87(1) EC. The distinction made in that provision between aid that is granted by a Member State and 
aid that is granted through state resources does not signify that all of the advantages granted by a state, 
whether financed through state resources or not, constitute aid, but is intended merely to bring within 
that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the state and those that are granted by a 
public or private body that is designated or established by the state (Case C 379/98 PreussenElektra 
[2001] ECR I 2099, Paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). 
It is not apparent that the advantage given by way of a measure that is adopted by a Member State, 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to the cinematographic industry of a Member State, 
constitutes an advantage granted directly by the state, or by a public or private body designated or 
established by the state. 
Such an advantage is the result of general legislation requiring television operators, whether public 
or private, to earmark a percentage of their operating revenue for the pre-funding of European 
cinematographic films and films made for television. 
Furthermore, since a measure adopted by a Member State, such as the measure at issue in the main 
proceedings, applies to public television operators, it does not appear that the advantage in question is 
dependent on the control exercised by the public authorities over such operators (by analogy, Joined 
Cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85 Kwekerij van der Kooy and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 219, 
Paragraph 37).  
Consequently, the answer to the third question is that Article 87 EC must be interpreted as meaning 
that a measure adopted by a Member State, such as the measure at issue in the main proceedings, does 
not constitute state aid in favour of the cinematographic industry of that Member State. 
After that, the Spanish Supreme Court adopted the resolution of December 9
th
, 2009. 
In that resolution, the Supreme Court decided that it would still not rule on the procedure, but 
would refer the questions to the Spanish Constitutional Court, asking for a preliminary ruling pursuant 
to the constitutionality of the second subparagraph in Article 5 (1) of Law 25/1994 of 12th July, 1994, 
transposing into Spanish law the Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3rd October, 1989, on the 
coordination of certain provisions that are laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in 
Member States that relate to the pursuit of television broadcasting activities. This is precisely the 
amendment that imposed on television operators the obligation to earmark each year 5% of their 
operating revenue from the previous year for the funding of European cinematographic films and films 
made for television.  
The Supreme Court considers that it will have to rule according to the judgment of the Court of 
March 5
th
, 2009, but will also have to analyse the constitutionality of the Decree that is being 
challenged.  
According to the Supreme Court, imposition by law inversions (on revenues, not benefices) to 
private companies is a limitation to their liberty, liberty that is guaranteed by Article 38 of the Spanish 
Constitution.  
Unfortunately, there is still no decision from the Constitutional Court.  
4) Personal comment 
From the perspective of European Law, the Court sustained the creation of a legal framework for the 
exceptions to the free movement of services in order to support audiovisual production in the EU, 
which can be achieved by means of an obligation to contribute to investment in European production. 
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The Court appreciated that there was a restriction on several fundamental freedoms that are 
guaranteed by the Treaty: freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment, the free movement 
of capital, and the freedom of movement for workers. Nonetheless, the Court considered that such a 
restriction may be justified when it serves to address reasons relating to the general interest, is suitable 
for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues, and does not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain it.  
By contrast, the Court established that the kinds of aids to the cinematographic industry that are the 
object of the procedure were not an advantage that was granted directly by the state or by a public or 
private body that is designated or established by the state, but is the result of general legislation 
requiring television operators, whether public or private, to earmark a percentage of their operating 
revenue for the pre-funding of European cinematographic films and films made for television. 
The ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, after the judgment of the European Court, highlights two 
important questions from recent years: 
1) The position and relationships between the High Courts of Justice of the Member States and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. After the judgment from the Court, in a 
preliminary ruling, it is still possible to challenge before the Constitutional Court any national 
law that transposes European law. 
2) The exceptions to the general prohibition of state aids. 
Furthermore, in my view, the position of the European Court in excluding from the state aids those 
obtained through private funding but which are imposed by law, means it is not easy to place in the 
frame of a general interdiction of state aids. 
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10.3. ELENA ROSALINOVA (THE SOFIA DISTRICT COURT) 
Misleading Advertising: “Praktiker” case 
Misleading advertising is a form of unfair competition under the Bulgarian Law on the protection of 
competition. In 2014, the National Competition Authority initiated proceedings against “Praktiker” – 
the owners of a chain of stores of the do-it-yourself (home improvement) type. Briefly, the facts are 
the following: 
In the autumn of 2013 the chain of do-it-yourself stores, “Praktiker”, launched an advertising 
campaign announcing it with the slogan:”- 22 % off everything”. The company used different types of 
advertisements to spread the promotion. They used a TV and radio spot to make the offer popular 
among the customers. On the radio spot, the promotion was announced as “-22 per cent off everything 
from 17th to 23rd November” with no additional information about the general conditions of the offer. 
The radio spot was broadcast 1,196 times on various radio stations all over the country. 
The TV spot presents an image of the logo of the company, “Praktiker”, and the text “-22% off 
everything”. On the bottom of the screen a text message appeared that passed across the TV screen 
with high velocity, so it is impossible for the human eye to read its content. The text is accessible only 
if the “pause” function is applied, provided that the TV device is set up with this available. The spot 
was broadcast 168 times on the channels that are managed by one of the national TV media, BTV. If 
the pause function is used the text message warns customers that the rebate is not applicable to stocks, 
to other promotional Articles and couldn’t be added to other rebates.  
The advertisement was also promoted on the web page and web store of “Praktiker” via the World 
WideWeb. The promotion and the rebate “-22 % of everything” are indicated on the web page with a 
banner. To be informed about the conditions of the promotion and the specific restrictions for its 
application, the average customer has to click on the banner and to be redirected automatically to a 
space reserved for the general condition of purchase. 
On site, in the stores, the promotion was made public with big posters in front of the store entrances 
and on big boards inside the store. The posters and the boards illustrating the promotion didn’t contain 
information about the general conditions of the offer and the restriction on the range of items to which 
it is applicable. The internal company policy and the market strategy of the company implement the 
use of different colours to indicate the difference between Articles that are included in a promotional 
offer and that are on sale, on the one hand, and those with regular prices, on the other. The colours of 
the board and of the labels vary: for stocks being sold at regular prices big white boards are used, and 
small yellow labels are put on the stand. Items with permanently low prices are indicated by big 
yellow boards and small yellow labels in a red frame. Promotional items, other than those with a 
permanently low price, are indicated by big red boards, and there are small red labels on the stand. All 
of these stocks are excluded from the promotion “-22 % of everything”, as well as stocks. The 
National Competition Authority and the Supreme Administrative Court observed that the average 
customer could be easily misled regarding both the value of the stock and the reductions in prices 
pointed out by the boards and labels in different colours but, at the same time, the customer is deprived 
of prior information about the significance of each colour and its correlation with the price of the 
stock. To be aware of the general conditions of the offer “-22% of everything” and the substance of 
the coloured labels and boards, the customer has to consult the general conditions on the web page or 
to solicit information from the staff in the store, which presumes diligence that he is not obliged to 
undertake, according to the principles of good trade practices. A similar observation was made by the 
Supreme Administrative Court about the text on the TV spot, which was produced at high velocity and 
which impedes the customers from reading it, namely, that the customer is not obliged to use the 
“pause” function on the TV to make the text visible, and this is all the more true, given that not all TV 
devices are furnished with this function. 
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Article 33, Par. 1 of the Bulgarian Law on the Protection of Competition defines misleading 
advertising as “any advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives, or is likely to 
deceive, the persons to whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and which, by reason of this, is likely 
to affect their economic behaviour or, for these reasons, damages or is likely to damage a competitor.” 
The Law on the Protection of Competition outlines three supplementary criteria about the misleading 
character of advertising: 
1. the characteristics of the goods and services, such as: their availability, appearance, execution, 
composition, method and date of manufacture of the goods or provision of the services, usage 
expiration date, ways of usage, quantity, geographical and commercial origin, the results to be 
expected from their use, the results and substantial features of tests or checks that are carried 
out on the goods or services; 
2. the price or the manner of its formation and the conditions on which the goods are supplied 
and the services provided; 
3. data about the advertiser or the advertising agency, such as: name or trade name, address or 
seat; address of management; property; industrial and intellectual property rights; awards or 
distinctions. 
In the present case, “Praktiker”, the Supreme Court stated that the advertising is treated as misleading 
because it has become public and reaches the customers and can, generally, mislead a significant 
sector of them. The advertisement is prima facie misleading with its message “-22 per cent off 
everything” which induces the delusion among customers who would logically associate the reduction 
of 22 percent with all the products that are offered in the Praktiker stores. The broadcast advertisement 
lay particular stress on the phrase “on everything” which attracts the attention of the customers and 
reflects on their perception and, finally, on their choice. The Court underlined that the price is one of 
the most important features of products in determining the consumer’s demand. The Court reiterates 
the conclusion of the Bulgarian Competition Authority of a breach of the rules of fair competition that 
is based on an imperative prohibition of misleading advertising. This activity is contrary to good faith 
business practices and harms fair competition, and it may also cause damage to competitors by 
exerting an influence on customers’ conduct.  
The relevance of the “Praktiker” case is in the complex nature of the rights that are affected by the 
infringement – both the rules of fair competition and consumers’ rights. According to Article of 6 of 
Directive 2005/29/EC of 11th May, 2005, concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market, and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 
98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), 
“commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if it contains false information and is therefore 
untruthful or in any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the average 
consumer, even if the information is factually correct, in relation to one or more of the following 
elements, and in either case causes or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he 
would not have taken otherwise”. As a resumé, the conditions are so attractive that the average 
consumer takes “a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise”, i.e., if he were 
aware of the mere conditions of the deal. The Commission on Consumer Protection also imposed a 
pecuniary sanction on “Praktiker” for the infringement of consumers’ rights, which was defined as 
misleading commercial practice.  
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10.4. VLADIMIR BEREZOVSKIJ (THE VILNIUS DISTRICT COURT) 
Case note on: 
Joint stock company (hereby referred to as - JSC) “AUTO EXPRESS” vs I.B. and JSC 
“TIROLA” 
Vilnius District Court Judgment No. 2-1322-431/2014, of 20
th
 June, 2014 
Lithuanian Court of Apeal Judgment No. 2A-183-516/2015, of 16
th
 April, 2015 
Lithuanian Supreme Court Judgment No. 3K-7-6-706/2016, of 5
th
 February, 2016 
1. This case deals with the interpretation and application issues relating to material legal norms 
regulating unfair competition and the repayment of damages. A civil claim due to damages that were 
related to the revealing of a trade secret, as well as actions relating to unfair competition, was 
submitted and based on Article 1.116 of the Civil Code (hereby referred to as – the CC), legal norms 
regulating civil liability owing to the competition law, and the above mentioned code.  
2. Article 15 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Competition stipulates a ban on unfair 
competition. Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of this Article prohibits any actions that are contrary to fair 
commercial practice and good custom when the said actions may compromise another legal entity’s 
opportunities to compete, including ... the use, transfer or publication of any information that 
constitutes another legal entity’s trade secret, without the consent of this legal entity ... Part 4 of the 
Article stipulates that persons who become aware of a trade secret due to an employment relationship 
or other contractual relationship with a legal entity, may use this information within no less than one 
year after the termination of the employment relationship or other contractual relationship, unless the 
law or the contract provide otherwise. 
3. In this case, the dispute started between JSC “AUTO EXPRESS” and I.B., as well as JSC 
“TIROLA”, because the latter attempted to gain unfair competitive advantage illegally through trade 
secret infringement. The plaintiff, JSC “AUTO EXPRESS”, asked for €185,469 of damages to be paid 
by the defendants, I.B. and JSC “TIROLA”, and in addition the interest and litigation costs. The 
plaintiff indicated that the company was established on 3
rd
 March, 2011, and the defendant, JSC 
“TIROLA”, on 22nd August, 2011. The activities of the companies are the transfer of cargos and 
logistics. The defendant, I.B., worked in the plaintiff’s company as a sales manager from 21st 
September, 2011, to 15
th 
March, 2012. She got to know the confidential information list, the 
management system for quality and the environment. She also signed confidentiality provisions, 
regarding the secrecy of the company’s trade, in the employment agreement (Items 9.4., 9.5.), on 21st 
September, 2011. The plaintiff used the above mentioned measures to protect the company’s 
confidential information. While working in the company, the defendant, I.B., disposed of the 
information about the plaintiff’s clients, cargos, the nature of orders, transfer prices, etc. This 
information is considered to form part of the plaintiff’s trade secretx. 
4. The defendant, I.B., started working at the defendant’s, JSC “TIROLA”, on 16th March, 2012, 
which then developed unfair competitive activity, i.e., while using the plaintiff’s trade secrets she 
provided analogous services for the clients of the plaintiff. For this reason, there was a decrease in the 
number of the plaintiff’s orders, as well as a fall in income from the clients A. K., Holwest Est OU, 
Hoi-Con GmbH, Perosha, Wal-mar, Globalply, DLH A.S., Interplus Services Ltd ., the S.C. Esprit 
Group, PFMK OOO, Technostar, Skipline Procesing OU, Biuro Handlowe GAMA, UAB Baltic tube 
services, Renox Sp.j., SC GalakoMert SRL, Diatomitovskij Kombinat OOO, Blockmile, Impuls 
GmbH, Skinest Baltija, EKO-HIT, Izopol, DLH Sverige AB, Mobel Sirche, Interkozha, Ziraks, DLH 
Nordisk, ACT Ltd ., S. A.  
During a 6 months period, while the defendant, I.B., was working at JSC “AUTO EXPRESS”, the 
plaintiff received €546 043 of income (from 21st September, 2011, to 15th March, 2012). When the 
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defendant, I.B., left the company, the income was only comprised of €272 849 (from 16th March, 
2012, to 15
th
 March, 2013). In this way, the defendants, while taking common illegal actions, caused 
€1,181,484 EUR of damages to the plaintiff (€819,236of non-received income and €362,247 EUR of 
income received by the defendant, JSC “TIROLA”). The plaintiff thus asked for €185 469 of damages 
to be awarded. 
5. On 20
th
 June, 2014, the Vilnius Regional Court reached a decision and did not satisfy the claim. 
It then divided the litigation coasts. The Court of First Instance indicated that there were no grounds 
for the information about t JSC “AUTO EXPRESS”’s clients being considered to be trade secrets. The 
court claimed that the trade secrets defined by the plaintiff do not correspond to the provisions of 
Article 1.116 of the CC, because the plaintiff defined the trade secret as everything related to the 
organisation and management of work.  
The Court stated that the following issues were not proven:  
- the defendant, I.B., revealed the trade secrets of the plaintiff, JSC “AUTO EXPRESS”; 
- the duties of the defendant, I.B., that were fullfilled at the defendant‘s, JSC TIROLA, had a 
competitive preferance over JSC “AUTO EXPRESS”;  
The Court indicated that the employment agreement on behalf of the defendant, I.B., did not deal with 
longer than a one year period (Paragraph 4 of Article 15 of the Competition Law, which states that an 
employee can make use of the information that is related to his work no sooner than a year after his 
dismissal). The decrease in the income does not prove the fact that the defendant, I.B., had revealed 
the trade secrets and provided analogous services for the clients of the plaintiff, because this 
circumstance is significant only when deciding upon the amount of damage caused.  
No non-competition agreement was concluded between the plaintiff and the defendant, I.B., and 
therefore the provision of similar services to the same clients cannot serve as a basis for the 
satisfaction of the claim. As the companies of the plaintiff and the defendant operate in a narrow 
market, both can carry out commercial transactions with the same market participants. 
6. JSC “AUTO EXPRESS” appealed the Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal. After the 
hearing, which took place on 16th April, 2015, the Court of Appeal overruled the previous Court 
decision and delivered a new judgment, whereby the claim was satisfied in part and the defendants 
were jointly ordered to pay €49,989.15 Eur in damages, which amounts to 5%, and the litigation costs, 
which were divided between them.  
On 16th April, 2015, upon examining the case as part of the appelate proceedings, the panel of 
judges of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania voided the decision that had been 
issued on 20th June, 2014, by the Regional Court of Vilnius and adopted a new decision whereby the 
claim was satisfied in part and the defendants were jointly and severally ordered to pay €49,989.15 in 
damages, and annual interest of 5% on the amount awarded by the Court from the date the proceedings 
were initiated until the full execution of the judgment, and the litigation costs were distributed 
accordingly.  
The Appelate Court ruled that the list of information that comprises the plaintiff’s trade secrets 
meets the provisions of Article 1.116 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff hadformulated the particular 
basis behind her demand – namely, that the information about her clients was divulged to the 
defendant, UAB “Tirola”, and was used by the said legal entity in an illegal manner. While working as 
a sales team leader, I. B. possessed detailed information that pertained to the plaintiff’s clients (their 
names, addresses, persons to be contacted on their behalf and their contact details, transportation 
routes and methods, solvency, and so forth).  
The expertise of the plaintiff’s company in the market for the services in question was greater than 
that of the defendant’s company, UAB “Tirola”. The trade secrets had been legitimately transferred to 
the plaintiff by another company, named UAB “Autostarto Grupe”, which belonged to the same 
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group. The other defendant is a company that began to perform economic and commercial activities to 
a far greater extent after I. B. was employed by them.  
Immediately after terminating the employment contract with the plaintiff, or, to be more precise, on 
the following day, the defendant, I.B., was employed by the company’s competitor.  
Taken separately, the fact that I. B. left the company to work for a competitor does not constitute a 
breach of the relevant legislation and does not incur civil liability, since she had not signed a non-
competition agreement. 
The defendant, UAB “Tirola”, contacted the plaintiff’s clients and offered them to cooperate on the 
grounds that it could offer more attractive terms than the plaintiff. The defendant took over those of 
the plaintiff’s clients who were the most solvent and used to place a large number of orders; at the 
same time, no attempt was made to attract clients on the blacklist. After I. B. left to work for the 
defendant UAB “Tirola”, the extensive cooperation between many of the clients and the plaintiff was 
reduced to a minimum, or else ceased altogether, while the clients who had not cooperated with the 
defendant, UAB “Tirola”, before began to do so in quite an extensive manner. 
The transfer of the orders from one company to the other, as well as the tendency to do so, indicate 
that the changes in question were not accidental, and were determined by an opportunity to use the 
information that constituted another legal entity’s trade secrets and which had previously been made 
available.  
The systematic overlap in the established factual circumstances leads one to the conclusion that the 
trade secrets had not only been disclosed, but had also been used. 
The panel of judges did not agree with the method proposed by the plaintiff for calculating 
unreceived revenue (the plaintiff considers losses to include any lost revenue) because there is no 
evidence that such revenue could reasonably have been expected. 
7. On 5th February, 2016, the enlarged panel of seven judges of the Civil Division of the Supreme 
Court of Lithuania issued an order that amended the decision issued on 16th April, 2015, by the panel 
of judges of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania with respect to the joint and several 
award of the damages from the defendants and the distribution of the litigation costs. 
The panel pointed out that trade secrets are objects of industrial property. As with any other objects 
of this property, trade secrets are an important instrument in relation to competition on the market. Part 
1 of Article 1.116 of the Civil Code defines the subject of a trade secret and it provides the criteria for 
information to be classified and stored as a company’s trade (industrial, commercial) secret. 
Moreover, the panel provided some further clarification on the explanations that the Court of 
Cassation had given in previous cases regarding the peculiarities of data protection actions that are 
aimed at maintaining a trade secret, pointing out that: ‘the measures intended to maintain a trade 
secret may not be too burdensome for private economic or commercial activity, or require a 
disproportionate amount of financial, human and other resources’. The more valuable the information 
that constitutes a specific trade secret, the more extensive an action the proprietor must take to protect 
this information in order for this protection to be recognised as reasonable. The panel also stated that 
information about an entity’s clients may be deemed a trade secret if this information possesses all the 
formal attributes of the latter: value, confidentiality, and the need for reasonable protection. If this be 
the case, it can be recognised as a trade secret and can be protected accordingly (see: order issued on 
22nd May, 2015, by the panel of judges of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in 
civil case Nr. 3K-3-317-916/2015). 
The Court decided that on 21st September, 2011, the appellant, I. B., and the plaintiff, UAB “Auto 
Express”, signed an employment contract under which the appellant was accepted for a position as a 
sales group manager. Paragraphs 9.4 and 9.5 of the employment contract set forth the employee’s 
obligation to protect the company’s trade secrets both during and after the employment relationship. 
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The client database that belonged to UAB “Auto Express” was password-protected, so the company 
had sufficient technical data protection for the data that was deemed to be a trade secret. The Court 
agreed with the Appellate Court’s decision, in that the information on the plaintiff’s clients met the 
requirements laid down in Part 1 of Article 1.116 of the Civil Code to the extent where it would be 
considered a trade secret. The obligation not to disclose any of the information that was deemed to be 
part of the plaintiff’s trade secrets was not limited to any particular term, therefore the legal provision 
which stipulates that this obligation is to last at least for one year was duly applied (Part 4 of Article 
15 of the Law on Competition). 
The appellant, UAB “Tirola”, employed the appellant, I.B., and several of the plaintiff’s other 
former employees, and knew that they were familiar with the plaintiff’s trade secrets and used the 
latter for business purposes, that is, in order to compete with the plaintiff. 
The Court pointed out that, first and foremost, Part 4 of Article 1.116 of the Civil Code differs from 
Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Article 15 of the Law on Competition in regard to the entities that are subject 
to the respective regulations – Part 4 of Article 1.116 of the Civil Code applies to all entities, whereas 
Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Article 15 of the Law on Competition applies only to independent economic 
entities. Secondly, these legal regulations are to be demarcated depending on whether or not there is an 
aim to compete – if there is no such aim, only Article 1.116 of the Civil Code shall apply, but if said 
aim is present, Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Article 15 of the Law on Competition shall also apply. In the 
present case, therefore, the civil liability of the appellant, I. B., is to be assessed according to the 
provisions of Article 1.116 of the Civil Code, while that of the appellant, UAB “Tirola”, is to be 
assessed both according to Article 1.116 of the Civil Code and ,Article 15 of the Law on Competition.  
The damages are manifested as the plaintiff’s loss of revenue and thus the corresponding unjust 
enrichment on the defendant’s part. 
The Court decided that the unreasonable amount of revenue not received by the plaintiff (€24 
186.58), which corresponds to the extent of the unjust enrichment, is to be awarded from UAB 
“Tirola”, which had received this profit. The remaining unreceived revenue that made it impossible to 
determine the separate elements of the obligation (€25,802,57 (€49,989.15 €24,186.58) is to be 
awarded from the defendants jointly and severally. 
Comment: This is a final cassation judgment in which the enlarged panel of seven judges of the 
Civil Division of the Supreme Court introduced some clarification on the complex question of the 
interpretation and application of data protection in the area of competition law and the repayment of 
damages. 
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